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ABSTRACT 
The World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
("ICSID") is frequently nominated for the resolution of investment disputes in 
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"). Despite this, investment treaty arbitration under 
ICSID has not been frequently used. In 2000-2001 the Republic of Argentina suffered 
a severe economic crisis. In the wake of this crisis over forty foreign investors 
instituted proceedings against Argentina before ICSID for breach of BIT obligations, 
with an estimated value of over US$30 billion (the "Argentine Cases"). This thesis 
examines the first awards in the Argentine Cases and assesses the impact of these 
awards on the future development of IC SID arbitration. 
Three major concerns arise from the analysis of the early awards. Firstly, the 
inconsistency between tribunals' interpretation and application of international law 
principles has resulted in conflicting awards regarding Argentina's key defence of 
necessity. Secondly, the Argentine Cases demonstrate that the limited procedural 
grounds for annulment available under ICSID pose significant challenges to the 
adequacy of the annulment procedure. This contributes to arguments for the 
development of an appeal facility for ICSID awards. Finally, Argentina's resistance 
to complying with ICSID awards in the Argentine Cases tests the compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms under ICSID and challenges Argentina's obligation to 
comply with its international obligations. The avoidance of obligations under ICSID 
awards may establish an unfavorable precedent of non-compliance in ICSID 
arbitration. 
The implementation of a response to these issues in the remaining Argentine Cases 
will have a significant impact on how the cases affect ICSID's development. The 
Argentine Cases have elevated awareness of ICSID and BIT protection, and will 
influence both states and investors in their assessment of the costs and benefits of 
allowing recourse to, or relying on, ICSID arbitration. This thesis argues that the 
impact of the Argentine Cases on the development of ICSID arbitration will depend 
on how the remaining Argentine Cases address the concerns raised in this thesis. 
Introduction 
Bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") are international agreements which establish the 
terms and conditions for foreign investment by nationals of one state in the state of the 
other. There are currently more that 2,500 BITs in force, involving the majority of states 
in the world. 1 BITs provide a number of guarantees and protections for foreign 
investment and are promoted as creating greater economic cooperation between states, 
while at the same time seeking to ensure a stable framework for investment. Nearly all 
BITs allow for dispute resolution by arbitration. The World Bank's International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") is often nominated for this purpose. 
Until recently ICSID's caseload has been limited to a handful of cases per year. As a 
result, BIT protection has been under-utilised and ICSID arbitration has, aside from the 
occasional dispute, gone untested. 
ICSID case numbers have undergone unprecedented growth in recent years, and in 2008 
there are 122 proceedings before ICSID.2 A third of these cases have been instituted by 
foreign investors against the Republic of Argentina in the wake of its economic crisis of 
2000-2001 (hereinafter the "Argentine Cases"). There are currently 42 cases pending 
against Argentina and the total amount claimed by investors is estimated at over US$30 
billion. 3 The aim of this thesis is to assess the impacts of the Argentine Cases on the 
development of IC SID arbitration. 
The Argentine Cases are the first significant body of cases to be arbitrated by ICSID. The 
cases are remarkably similar; they arise from the same factual background and contain 
virtually identical claims and defences. The similarity between the cases provides a 
1 Umted Nat10ns Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Recent Developments m lnternatzonal Investment 
Agreements (2006- June 2007) IIA Monitor No 3 (2007) at http·//www unctad org/en/docs/web1tena20076 en.pdf (9 
September 2008) 
2 ICSID List of Pending Cases - Last updated 22 October 2008 at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?reguestTvoe=GenCaseDtlsRH&act10nVal=L1stPendmg (23 October 
2008) 
3 C1b1hs A, "ICSID Bleeds Argentma" Multmatzonal Monitor Vol 26 (7-8) July/ August 2005 
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foundation from which to identify trends and discrepancies in ICSID arbitration, and 
constitutes a unique profile for examination. 
The Argentine Cases have been instituted under BITs signed by Argentina during the 
1990s as part of a wide economic reform and privatisation program. Like most BITs 
internationally, Argentina's BITs provide for recourse to ICSID in the event of a dispute. 
Argentina's economic reform and privatization program sought to eradicate inflation, 
privatize industry, deregulate the economy and remove trade barriers. Among the reforms 
implemented, Argentina adopted a currency board. This was an exchange rate regime that 
legally guaranteed the convertibility of the Argentine currency to the US dollar on a one-
to-one fixed exchange rate ("convertibility").4 Attracted by favourable investment 
conditions, including BITs and convertibility, foreign investors made large capital 
investments in Argentina, and in the 1990s Argentina emerged as one of the highest 
developing country recipients of foreign investment. 5 
Argentina was unable to enforce the disciplined economic polices it needed to support its 
growth, and its economic success was short lived. Government spending, tax evasion and 
corruption were high, and Argentina had a large public debt that it struggled to pay. 
While convertibility attracted foreign investment, it also increased Argentina's imports 
and damaged competitiveness in exports. These internal factors, coupled with an 
increasingly unfavourable international economic environment, saw Argentina's 
economy begin to slow. Towards the end of the 1990s it entered a period of prolonged 
recession which cumulated in the financial crisis of 2000-2001. 6 
Following a freeze on bank withdrawals introduced to stop a run on Argentine banks, 
social unrest in Argentina escalated. Public protests were widespread and included 
4 Law No. 23.928 Converflb1hty of the Australof27 March /1991, Boletm official de la Republzca Argentina, 27104, 
28 March 1991 (See candidate's citation note at Table oflnstruments) 
5 Chudnovsky D & Lopez A, Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in Argentina Working Group on 
Development and Environment in the Americas, Discussion Paper Number 12, April 2008, 8 
http://ase.tufts edu/gdae/Pubs/m/DP12Chudnovsky LopezApr08.pdf(15 September 2008) 
6 The factors leading to the financial crisis of2000-2001 are discussed m more detail at 1.3. See also Appendix 3 
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property destruction directed at government, banks and foreign privatized companies. A 
state of emergency was declared, and from 19 December 2001 to 1 January 2002 
Argentina was infamously governed by five presidents in two weeks. In an attempt to 
halt the crisis and aid Argentina's recovery the government enacted a series of measures, 
including ending convertibility. 
These measures impacted heavily on foreign investors in Argentina. Investors had relied 
on the regulatory framework in Argentina which granted long-term licenses and tariffs 
calculated in US dollars. In the wake of the crisis, tariff adjustments were temporarily 
suspended before being restructured into pesos, causing foreign investors to suffer 
considerable un-indemnified losses. Looking for a way to recoup losses without relying 
on Argentina's national legal system, foreign investors turned to the BITs signed by their 
home states and Argentina in the 1990s. To date, 42 investors have instituted ICSID 
arbitration proceedings against Argentina for breaches of BIT provisions resulting from 
the measures Argentina adopted during the crisis. 
This thesis critically analyses the first awards in the Argentine Cases and identifies three 
major issues as potentially having the greatest impact on the development of ICSID: 
firstly, the clear inconsistencies between early awards in the Argentine Cases on the 
question of Argentina's key defences of necessity; secondly, issues relating to the lack of 
a substantive review for ICSID awards; and finally, the potential challenges to 
compliance with ICSID award obligations by Argentina. 
The analysis of the Argentine Cases is conducted against a background of BITs and 
investment treaty arbitration under ICSID. This is followed by a summary of the 
circumstances of the Argentine crisis of 2000-2001. The analysis of the Argentine Cases 
adopts the sequential process of ICSID, and begins with a legal examination of the 
tribunals' awards in Chapter 2. The focus of this chapter is on the inconsistency between 
tribunals' interpretation and application of international law principles, which has 
resulted in conflicting awards regarding Argentina's key defence of necessity under both 
treaty and customary international law. The awards in CMS Gas Transmission Company 
3 
Introduction 
v The Argentine Republic7 (the "CMS Award") and LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital 
Corp, LG&E International Inc v The Argentine Republic8(the "LG&E Award") form the 
basis for this analysis. 
The divergent awards discussed in Chapter 2 lead to an examination of the review 
mechanisms under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention").9 In this context Chapter 3 
appraises the ad hoe committee's decision on annulment in CMS v Argentina (the "CMS 
Annulment Decision"). The chapter discusses the limited procedural grounds for 
annulment available under ICSID, and demonstrates how the identification of un-
reviewable errors in. the CMS Award underlines a perceived weakness in the IC SID 
annulment provisions. 
The final stage of the analysis ponders challenges to compliance with ICSID award 
obligations. Chapter Four discusses indications that Argentina will not comply with 
ICSID awards and assesses the strength of its challenges against the mechanisms for 
compliance, recognition and enforcement embodied in the ICSID Convention. It 
examines arguments for non-compliance developed outside the ICSID framework, 
starting with a challenge to the constitutionality of the ICSID Convention, followed by 
arguments to subject ICSID awards to a review by Argentina's national courts. The 
chapter examines the implications of Argentina's stance on the remaining Argentine 
Cases, its risk profile and future reliance on ICSID arbitration as an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
7 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/08 
8 LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v The Argentine Republzc ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/1 
9 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 (entered mto 
14 October 1966) 
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In the face of the present global economic uncertainty states are actively taking measures 
to stabilise their economies, including strategies to prevent a run on national banks. 10 
hnplicit in this instability is an increasing awareness of foreign investment protection. 
States and investors, now more than ever, need to clearly understand their obligations and 
options regarding investment protection, including the provisions of BITs and ICSID 
arbitration. The Argentine Cases will impact on these perceptions, influencing how states 
assess the costs and benefits of providing private investors access to ICSID arbitration. 
Investors too, are likely to draw lessons from the Argentine Cases and use them to test the 
utility of pursing I CS ID arbitration to enforce BIT protection of investments. 
This thesis concludes that in order for the Argentine Cases to positively impact on the 
growth and development of ICSID arbitration, the remaining Argentine Cases need to 
respond to the lessons drawn from the early cases. The correct consideration of public 
international law principles and consistency in awards will establish a coherent and 
consistent ICSID jurisprudence and increase confidence in the system. This in tum will 
minimise the effects of ICSID's limited annulment regime and provide less ammunition 
to Argentina to avoid compliance with its obligations. It is argued that if these concerns 
are not addressed in the remaining cases, a dark shadow may be cast over ICSID 
arbitration just as it gains momentum. 
Method 
Research for this thesis primarily involved the analysis of I CS ID awards in the Argentine 
Cases. This analysis was conducted against extensive research of both primary and 
secondary material related to the Argentine Cases. Twelve months of research were 
conducted in Argentina, where the candidate researched primary materials, including 
10 A number of states have drafted and/or passed bills to guarantee bank deposits m an effort to shore up mvestor 
confidence. States include: Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Denmark, Ireland, 
Germany and Greece: "Asian Governments Guarantee Bank Deposits" 17 October 2008, The Age 
http://news.theage.com.au/busmess/asia-govemments-guarantee-bank-deposits-20081017-5399.htrnl (23 October 2008) 
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legislation and case law, in addition to significant secondary material by way of legal 
journals, articles and journalistic reports. 
Scope 
The Argentine Cases are at an early stage. Out of forty two cases instituted, only seven 
awards have been awarded. One annulment decision has been made, four annulment 
decisions are pending and five cases have been settled. 11 Studying the Argentine cases at 
this early stage allows for key lessons to be drawn out early, the consideration of which 
may influence the impact the Argentine Cases will ultimately have on the development of 
ICSID arbitration. 
In addressing the aim of this thesis certain boundaries have been adhered to. Firstly, 
primary research for this thesis was concluded on 31 August 2008 and the analysis in this 
thesis relates to the law at that date. Proceedings are ongoing and since the research cut-
off date the decision in Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine Republic12 has 
been awarded. While it was not possible to include this award in my analysis, an initial 
reading of the award validates many of the arguments made in this thesis. It confirms the 
requirement for the application of principles of public international law and treaty 
interpretation relating to Argentina's defence of necessity, discussed in Chapter 2 and 
lends support to arguments relating to the value of the ad hoe committee's obiter dicta 
statements in the CMS Annulment Decision discussed in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, the thesis does not seek to provide a conclusive commentary on the political, 
social and economic consequences of the Argentine crisis in 2001-2002. It does not 
address the causes or effects of this crisis on Argentina or its people except insofar as 
they relate directly to the Argentine Cases. 
11 See Appendix I 
12 Continental Casualty v The Argentine Republzc ICSID Case No ARB/03/9 
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Thirdly, there is currently a strong trend in Latin America to move away from capitalism 
and free market economies. Any arguments in this thesis that allude to, or lend support to 
this stance, are limited to the development of ICSID, including the acceptance by states 
of ICSID as a dispute resolution system. This thesis does not seek to analyse changes to 
the political standing of Latin American states. 
Finally, any discussion of foreign investment cames with it the inherent imbalance 
between states seeking to attract investment and the home states of large corporations 
promoting that investment. These issues do not form part of the substantial discussion of 
this thesis. However, as concepts they are implicit in assessing how the Argentine cases 
are likely to influence state and investor behaviour. 
7 
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The Argentine Cases in Context 
1.1 Introduction 
In order to appreciate the impact of the Argentine Cases on the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), it is important to consider the cases in 
the appropriate context. The first section of this chapter consists of a brief background to 
the development of laws relating to foreign investment. It focuses on the development of 
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") and the referral of disputes to ICSID as the legal 
framework for the Argentine Cases. The chapter then discusses the factual background to 
the Argentine economic crisis. It begins by providing an overview of foreign investment 
in Argentina, before summarising recent developments in the Argentine economy, from 
the dramatic increase in foreign investment and spectacular economic growth during the 
early 1990s, to the rapid downturn in late 1998 to 2001. The chapter identifies the key 
events leading up to Argentina's economic crisis of 2000-2001 and discusses how those 
elements affected foreign investors in Argentina. This contextual discussion concludes 
with a brief overview of the Argentine Cases. A summary of the central claims and 
awards in those cases provides a springboard for the more detailed analysis in subsequent 
chapters. 
1.2 Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment involves a minimum of two states: the "home state" where investors 
maintain their nationality, and the "host state" where investments are physically located 
or where, in relation to intangible assets, the economic value of those assets is realised. 1 It 
1 Sornarajah M, The Intematwnal Law on Foreign Investment, znd Ed1t10n, Cambndge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004, 5. Trad1t1onally "home states" are ncher developed countries while host states, those receiving the investment, 
are poorer or developing states. The author acknowledges that this classification has exceptions, however because the 
Argentme Cases reflect this division, the terminology will be used throughout this thesis. 
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differs from other international business transactions, such as international trade, in that 
the foreign investment transaction is intrusive and typically involves ownership in a 
foreign state, intended to set up a long term relationship with a party in the host state, 
either with the state itself or with a state entity. Foreign investment is vital for economic 
development and prosperity.2 It allows host states to develop local industries and 
infrastructure and to recover funds from foreign investors. Meanwhile investors obtain 
financial returns and establish footholds in emerging developing economies.3 
1.2.1 Brief history of foreign investment laws 
During the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign investment was 
largely part of colonial expansion. The need for an international law on foreign 
investment in this period was perceived as minimal, and military force and diplomacy 
were the principal vehicles for protecting foreign investment.4 Decolonisation began 
during the twentieth century. This process saw the emergence of newly independent but 
economically underdeveloped states. Many of these states resented foreign control over 
production and interference in domestic affairs; as a result, they closed their doors to new 
foreign investment and began to nationalise existing property. 5 Developed countries had 
invested large amounts in many of these newly independent states while they were 
colonies, and governments were determined to protect the rights of their nationals who 
2 There is considerable conflict regarding the benefits of foreign investment on host states. To this extent benefits such 
as technology transfer to foreign affiliates and domestic firms, deeper and more lmkages with local enterpnses, higher 
exports, higher employment and upgraded skills need to be balanced agamst negative effects related to foreign 
mvestment, such as financial volatility, anti-competitive practices, abusive transfer prices, the crowdmg out of domestic 
firms and too much dependence on foreign ownership. See generally, Umted Nat10ns Conference on Trade and 
Development Issues Related to International Arrangements" TDIBICOM.2145 9 December 2002, par 9 at 
http·//www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d45 en.pdf (23 October 2008); "Foreign Direct Investment: A Lead Dnver for 
Sustamable Development" Towards Earth Summit Economic Bnefing Senes No. 1 at 
http://wwwstakeholderforum.org/fileadm1n/files/SF Bnefing Papers/bp FDI.pdf (23 October 2008) 
3 Franck S D, "The Legitimacy Cns1s in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pnvatlzmg Public Intemat10nal Law Through 
Inconsistent Dec1s10ns" (2005) 73 Fordham Law Revzew 1521, 1537 
4 Vandevelde K J, "A BnefHistory oflntematlonal Investment Agreements, Symposium: Romancing the Foreign 
Investor: BIT by BIT" (2005) 12 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157, 161 
5 Ibid, 166 
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had made these investments.6 Thus the protection of foreign investment emerged as a 
crucial concern. 
As the economic powers, most notably Great Britain and the United States, moved away 
from military protection, they turned to international legal standards to protect their 
investments. Rather than regulation by the host states' national laws, they claimed that 
foreign investment was to be accorded a minimum international standard, the most 
important aspect being the requirement for "prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation" in the event of expropriation. This standard was to become known as the 
"Hull Formula."7 
The "international" standard propounded by the economic powers attracted increasing 
dissent. Latin American countries refused to recognize an international standard, instead 
adhering to the "Calvo Doctrine", under which foreign investors were only entitled to the 
treatment that the host country afforded its own investors. 8 Middle Eastern states and 
Russia also resisted the "Hull Formula"; although conceding to some form of 
6 Von Moltke K & Mann H, Towards A Southern Agenda on International Investment. Discussion Paper on the Role of 
Intematwnal Investment Agreements International Institute for Sustamable Development, 3 at 
http.//www.nsd.org/pdf/2004/investment sa1.pdf (2 October 2008) 
7 The reqmrement of full compensat10n for expropnahon was most clearly articulated in the 1930s when it was 
challenged by the government ofMexico. Mexico confiscated various properties between 1915 and 1940. The United 
States, whose nat10nals suffered from these acts of expropriation, sought compensation for its affected citizens. In 
response to the takmgs by Mexico, the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, put forth what has become the 
leading formulation of the full compensation standard: 
The Government of the United States merely adverts to a self-evident fact when it notes that the applicable 
precedents and recogmzed authorities on internat10nal law support its declaration that, under every rule oflaw 
and eqmty, no government ts entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without prov1s10n 
for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore. 
See, Guzman A, Explammg The Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties· Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them, 
1997 at http://www.1eanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97 /97-12.html (2 October 2008) 
8 The doctnne ts named after Carols Calvo, an Argentme foreign mimster and jurist. In his writmgs Le Droit 
Intemaflonal (vol. 6, 5th ed., 1885) Calvo said: "Ahens who estabhsh themselves in a country are certamly entitled the 
same rights of protection as nationals, but they cannot claim any greater measure of protection"; Schreuer C, "Calvo's 
Grandchildren: the return oflocal remedies m mvestment arbitration" (2005) 4 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals I, 3 
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international rule, these states tended to uphold a lesser standard of "adequate" 
compensation. 9 
The emergence of the Soviet Bloc led by the former Soviet Union involved massive 
expropriation of foreign held assets. Its economic success at this time encouraged 
developing countries in the view that economic relations with the developed countries of 
Western Europe and North America would be inherently exploitative, and that the best 
path to economic development lay in extensive state regulation of the economy rather 
than the free market. w The collapse of this ideal would have the reverse effect some years 
later. 
The collective efforts of developing states' challenge to strict investment protection 
resulted in a series of declarations and resolutions in the United Nations General 
Assembly. In 1962 the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources11 
recognized a state's basic right to nationalise and freely exploit its natural resources. A 
1972 resolution moved further towards the Latin American view of domestic legal 
control over expropriation disputes, adopting national treatment as the only requisite 
standard. 12 Finally, in 1974 the General Assembly passed the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, which endorsed a state's right to freely regulate foreign investment 
and provided a set of standards to which capital exporting states and their investors were 
obligated to conform. 13 In addition to development of conflicting principles, home states 
9 Robbins J, "The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties" (2006) 13 University of Miami 
Intematwnal and Comparative Law Review 403, 411 
10 Vandevelde K J, above n4, 167 
11 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Umted Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVI!), 17 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) at htto://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/mstree/c2psnr.htm (20 Apnl 
2007) 
12 Umted Nations General Assembly Resolution 3041 (XXVII) endorsmg the Trade and Development Board's 
resolution 88 (XII) of October 19, 1972 that compensation natural resources nationahsat10n cases was to be fixed by the 
nationalizing state with Jurisdiction for such cases fallmg w1thm the sole 1unsd1ction of the nat10nalizmg country's 
courts See, Guzman A, Elkins Z & Simmons B, "Competmg for Capital: The Diffusion ofBtlateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000 (2005) paper 31 presented at American Law & Economics Assocwtwn Annual Meetings, 4 
13 Umted Nations General Assembly Resolutton 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974); Vandevelde K J, above n4, 168 
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were subject to a series of under-compensated expropriations of foreign investments 
around the world. 14 
1.2.2 Bilateral investment treaties 
In response to the eroding consensus on the development of international law principles 
regarding foreign investment law and the threat of uncompensated expropriation, 
developed countries created an instrument to protect investment in a more effective and 
less controversial manner, the BIT. 15 BITs provide parties with the opportunity to set out 
norms that apply to investments in each other's territory. 16 Although countries negotiate 
BITs individually, they are usually similar in organisation and content and the terms are 
usually dictated by traditional home states which hold the capital for the investment. 17 
BITs exhibit two fundamental innovations: they provide a series of substantive rights to 
investors aimed at securing foreign investment and stabilizing the host states investment 
climate; 18 and they offer investors direct remedies to address violations of those 
substantive right through arbitration on a state-to-state or investor-to-state basis. 19 
The substantive rights of BITs typically involve the following: 20 (1) the payment of 
adequate compensation following expropriation of investments; (2) the free flow of 
capital, including a right to repatriate profits and other investment-related funds; (3) a 
14 These mcluded the nat10nahsatlon of British oil assets by Iran m 1951, the expropriation ofLiamco's concessions m 
Libya m 1955, the nationalisation of the Suez by Egypt m 1956 and the nationalisation of sugar interests by Cuba m the 
l 960's; Guzman A, Elkms Z & Simmons B, above nl2, 3-4 
15 Wong J, "Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between 
Developing and Developed Countnes m Foreign Investment Disputes" (2006) 14 George Mason Law Review 135, 141 
16 SomaraJah M, above nl, 213 
17Th1s 1s due m part to the large number of mvestment treaties based on model BITs which often use common sources, 
such as the 1967 Organzzationfor Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Draft Conventwn on the 
Protectwn on Foreign Property; Vandevelde K J, "The economics ofbilateral investment treaties" (2000) 41 Harvard 
Intematwnal Law Journal 469, note 3. See also, Von Moltke K & Mann H, above n6, 4 
18 Franck S D, above n3, 1529 
19 Von Moltke K & Mann H, above n6, 6 
20 See generally Franck S D, above n3, 1531-1532 & Von Moltke K & Mann H, above n6 
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guarantee of national treatment21 and sometimes a promise to treat states as favourably as 
other foreigners, the most~favoured-nation ("MFN") provision;22 (4) the promise of fair 
and equitable treatment; ( 5) the promise of full protection and security to an investment; 
( 6) a guarantee of minimum international standards of treatment; and (7) an agreement to 
honour all other commitments regarding an investment (the "umbrella clause").23 
Initially states were slow to sign BITs. From 1959 to 1969 only 75 BITs were concluded, 
fewer than seven per year. This increased slightly from 1970 to 1979 to just over nine per 
year.24 The 1980s and 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the conclusion of BITs, and by 
the end of 2006 the number of BITs had reached 2,573.25 Today the BIT is one of the 
most widely used international agreements for protecting and influencing foreign 
investment26 and over 170 countries are party to at least one BIT.27 
The rapid rise in BITs in the 1980s and 1990s can be attributed to two main factors, the 
global victory of market ideology, and the lack of alternative sources of capital available 
to the developing world.28 The rise of free market economies associated with the Reagan 
government in the United States and the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom 
gave a vigorous push to the liberalization of investment regimes. 29 This drew support 
21 Meanmg mvestors cannot be treated worse than the state's own citizens. 
22 A MFN prov1s10n enables mvestors to profit from more favourable provisions given to nationals of third states. The 
leadmg case of Emilio Agustin Maffez1m v Kingdom of Spam IC SID Case No ARB/9717 held that a foreign mvestor 
protected by an mvestment treaty with an MFN proV!sion was able to rely on the better dispute resolution provisions in 
a treaty made by the respondent with a third state. 
23 An umbrella clause is designed to allow for a breach of any relevant investment contract to be resolved under treaty 
m an mtemat10nal forum. It requires that each state observe all mvestment obligations it has assumed. The clause 
bnngs otherwise independent mvestment agreements under the treaty's umbrella of protection; Wong J, above nl 5, 143 
24 Vandevelde K J, above n4, 172 
25 Umted Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in International Investment 
Agreements (2006- June 2007) IIA Momtor No. 3 (2007) at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/web1teiia20076 en.pdf (9 
September 2008) 
26 Guzman A, Elkms Z & Simmons B, above nl 2, 4 
27 Vandevelde K J, above n4, 184 
28 Somara1ah M, above nl, 215 
29 The Washmgton Consensus 1s evidence of the widespread acceptance of these ideals. See below n76 and 
accompanymg text. 
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from the evident success of several Asian economies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
which adopted liberal attitudes to foreign investment, compared to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the failure of other developing countries that had operated under more 
restrictive models. 30 This comparison lessened hostility to foreign investors and a market 
economy. The overall decrease in the developed world's provision of traditional 
development assistance during the 1980s was also a contributing factor. With foreign 
investment as one of the only sources of capital available for economic development, 
developing countries had little alternative but to liberalise their investment regimes, 
accepting the BIT regime in order to attract this investment.31 The influence of these 
factors on developing states to sign BITs was based on a strong presumption by host 
states that signing BITs would increase inward flows of foreign investment.32 
1.2.3 Resolution of foreign investment disputes in international law 
Traditionally, foreign investment disputes had no way of overcoming the lack of legal 
personality held by a private person at international law. Despite the presence of a BIT, 
an individual lacks legal standing at international law. This meant that any legal action 
taken in relation to an investment is limited to actions available under the national laws of 
30 Vandevelde K J, above n4, 177 
31 Somarajah M, above nl, 274 
32 The hypothesis that BITs attract foreign mvestment has been widely questioned. For example 80 percent of foreign 
mvestment from the US 1s directed at three countnes: Mexico, China and Brazil. The US has an investment agreement 
with Mexico (the North American Free Trade Agreement), however 1t has no agreement with either China or Brazil. 
See Stanley L & Mortimore M, "Obsolescencm de la proteccion a los inversores extranJero despues de la cnsis 
argentina" Rev1sta de la CEPAL, Apnl 2006, 24 
Commentators argue that factors such as market size and stability and the ava1lab11ity of natural resources can have a 
greater influence than investment agreements m attractmg foreign investment. Others acknowledge that the impact of 
BITs will depend on the level ofnsk the importing state poses to mvestments w1thm its state. See, eg, Tobin J & Rose-
Ackerman S, "Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developmg Countries: the Impact of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties" William Davidson Institute Working Paper No 587, 13 November 2003, at 
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrarv/Collect10ns/WorkmgPapers/wdmum.htm (20 October 2008); Hallward-
Dnemeier M, "Do bilateral mvestment treaties attract FDI? Only a b1t...and they could bite" Pohcy Research Working 
Paper 3121 The World Bank Development Research Group, Investment Clzmate, August 2003; Von Moltke K & Mann 
H, above n6, 7 
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the host state, or to protective actions of its home state's diplomatic protection under 
international law. 33 
Diplomatic protection is a mechanism designed to secure reparation for injury to the 
national of a State premised largely on the principle that an injury to a national is an 
injury to the State itself. The International Law Commission has recently completed its 
codification of the principles of the customary international law of diplomatic 
protection.34 The mechanism for a home state to protect its investors is "espousal", 
namely the assumption by a state of an injured person's claim as is its own and presenting 
it against the state that has injured the national in an international court or tribunal.35 The 
shortcomings of diplomatic protection are well known: the need to exhaust local remedies 
before resort can be made to an international claim; the restrictive rules on nationality of 
the legal person and the difficulties surrounding this for multinational corporations, 
shareholders and other legal entities.36 There is no enforceable obligation for a home state 
to exercise diplomatic protection, nor does an individual legal entity have any control 
over the claim, which leaves the home state free to settle on any terms it chooses and with 
no guarantee the state will pass on any benefits gained from the settlement to the 
investor.37 While the built-in deterrents of exercising diplomatic protection in terms of the 
potential for collateral diplomatic fall-out in doing so and the fact that the existence of a 
claim to diplomatic protection did not necessarily mean that a forum would be available 
in which the dispute could be resolved, still less did it ensure that any award which was 
rendered would be enforceable. For example, the only enforcement tool available under 
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the enactment of a Security Council 
33 Von Moltke K & Mann H, above n6, 30 
34 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentanes'', A/61/10 Yearbook of 
the lnternatwnal Law Commission, Vo! II, Part Two, 2006 at 
http://untreaty.un.org/Jlc/texts/instruments/enghsh/commentanes/9 _ 8 _ 2006.pdf (30 June 2009) 
35 Vandevelde K J, above n4, 160 
36 Intemat1onal Law Comm1ss10n, above n34 
37 Ibid 
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Resolution, a limited remedy when an investor seeks financial compensation.38 Investors 
are also limited by the fact that recourse to the ICJ is only available to states which are a 
member of the United Nations.39 
1.2.4 Investment treaty arbitration under ICSID 
One of the most important components of modem foreign investment law is the 
mechanism created to remove investment-related disputes from the political realm, 
dependent on espousal and diplomacy, to the legal realm through arbitration.40 The 
inclusion of arbitration provisions in BITs was prompted by the conclusion of the IC SID 
Convention in 1965.41 The ICSID Convention was formulated by the Executive Directors 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and it 
established the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.42 
The provision for ICSID arbitration of investment disputes in BITs has become a 
permanent feature of foreign investment. This is illustrative of its growing status among 
states. The ICSID Convention currently has 155 Contracting States43 and, of the current 
BITs currently in existence, more than 1,500 provide for ICSID as a forum for the 
settlement of investment disputes.44 There is a general consensus among commentators 
38 Franck S D, above n3, 1537 
39 See, http.//www 1c1-c11 orghc1wwwhcjhome.htm 
40 Robbms J, "The Emergence of Positive Obligations m Bilateral Investment Treaties" (2006) 13 University of Miami 
International and Comparative Law Review 403, 414 
41 The IC SID Convention was submitted to prospective member states for signature on 18 March 1965 and entered into 
force on 14 October 1966. The provisions of the ICSID Convent10n are complemented by rules. The ICSID Convention 
article 6(1)(a)-(c) estabhshes ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitratwn Proceedings (Arbztratwn Rules) and ICSID 
Rule of Procedure for Concilzatwn Proceedings (Conc1/iatwn Rules) 
42 ICSID Convention, article 1 
43 List ofContractmg States and other signatories of the Convention (as of November 4 2007) ICSID/3 at 
http://ics1d.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= ICSIDDocRH&action Val=ContractmgStates&ReqFrom= 
Mam (9 September 2008) 
44 Dafimo R, "Openmg Remarks of the OECD/ICSID/UNCTAD SYMPOSIUM" Making the most of International 
Investment Agreements· a Common Agenda Pans, France, 12 December 2005 
There are other methods of dispute resolution and BITs usually offer the ch01ce between two or more options for 
international arbitration. Typically the choice will be between ICSID arb1trat10n on the one hand and a tnbunal 
operating under the rules of the United Nations Commisswn on lnternatwnal Trade Law Arbitration Rules 
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that over half of investment treaty disputes are referred to ICSID,45 although 
confidentiality issues preclude a definitive figure.46 
The increase in the volume of foreign investment m recent decades from some 
US$299,598 million in 1990 to $1,215,789 million in 200647 has coincided with an 
increasing number of foreign investment disputes. A decade ago, ICSID had a caseload 
of five pending cases for an aggregate amount of US$15 million; in October 2008 122 
cases were pending48 and the cases against Argentina alone are estimated at over US$30 
billion.49 Current data indicates that at least 73 states have faced investment treaty 
arbitration as defendants. Argentina tops this list with 46 claims lodged against it.50 
The ICSID Convention established ICSID as an autonomous international institution.51 
Its purpose is to resolve investment disputes by means of two different procedures; 
conciliation and arbitration. 52 IC SID itself does not engage in the task of conciliation or 
arbitration, this is the task of the Conciliation Commission and the Arbitral Tribunal 
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) the Internatzonal Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (entered mto force 1 
January 1998) (ICC Arbitration Rules) or theArbitratwn Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, (entered into force January 2007). See, Franck S D, above n3, 1541 
45 See, Franck S D, above n3, note 78 
46 In 2007 the total number of known mvestment treaty cases reached 290. The majority of these disputes were filed 
with ICSID ( 182), with the remamder filed with UNCITRAL (80), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (14), the ICC 
(5) and ad hoe arbitration (5). A further case was filed with the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
arbitration, and another was admm1stered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement IIA Momtor No. 1 (2008) 
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3 at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/1teiit200511 en.pdf (9 September 2008) 
47 Umted Nations Conference on Trade and Development, WIR Annex tables# 12 Outward foreign znvestmentflows, 
by Host Regzon and Economy, 1970-2006, 10110107 at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemID=3277&Jang=1 (9 September 2008) 
48 ICSID List of Pendmg Cases - Last updated 22 October 2008 at 
http· //ics1d. worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?reguestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&action Val=L1stPending (23 October 
2008) 
49 Cib11is A, "ICSID Bleeds Argentina" Multinational Monitor Vol 26 (7-8) July/August 2005 
50 42 of these cases make up the Argentine Cases. 
51 ICSID Convention, articles 18-24 
52 ICSID Convention, article 1(2). This thesis will only deal with the arb1trat1on procedure. 
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respectively, which are constituted pursuant to the ICSID Rules for the purpose of 
adjudicating investment disputes.53 
ICSID arbitration proceedings are instituted with a request for arbitration by one party, 
addressed to the Secretary General. 54 Jurisdiction of the IC SID Convention is based upon 
article 25(1) of the Convention, which states in relevant part: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their 
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally ... 
Jurisdiction can be broken into four basic elements: (1) the dispute must arise from an 
investment; (2) the dispute must be a legal dispute; (3) one party must be a Contracting 
State or a designated subdivision thereof, and the other party must be a national of 
another Contracting State; and (4) both parties must have consented on writing.55 
Though the concept of "investment" is central to the ICSID Convention, it leaves the 
term undefined. The parties must therefore define what kinds of investments they wish to 
bring to ICSID. A clause in an investment contract referring a dispute to ICSID is 
considered a strong indication that the parties considered their transaction an 
investment.56 Where consent to jurisdiction is based on a BIT, no inference can be drawn. 
In these cases the BIT usually contains a definition of "investment". As a general rule, the 
definition of investment is introduced by a broad general description followed by a non-
exhaustive list of typical rights. It usually includes traditional property rights, 
participation in companies, money claims and rights to performance, intellectual and 
industrial property rights, and concessions or similar rights.57 This approach has allowed 
53 In this sense, references m this paper to "ICSID award(s)" are for convemence only. 
54 ICSID Convention, articles 28 & 36 
55 MacKenzie G W, "ICSID arb1trat10n as a strategy for levelmg the playmg field between international non-
govemmental organizations and host states" ( 1993) 19 Syracuse Journal of lntematwnal Law and Commerce 197, 222 
56 Schreuer C, The /CSID Convention. A Commentary Cambndge Umversity Press, Cambridge, 2001, 126, pars 92-104 
57 Ibid, 129 par 99 
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ICSID to give a broad interpretation of the term and allowed ICSID to hear disputes 
arising from contracts to provide managerial services, to train sailing crews and to 
construct low income housing. 58 
As with all arbitral institutions, consent is the "cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the 
Centre".59 The most obvious method for consent is on the basis of an arbitration clause in 
the foreign investment contract. State consent is also widely accepted as being contained 
in the BIT itself through the dispute resolution clause, which is generally understood to 
constitute a unilateral offer by a state to settle a dispute by arbitration, which investors 
accept by instituting arbitration proceedings.60 
Generally BITs provide a clause referring disputes concerning the investment of an 
investor in the territory of the host state to IC SID arbitration. Despite this the majority of 
BITs contain no specific provisions indicating the nature of disputes to be submitted to 
ICSID; whether only disputes for breach of a BIT, or whether it extends to the resolution 
of disputes for breach of contract or local law.61 The ambit of protection given by a BIT 
will depend on the agreements between the parties under either treaty or contract or 
both.62 
The ICSID process follows a relatively standard set of procedures including: (1) 
submitting a notice of dispute to the State; (2) complying with applicable waiting periods; 
58 MacKenzie G W, above n55, 225 
59 ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors of the Internatwnal Bank for Reconstructwn and Development on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Natwnals of Other States (1965) 4 ILM 524, 
23 cited m SomaraJah M, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law Intematmnal, The Netherlands, 
2000,208 
60 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No ARB/84/3 (Dec1s10n on 
Junsdictton); Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka ICSID Case No 
ARB/87/3; 30 ILM 577 (1991) holdmg that a dispute resolution provtsion ma BIT submitting future disputes to ICSID 
was sufficient to constttutejurisd1ctton. See, Franck S D, above n3, 1542-1543. For a detailed d1scuss10n on the 
controversial nature of constructmg consent m tlus manner see Somarajah M, above n59, 208-222 
61 McLachlan C, Shore L & Weiniger M, International Investment Arbitration, Oxford Umversity Press, 2007, 46- 47 
62 The line between treaty and contract claims will depend, among otlter factors, on the existence or otherwise of an 
"umbrella clause". An umbrella clause extends the scope of BIT protection to specific undertakmgs entered into by 
contract or otherwise with mvestors of the oilier contracting state, bnngmg those undertakmgs under the "umbrella" of 
BIT protection. It should be noted that not all BIT claims are based on contract; Ibid, Part II, Guzman A, above n7, 7 
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and (3) electing where to resolve the dispute. The next significant step is the appointment 
of the tribunal. Parties have considerable freedom regarding the constitution of the 
tribunal, and any agreements as to the number of arbitrators and the method of their 
appointment is to be communicated to ICSID. ICSID maintains a Panel of Arbitrators,63 
but parties may appoint arbitrators from outside this Panel, provided the appointee(s) 
possess the qualities prescribed by article 14(1).64 In the absence of agreement, the 
designated tribunal consists of three arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties. The 
President of the tribunal is appointed by agreement between the parties or, where 
agreement is lacking, by the Chairman of the World Bank. 65 
Investment treaty arbitration is based on a strong presumption of confidentiality. ICSID is 
considered to have greater transparency than other international arbitration institutions, 
principally because it maintains a public list of all cases being arbitrated before it. ICSID 
will not publish an award without the consent of the parties, but it is required to publish 
its "legal reasoning". 66 In practise almost all IC SID awards are made public by one of the 
parties. 67 The actual proceedings and related documents of I CS ID arbitration, including 
pleading and evidence, are closed to the public. 68 
63 ICSID Convention, article 3. See also ICSID Convent10n, articles 12-16 which outline the manner and terms of the 
des1gnat1on of the Panel of Arbitrators 
64 As required by ICSID Convention, article 40(2). ICSID Convention, article 14(1) reqmres arbitrators to be ofhigh 
moral character and to have recognized competence m the fields oflaw, commerce, mdustry or finance 
65 ICSID Convention, articles 37 & 38 
66 ICSID Convention, article 48(5) provides: 
The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. 
Arb1trat10n Rules rule 48(4) reiterates article 48(5) and provides: 
... the Centre shall, however, promptly mclude m its publications excerpts of the legal reasomng of the 
Tribunal. 
This has no direct 1mplicat10n on the parties to proceedmgs but is relevant when considering ICSID's contribution to 
the development ofmtemational law pnnc1ples. 
67 Evidenced by the relative number of awards pubhshed at www.worldbank.org/icsid 
68 Peterson L, "Research Note: Emerging Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustamable Development" Editor-
lnvest_SD News Bulletin Intemat10nal Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2006. The Arb1trat10n Rules 
articles 6, requires arbitrators to sign a form promising to keep all mformat10n confidential 
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1.3 Foreign Investment and the Argentine Economy 
The Argentine Cases arose out of, or in connection with, a severe economic cns1s 
suffered by Argentina in 2001-2002. In order to properly understand the Argentine Cases, 
it is important to have a clear understanding of the background to foreign investment in 
Argentina, including the massive push for foreign investment in the 1990s. It is also vital 
to provide a clear overview of events leading up to Argentina's economic crisis in 2000-
2001 and the measures taken by Argentina which constitute the basis for claims in the 
Argentine Cases. This section provides this context, beginning with an overview of 
Argentina's history of foreign investment, followed by a discussion of its economic 
success under a privatisation regime in the early 1990s, and the deterioration of the 
country's performance in the second half of 1998.69 
1.3.1 History of foreign investment in Argentina 
Foreign investment played a key role in Argentina's modem history. From the 1860s to 
the 1930s foreign investment from the United Kingdom in rail, agricultural exports, 
public utilities and banking were particularly important.7° Foreign investment decreased 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s and did not revive until the Desarrollista 
(developmentalist) government of President Frondizi in 1958.71 Frondizi launched an 
ambitious industrialization program which relied on foreign investors as key participants. 
Increasing concerns about the presence of foreign investors in Argentina, and their share 
of market power, led governments of the late 1960s and 1970s to restrict and control 
foreign investors' activities in Argentina.72 This trend was reversed by the military 
dictatorship which took office in 1976. As part of a pro-market reform, the dictatorship 
69 See also, Appendix 3 for a detailed chronology of events pertaining to the Argentme Cnsts. 
7° Chudnovsky D & Lopez A, Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development m Argentina Working Group on 
Development and Environment m the Americas, D1scuss10n Paper Number 12, Apnl 2008, 4 at 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP12Chudnovsky LopezApr08.pdf (15 September 2008) 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibtd. 
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passed the Foreign Investment Act,73 which saw a shift from a policy of control of foreign 
investment to its promotion. The Act eliminated all general restrictions on foreign 
investment, guaranteeing equal rights and obligations to foreign and local investors 
(national treatment), authorising the calculation of used capital goods and immaterial 
assets as equity capital, and guaranteeing the free remittance of profits and principal.74 
Despite this, foreign investment inflows were not significant during the military 
government; it was not until the late 1980s, when democracy was restored, that more 
significant changes to foreign investment regulation occurred. 
1.3.2 Economic evolution: privatisation and convertibility 
The 1980s in Argentina were characterised by deep recession, hyperinflation and banking 
collapses, which collectively destroyed domestic and international confidence in the 
Argentine currency and government economic policy. In 1989 Carlos Menem was elected 
as Argentina's president. Menem set out to reverse the economic decline of the country. 
His administration's policy centred on high growth and low inflation, implemented by 
disciplined macroeconomic policies and market-orientated structural reform, 75 which 
closely followed the ideals of the Washington Consensus.76 Among other things, the 
73 Foreign Investment Act, Law 21 3 82 of 12 August 1976, Boletin Oficzal de la Republica de Argentina, 19 August 
1976 
74 A small number of restrict10ns enacted by specific leg1slat10n continued to exist in certain sectors. Bouzas R & 
Chudnovsky D, Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, "Fore1gu D1rect Investment and Sustamable Development. The Recent 
Argentina Expenence" Univers1dad de San Andres Victoria (Argentma) 2005, part 3(a) 
75 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Policy Development and ReVIew Department Lessons from the Crisis zn 
Argentina 8 October 2003, 6 
76 The Washington Consensus was first presented in 1990 to descnbe a relatively specific set often economic pohcy 
prescriptions considered to constitute a sta!Mard reform package promoted for cns1s-racked Latin Amencan countnes 
by Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and US Treasury Department: 
Fiscal Discipline 
Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities to basic health and education and infrastructure 
Tax Reform to combme a broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates 
Liberalizing Interest Rates 
A Competitive Exchange Rate 
Trade Liberalzzation 
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government sought the eradication of inflation, the privatisation of industry, the 
deregulation of the economy, openness to foreign investment and the removal of trade 
barriers. 
a) Privatisation 
To achieve these objectives, the government began an active programme of privatizing 
state assets. Privatisation commenced in 1989 and was developed through changes to the 
governing legal and regulatory framework of foreign investment. Chapter IV of the 
Economic Emergency Act77 brought new flexibility to foreign investment by eliminating 
authorization requirements in the information, telecommunication and electronic 
sectors.78 That year also saw the enactment of the State Reform Act,79 which provided the 
basic legal framework for the privatisation process and governed the transfer of the 
majority of public sector firms to the private sector, in areas as diverse as 
telecommunications, ports, energy, airlines, railways, electricity generation and 
distribution, and sanitation. 80 The government lifted the ban on new exploration and 
Openness to Foreign Direct Investment 
Privatisation of State Enterpnses 
Deregulatwn on bamer to entry and exit or restrictmg compet1tlon 
Property Rights 
Williamson J, "A Short History of the Washmgton Consensus" Semor Fellow, Institute for International Economics 
Paper comm1ss10ned by Fundaci6n CIDOB for a conference From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global 
Governance Barcelona, September 24-25, 2004 at http://www.he.com/pubhcat1ons/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf (15 
September 2008) 
77 Economic Emergency Act, Chapter IV Foreign Investment Regime, Law 23697of15 September 1989, Boletzn 
Oficzal de la Republzca Argentina, 25 September 1989 
78 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 3(a) 
79 State Reform Act, Law 23.696of18 August 1989, Boletin Oficial de la Republzca Argentina, 26702, 23 August 1989 
Within tlus broad framework specific instruments were enacted to govern the pnvat1sation of the mam industries. For 
example in the Gas Industry the Gas Law (Law 24.076 of7 July 1991 on tlie Regulation ofNatural Gas, Boletin Oficzal 
de la Republica Argentzna, 12 July 1992; tlie Gas Decree (Decree 1738/92of18/ September 1992 which regulates the 
transportation and distribution of natural gas as a pubhc service, pnces, import-export, enforcement authority of the law 
and general pohcy principles apphcable to the privatized company prov1dmg natural gas, Boletin Oficial de la 
Republzca Argentina, 28 September 1992 and Gas Decree (Decree 2255/92 of2 December 1992 which provides for 
the regulation oftransportat10n and distnbution of natural gas, Boletzn Ojiczal de la Republzca Argentina, 7 December 
1992) 
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exploitation licences on mining, petroleum and natural gas production, and deregulated 
the internal and external trade in crude petroleum and fuels. 81 Foreign investors were 
given national treatment for all incentives enjoyed by nationally-owned firms and were 
guaranteed free remittance of profits and capital. 82 
b) Convertibility 
With the deregulation of foreign investment came the cornerstone ofMenem's economic 
reform, convertibility. 83 Convertibility was a type of currency board under which the 
Argentine currency was fixed to the United States dollar. The regime entailed that the 
national currency, the peso, 84 was freely convertible with the United States dollar at an 
exchange rate of one-to-one. The system required the central bank to keep enough dollars 
or gold in reserve to back the total amount of pesos that had been printed. This prevented 
the government from creating unbacked currency or "running the printing press", and 
thus limited inflation. 85 The aim of convertibility was to contribute to the integrity of the 
monetary system and foster the stability necessary for business and investors. As 
described by the IMF in 2004: 
The Convertibility Law, which pegged the Argentine currency to the U.S. dollar in April 
1991, was a response to Argentina's dire economic situation at the beginning of the 
1990s. Following more than a decade of high inflation and economic stagnation, and after 
several failed attempts to stabilize the economy, in late 1989 Argentina had fallen into 
hyperinflation and a virtual economic collapse [ ... ] The new exchange rate regime, which 
operated like a currency board, was designated to stabilize the economy by establishing a 
hard nominal peg with credible assurances of non reversibility. The new peso (set equal 
81 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 3(a) 
82 Temporary restnct10ns could be enforced for balance of payments purposes, this occurred in December 2001. Bouzas 
R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 3(a) 
83 Convert1b1/ity of the Austral, Law 23.928 of 27 March 1991, Boletm official de la Republica Argentina, 27104, 28 
March 1991 Convertibility was mtroduced by Menem's Mmister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo, who was 
appointed m early 1991 after the Menem admmistration 's unsuccessful attempts to stabilise the economy 
84Changes to denominatwn and value of currency, Decree 2128/91 of 10/10/199, Boletm official de la Repubbca 
Argentina, 17 October 1991 changed the denommatton and value of the national currency into pesos at one peso for 
each 10,000 Australes, it also established the panty of one peso to one dollar. 
85 For an in depth analysis of the Argentine convert1bihty regime and its differences from an orthodox currency board 
see Hanke S & Schuler K, "What went wrong m Argentina" (2002) 12(3) Central Banking Journal, 43 
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to 10,000 australes) was fixed at par with the U.S. dollar and autonomous money creation 
by the central bank was severely constrained, though less rigidly than in a classical 
currency board. The exchange rate arrangement was part of a larger Convertibility Plan, 
which included a broader agenda of market-oriented structural reforms to promote 
efficiency and productivity in the economy. Various service sectors were deregulated, 
trade was liberalized, and anti-competitive price-fixing schemes were removed; 
privatisation proceeded vigorously, notably in oil, power, and telecommunications, 
yielding large capital revenues. 86 
Convertibility led to the "dollarization" of the economy in the sense that contracts, 
especially long term contracts, were expressed in dollars rather than pesos, and bank 
deposits were opened and maintained in dollars.87 
1.3.3 International reform by Argentina 
In addition to unilateral domestic policy reforms, the Argentine government was an active 
participant in international negotiations dealing with foreign investment. This contributed 
to the development of investor confidence towards Argentina. 
Argentina adopted an investor friendly stance in relation to its international agreements 
including ratification of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards,88 commitments in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS),89 a pro-foreign investment approach to the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS),90 and several regional agreements with MERCOSUR 
86 !MF, The !MF and Argentina, 1991-200j, [Washmgton D.C.] International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation 
Office 2004 (C-149, R-207), 11 (footnotes omitted) 
87 In the second half of 2000 more than 70% of private sector deposits and almost 70% of the bankmg system credit to 
the pnvate sector were dominated in dollars: Daseking C, Ghosh A, Lane T & Thomas A, Lessons from the Cns1s m 
Argentina IMP Occasional Paper No. 236, Washington DC, 2005, 21 
88 Argentma ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arb1tral Awards 1958 (New York 
Convention) (which is had signed but not ratified m 1958) m 1989 and it entered into force on 12 June 1989. 
89 General Agreement on Trade m Services (entered mto force January 1995). The commitments undertaken by 
Argentina m GATS have important imphcations for the treatment of foreign investment in service activities and 
md1cted a high degree of liberalisation of trade and foreign investment in services by Argentina. See, Bouzas R & 
Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 4(b) 
90 Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) (entered mto force January 1995). TRIMS estabhshed 
that certam mvestment measures, such as domestic content requtrements, distorted international trade and parties 
agreed to refram from imposing such measures on investors. 
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partners.91 Argentina was also enthusiastically supportive of the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) proposed by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).92 Individually these agreements had very little direct impact on 
foreign investment in Argentina. Collectively, however, they demonstrated the liberal 
approach to investment and trade adopted by Argentina during this period. 
To attract investment in support of its privatisation regime, Argentina also undertook to 
provide enhanced legal protection to investors. It signed the ICSID Convention on 21 
May 1991 93 and became an active signatory of BITs. The first of Argentina's BITs was 
concluded with the Republic of Italy on 22 May 1990. Today, Argentina is signatory to 
56 BITs, nearly all of which were negotiated during the 1990s.94 
1.3.4 Argentina's bilateral investment treaties 
Argentina's BITs provide typical BIT investment protection. As a general rule, they 
include a broad definition of "investment".95 Protected investments are granted the right 
91 On 26 March 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion estabhshmg a common 
market MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur orMercosur) 26 March 1991 (entry into force 31 December 1994); 30 
ILM 1041 (1991). The purpose of the agreement was to set up a common market and elimmate trade barriers among 
the signatory parties. Rotman E, A Guide to MERCOSUR Legal Research: Sources and Documents, September 2005 
at http://www.nvulawglobal.org/Globalex/Mercosur.htm# ednl (19 September 2008) 
Argentma and its Mercosur partners signed several regional agreements that touch on investment issues: Buenos A ires 
Protocol on the Promotwn and Protection of Investment Proceeding from Non-Member Countries of the MERCOSUR 
(1994) established general principles of treatments for extra-zone investments m order to prevent distortions m 
investment locattons; Coloma Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protectwn of Investments in MERCOSUR (17 
December 1994) aimed at establishmg treatment standards for mvestment from member states; and The Montevideo 
Protocol on Trade in Services in the MERCOSUR (15 December 1997) a regional agreement reflectmg the 
undertakmgs m GATS. These three regional protocols are v01d oflegal force because they have not yet been ratified by 
the reqmred number of member state parliaments. Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 4(c) 
92 The MAI was proposed by the OECD m 1995, efforts to conclude the agreement collapsed m 1998. Bouzas R & 
Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 3(a) 
93 The ICSID Convention was signed by Argentma's Executive branch on 21 May 1991. It was approved by Congress 
by Law 24.353 on 28 July 1994, promulgated by the Executive on 22 August 1994 and published m the Official 
Gazette on 2 September, Boletin Oficial de la Repubhca Argentina. 
94 See Appendix 2 for a table ofBITs signed by Argentma 
95 For example the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protectwn of Investments, signed 14 November 1991, entry mto force 
20 October 1994, (US-Argentma BIT) defines investment at article 1 to include: (see full text of the US-Argentina BIT 
at Appendix 4) 
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to be treated in accordance with certain standards, including fair and equitable 
treatment96, "most-favored nation"97 and "national treatment".98 BITs signed by 
Argentina with OECD countries also include an "umbrella" clause that binds the 
signatories to fulfill any commitment previously made concerning investments by the 
other party.99 Argentina's BITs generally contain no restrictions or safeguard clauses 
regarding the remittance of investment related funds, and expropriation clauses require 
prompt adequate and effective compensation. 100 The duration of BITs signed by 
Argentina varies between five and fifteen years, and can be extended. 101 
All BITs signed by Argentina require that paries to a dispute initially seek to resolve that 
dispute amicably through consultations and negotiations. A time period (between six and 
eighteen months) must elapse before a dispute can be taken to arbitration. BITs usually refer 
disputes to international arbitration under ICSID or to alternate forms of arbitration, such as 
... every kmd of mvestment m the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nat10nals 
or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes 
without limitation: 
... mortgages ... a company or shares of stock or other mterests in a company ... 
96 For example m the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic 
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol, Canberra, 23 August 1995, entry into force 11 January 
1997, article 1 provides: "Each Contractmg Party shall at all times ensure fa1r and eqmtable treatment to investments " 
97 The most favoured nat10n clause requires that there be no discrimination between BITs signed with other countries. 
Each state treats all the other states equally as "most-favoured" nations. If a country improves the benefits that it gives 
to one mvestor, it has to give the same "best" treatment to all the other mvestors so that they all remain "most-favored." 
See above n22 
98 For example m the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protectwn of Investments, London 11 
December 1990, entry mto force 19 February 1993, article 3 provides· 
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall m its territory subject mvestments or returns of investors of the other 
Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that which 1t accords to mvestments or returns of its own 
mvestors or to mvestments or returns of investors of any third state. 
(2) Neither Contractrng Party shall m its territory subject investors of the other Contractmg Party, as regards 
their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of the1r investments, to treatment less favorable 
than that which it accords to its own investors or to mvestors of any third states. 
99 The clause brings otherwise mdependent investment agreements under the treaty's umbrella ofprotect10n. See above 
n23. For example in the US-Argentma BIT, article II 2(c) provides: "Each Party shall observe any obligation it may 
have entered mto with regard to mvestments." 
100 US-Argentina BIT, article IV(l ). The full text of the US-Argentina BIT is provided at Appendix 4 
101 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 4( d) 
27 
Chapter 1 
the UNCITRAL rules or ad hoe arbitration by another institution by mutual consent of the 
parties.102 
The influence the mass ratification of BITs by Argentina had on attracting foreign 
investment to Argentina is impossible to ascertain with any precision. Although foreign 
investment in Argentina increased markedly during the 1990s, there is no direct correlation 
between the signature of BITs and the level of foreign investment in Argentina. 103 Many 
countries that signed BITs with Argentina have not been significant foreign investors in that 
country. Similarly, there is no BIT in force with Brazil, which is the major Latin American 
foreign investor in Argentina.104 Regardless of whether Argentina's framework of BITs 
actually influenced the decision of whether or not to invest in Argentina, the dispute 
resolution mechanisms contained in BITs which provided Argentina's consent to ICSID 
arbitration have become a critical element of foreign investment in Argentina. 
1.3.5 Foreign investment in the 1990's 
The Menem government opened new prospects for foreign investment in Argentina. The 
convertibility regime drastically reduced inflation, economic growth was strong and 
given the depths to which the economy had fallen in the 1980s, the rebound was initially 
spectacular. The Argentine economy grew on average 6. 7 percent per annum between 
1991 and 1997, 105 and Argentina entered a period of healthy export and investment-led 
growth.106 
Menem's de-regulation of foreign investment meant there were no approvals, formalities 
or registrations required for foreign investment in Argentina. Nor were investors subject 
102 US-Argentma BIT, article VII. The full text of the US-Argentina BIT is provided at Appendix 4 
103 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 2(b) 
104 Ibid. 
105 Hausmann R & Velasco A, "Hard Money's Soft Underbelly: Understandmg the Argentme Cns1s" (2002) Brookings 
Trade Fontm, 59 
106 IMF, The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, [Washington D.C.] Intemat10nal Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation 
Office 2004 (C-149, R-207), 11 
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to any discriminatory withholding taxes on incomes or profits. These structural reforms, 
together with an abundance of natural resources, the size and growth of the domestic 
market, privatisation, price stabilization and trade liberalization, created a foreign 
investment-friendly environment in Argentina. 107 
The 1990s saw large capital inflows in the form of foreign investment and Argentina 
emerged as one of the highest developing country recipients of foreign investment.108 
Argentina sold its oil and telecommunications monopolies; several electrical, gas and 
water companies; the state airlines; television stations; roads; railway lines; steel and 
petrochemical firms; grain elevators; hotels; and even racetracks. Foreign investment was 
predominately from the United States and Spain while other important investors were 
from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The majority of 
the top ten companies in Argentina were under foreign ownership109 and, in the opinion 
of some, "Mr Menem privatised almost everything the state owned". 110 From an annual 
average of approximately US$650 million in 1984-89, net inward foreign investment 
increased to US$3.6 billion in 1992-94, US$8.2 billion in 1997-98111 and to a peak of 
more than US$23 billion in 1999.112 
Argentina became a poster child for privatisation during the 1990s and between 1991 and 
1997 the Argentine economy outperformed that of most other countries in Latin 
America. 113 The international financial community, including the IMF, the World Bank 
and the Inter American Bank for Development, applauded its performance. An example 
of this recognition was President Menem's appearance alongside President Clinton at the 
107 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 1 
108 Chudnovsky D & Lopez A, above n70, 8 
109 Powell A, "Argentina's Avoidable Cns1s: Bad Luck, Bad Economics, Bad Politics, Bad Advice" (2002) Brookings 
Trade Forum, 3 
110 
"A declme without parallel" The Economist, Feb 28 2002 
111 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 2 
112 Chudnovsky D & Lopez A, above n70, 8 
113 Hausmann R & Velasco A, above nl05, 59 
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1999 annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank:. 114 By the end of the decade, 
privatisation and convertibility were viewed as the solution to Argentina's precarious 
economic situation. 115 In October 1998 the IMF Managing Director remarked: 
Argentina has a story to tell the world: a story which is about the importance of fiscal 
discipline, of structural change, and of monetary policy rigorously maintained. 116 
The story Argentina would go on to tell, however, was not that alluded to by the IMF 
Managing Director. Instead Argentina was heading towards what has been described as 
"one of the worst economic crises in its history"117 and "among the most severe of recent 
economic crises worldwide". 118 
1.3.6 Economic slowdown and downturn 1998-2000 
Towards the end of 1998 foreign investment began to decline and Argentina's economy 
entered into a period of recession. The downturn was triggered by a variety of factors, 
some external to Argentina and others directly related to its political and economic 
choices. Once the downturn started, Argentina was unable to turn its economy around. 119 
114 Krueger A, "Cnsis Prevention and Resolution: Lessons from Argentma" speech from The Argentina Crisis: 
National Bureau Of Economic Research (NEER) Cambndge, July 17, 2002 
115 Johnson A, "Evaluating privatization ofTelecommumcations to Foster Economic Growth: Argentma Revisited" 
(2003) 36(4) Law Technology Washington 3 
116 IMF, The !MF and Argentina, 1991-2001, [Washington D.C.] International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation 
Office 2004 (C-149, R-207), 12 
117 Dasekmg C, Ghosh A, Lane T, & Thomas A, above n87, 1 
118 IMF, The !MF and Argentina, 1991-2001, [Washmgton D.C.] International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation 
Office 2004 (C-149, R-207), 8 
119 Debate on the causes of the Argentine Cnsis 1s substantial and goes beyond the limits of this thesis. Expert opmion 
1s divided and economists and other policy experts provide for a mult1d1mens10nal mix of conflicts, actors and 
measures. See generally Hausmann, R & Velasco A, "Hard Money's Soft Underbelly: Understandmg the Argentine 
Cns1s" (2002) Brookings Trade Forum; Powell A, "Argentma's Avoidable Cnsis: Bad Luck, Bad Economics, Bad 
Politics, Bad Advice" (2002) Brookings Trade Forum; Blustein P, And the money kept rolling in (and out). Wall 
Street, the !MF, and the bankn1pting of Argentina Pubhc Affairs, 2005; International Monetary Fund, Pohcy 
Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina October 8, 2003; Bouzas R & Chudnovsky 
D, Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development. The Recent Argentina Experience Universidad de San 
Andres Victoria (Argentma) 2005; Chudnovsky D & Lopez A, Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in 
Argentina Workmg Group on Development and Environment in the Amencas, D1scuss10n Paper Number 12, April 
2008, at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/m/DP12Chudnovsky LopezApr08 pdf(15 September 2008) 
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Convertibility had lowered inflation and stabilized the economy. The fixed exchange rate 
made imports cheap, producing a constant flight of dollars away from the country and a 
progressive loss of Argentina's industrial infrastructure, which led to an increase in 
unemployment. The Russian crisis in August 1998 brought about a reversal in capital 
flows from emerging markets and significantly affected Argentina. 120 A decline in trade, 
in particular the weakening of demand in Brazil (Argentina's largest trade partner) and 
the strengthening United States dollar, also impacted heavily on Argentina. The pegging 
of the peso to the US dollar affected Argentina's competitiveness in export markets to 
both Europe (Argentina's second largest market after Brazil) and with other countries 
exporting to the United States (Argentina's third largest importer). 121 Government 
spending was high and Argentina's public debt grew enormously during the 1990s. 
Although the country showed no signs of being able to pay, the IMF kept lending money 
to Argentina and postponing its payment schedules. 
Some argue that the downturn was a cyclical correction, due to the fact that the economy 
had been running above potential, not least due to a significantly overvalued peso. 122 
Heightened political uncertainty123 and concerns over Argentina's public debt were also 
important factors. The continued appreciation of the US dollar, a further decline of 
investment in emerging capital markets and Argentina's public debt intensified 
Argentina's problems in 2000. 124 These were exacerbated by the restrictions on fiscal 
policy open to the government in light of the convertibility regime. 
120 Powell A, above nl 09, 3 
121 Ibid. 
122 IMF, Policy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina 8 October 2003, 37 
123 Although Menem had brought some political stability, the situation became uncertam m 1998 with his attempts to 
remain m power for an unprecedented third term, despite widespread opposition; IMF, Pohcy Development and 
ReVIew Department Lessons from the Crzszs in Argentina 8 October 2003, 40 
124 IMF, The !MF and Argentina, 1991-2001, [Washmgton D.C.] International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation 
Office 2004 (C-149, R-207), 12 
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1.3.7 The deterioration of the economic climate in 2001 
By 2001 the political, economic and social elements had taken a turn for the worst. 
Argentina's crisis deepened in 2001 and authorities took a series of measures to correct 
the slide: (1) improvements in tax enforcement and the introduction of exemptions; (2) an 
equally weighed basket of the dollar and the euro; (3) an exchange of outstanding bonds 
totalling US$30 billion for longer maturity instruments; and (4) increased competition 
plans in domestic markets. These plans were introduced together with an increase in IMF 
funding to Argentina. 
The measures did not yield the expected results, and attempts at strengthening public 
finances failed to break the cycle of raising interest rates, failing growth and fiscal 
underperformance. 125 Moreover, market confidence was further damaged and doubts 
about the sustainability of public debt and convertibility strengthened. 126 Despite IMF 
assistance, the general economic situation in Argentina deteriorated. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) declined 4.5 per cent in 2001 and unemployment rose to 18.3 per cent.127 
Economic indicators were accompanied by significant social problems, and by December 
2001 almost half the population was living below the poverty line. 128 
1.3.8 Argentina responds to the crisis 
As poverty and unemployment soared, consumer confidence failed and savmgs were 
massively withdrawn from banks. 129 The government's first response in a series of 
125 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis m Argentina 8 October 2003, 59 
126 Ibid, 35 
127 Ibid, 37 
128 Blustein P, And the money kept rolling in (and out). Wall Street, the IMF, and the bankrupting of Argentina Pubhc 
Affairs, New York, 2005, 2 
129 Pnvate sector deposits fell by more than $3.6 million (6 percent of the deposit base) dunng November 28-30. See, 
Daseking C, Ghosh A, Lane T, & Thomas A, above n87, 21 
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measures was to issue a bank deposit freeze known as "corralito". 13° Corralito was 
aimed at preserving the stability of the banking system; it worked by restricting bank 
withdrawals to 250 pesos per week and prohibiting the transfer of currency abroad. 
Public discontent was clear, with public demonstrations across the country including the 
banging of pots and pans, looting shops and vandalising government buildings, banks and 
foreign owned companies. Confrontations between the police and citizens were common, 
and fires were regularly lit on Buenos Aires avenues. The demonstrations resulted in the 
death of more than two dozen people. 131 On 7 December 2001, Argentina announced that 
it could not guarantee payment of foreign debt, thereby evidencing Argentina's de facto 
default. 132 
In the midst of mass riots, looting and demonstrations the current President de La Rua 
and his cabinet were forced to resign. This resignation was followed by the infamous 
succession of five presidents taking office over ten days, ending on 1 January 2002 when 
Eduardo Duhalde was made president. 
On 6 January 2002 Duhalde introduced the Public Emergency and Reform to the 
Provisions about Exchange Rate Law133 (hereinafter the "Emergency Law"). The law 
declared a public emergency as regards: social; economic; administrative; financial; and 
foreign exchange market affairs. The Emergency Law ended convertibility, thus ending 
the one-for-one peg of the Argentine peso to the United States dollar. It also provided for 
the switch from dollars to pesos of debts owed to the banking system, debts arising from 
management contracts governed by public law and debts under private agreements. The 
law further provided for the renegotiation of private and public agreements to reflect the 
13° Financial Entities Decree 1570/01 on 1 December 2001, Boletin Ojicial de la Republzca Argentina, 29787, 3 
December 2001; Corralzto 1s the diminutive form of "corral", which means an animal pen or enclosure. The d1mmut1ve 
1s used to refer to a "small enclosure" and refers to the restrictions imposed by the measure. 
131 Blustein P, above n128, 1 
132 Horebeck J F, The Argentine Financial Crisis· A Chronology of Events CSRS Report for Congress, RS21130, 
January 2002 
133 Public Emergency and Reform to the Provisions about Exchange Rate, Law No. 25.561 of06 January 2002, Boletin 
Oficial de la Republica Argentina, 07 January 2002 
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end of convertibility. This all-encompassing switch into Argentine pesos was called 
"pesification" and it affected the entire Argentine economy. A further set of measures 
adopted under the Emergency Law acknowledged and formalized the default of 
Argentina on its internal and external debt, and provided subsequently for that debt's 
restructuring with the aim of progressively restoring normal economic conditions. 134 
The crisis was characterized by severe deflation and a deterioration of the economy. It 
also led to severe social hardship: unemployment rose to above 25 percent and in 2002 
more than 50 percent of Argentines were living below the poverty line. 135 Moreover, the 
financial impact was not limited to Argentina. Also affected were foreign companies that 
had invested in Argentina during the 1990s. Investors had been attracted to the regulatory 
framework in Argentina which granted long-term licenses and tariffs calculated in US 
dollars. In the wake of the crisis, tariff adjustments were temporarily suspended before 
being restructured into pesos. This caused foreign investors to suffer considerable un-
indemnified losses. 
1.4 The Argentine Cases 
To seek compensation for losses suffered, foreign investors turned to the BITs their home 
states had signed with Argentina during the 1990s. Relying on the dispute resolution 
provisions of those BITs, which referred disputes to ICSID, investors instituted 
proceedings against Argentina for expropriation of investments and violation of BIT 
obligations. 
Each of the Argentine Cases has its own individual characteristics, including the parties, 
relevant treaties, the terms of the individual commercial contracts and the regulatory 
framework of the industry to which the investment relates. Each case therefore raises its 
own special issues and particular considerations. Yet as the Argentine Cases arise from 
134 Ibid 
135 Blustem P, above nl28, 2 
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the same crisis, and the claims by investors are for breaches of similar BIT provisions, the 
cases provide a significant contribution to the development of I CS ID jurisprudence. 
1.4.1 The claims 
Except for a handful of cases, the Argentine Cases have been instituted by investors in 
the public utility sector (oil, gas, electricity, water, transportation and 
telecommunications). 136 Investment returns were tied to tariffs that were substantially 
reduced by the devaluation, the adjustment of which was prevented by the government in 
its measures to respond to the crisis. This, and various other administrative and financial 
measures adopted by the government, adversely impacted on investors. Investors claimed 
breaches for alleged violations of some of the most substantive BIT provisions, including: 
the direct and indirect expropriation of the investment; failure to treat investment in 
accordance with the standard of fair and equitable treatment; failure to observe 
obligations entered into in regard to the investment in breach of umbrella clauses; and 
discriminatory treatment of the investor. 
The claims centre on losses incurred by investors due to some or all of the following 
measures adopted by Argentina: 
• Corralito - the measures that blocked deposits (temporary bank freeze) severely 
curtailing the right to withdraw money; 
• The official ban on the transfer of funds abroad and their exchange in freely 
convertible and transferable currencies; 
136 Exceptions are a number of cases relating to the finance, msurance and leasmg sectors: Continental Casualty Co v 
The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/03/9; CIT Group Inc v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No 
ARB/0419; RGA Reinsurance Company v The Argentine Republic I CS ID Case No ARB/04/20; Daimler Chrysler 
services AG v The Argenflne Republic ICSID Case No ARB05/1; Asset Recovery Trust SA v The Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No ARB/05/11. A case concernmg the production and sale of publtc transportation vehicles: Meta/par SA. 
and Buen Aire S.A v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/03/5. A case concerning the development of 
mformation storage of the Jud1c1ary: Unys1s Corp v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/03/27 While not tted to a 
tanff regime the claims m these cases still respond to the measures adopted by Argentina m response to the economic 
crisis of2000-2001. 
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• Pesification - the mandatory conversion of dollar-denominated bank deposits, 
contracts, public utility rates and private or governmental debt into Argentine 
pesos; 137 
• Measures that rescheduled term deposits and reduced interest rates; 
• The suspension of adjustment clauses indexing the US Producer Price Index 
("PPI"), leading to a loss in the value of investments; 
• Loss of ability to pay debt - ability to pay debt has been reduced as the investor's 
debt was generally dominated in dollars; 
• Losses incurred due to dollar dominated operating costs; and 
• Default on and unilateral rescheduling of governmental debt. 
Argentina denies that it has violated BIT obligations on the grounds that: the challenged 
measures were across-the-board; no difference was made between domestic and foreign 
investors; and none of the challenged policy measures interfered with ownership rights of 
investors. It maintains that the abandonment of the currency board and the policy 
measures that followed, including the suspension of adjustment clauses indexed to US 
PPI and pesification, were necessary and protected under the emergency clause of 
relevant BITs. Alternatively, Argentina argues that its measures were in response to a 
"state of necessity'' and thus excused from liability under BITs and customary 
international law. The catalyst for the state of necessity, it is argued, was one of the 
deepest economic crises in history, and that maintaining the currency board would have 
increased the already peaking poverty rates in the country. It also argues that public 
137 Decree 214 of3 February, Decree 471 of 8 March, Decree 644of18 April 2002 
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utility firms took investment and financial decisions as part of their regular business 
operations, the consequences of which cannot be shifted onto the public sector. 138 
1.4.2 The awards 
To date all of the Argentine Cases, except one have found Argentina liable to some extent 
for breach of BIT obligations. 139 The details of the substantive holdings of the awards are 
not essential to this thesis but for completeness they are briefly summarized below. 
a) Expropriation 
Investors have alleged expropriation of investments by Argentina. 140 This allegation has 
been consistently rejected by tribunals in the Argentine Cases. 141 The claim of 
expropriation raises two main inquiries: whether a regulation results in expropriation and, if 
so, the lawfulness of the expropriation. This involves balancing two competing interests: the 
degree of the measure's interference with the right of ownership, and the power of the State 
to adopt its policies. The awards have concluded that the effect of Argentina's actions had 
not been permanent on the value of the claimants' shares and that investment had not 
ceased to exist. Without a permanent, severe deprivation of rights with regard to its 
investment, or almost complete deprivation of the value of investment, there is no 
expropriation. 142 For example, the Sempra Award held that for a claim of indirect 
138 Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, above n74, part 5(b) 
139 See Appendix 1 for the details of the Argentme Cases 
140 See the US-Argentma BIT, article IV, the full text of the US-Argentma BIT is provided at AppendJX 4. The US-
Argentina BIT 1s relevant BIT in all but one of the Argentme Cases decided to date. The other is the Treaty between the 
Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 1991 
(Chile- Argentina BIT) relevant to Meta/par SA. and Buen Aire SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/5 
(hereinafter Meta/par Award) 
141 Two awards involving Argentina have held Argentina to have expropnated investments. These proceedmgs related 
to events before the Argentme Cns1s and are outside the analysis of this thesis. See, Siemens v Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No ARB/02/08, Compama de Aguas de! Aconquya SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No ARB/97/3 
142 LG&E Award par 200; Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic IC SID Case No ARB/02/16 (hereinafter 
Sempra Award) pars 283-285; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, P.L v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/3 (heremafter Enron Award) par 246; CMS Award par 264; Meta/par Award pars 173-174 
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expropriation to succeed it would require that "the investor no longer be in control of its 
business operation, or that the value of the business has been virtually annihilated". 143 
b) Breach of the "Umbrella Clause" 
Umbrella clauses work by bringing other investment agreements between the parties 
under the protection of a BIT. The umbrella clause in the US-Argentine BIT provides: 
Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments. 144 
All tribunals have found Argentina in violation of this provision. The Enron and LG&E 
Awards held that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "any obligation" included both 
contractual obligations and statutory obligations undertaken with regard to 
investments. 145 The approach in the Sempra Award distinguished between ordinary 
commercial breaches of contract and treaty breaches, implying that only the latter would 
fall under the scope of an umbrella clause. This distinction, it claimed, is necessary to 
avoid "an indefinite and unjustified extension of the umbrella clause". 146 The tribunal's 
slightly divergent approaches proved immaterial, because Argentina's measures were not 
ordinary contractual breaches but the product of major legal and regulatory changes 
introduced by the state. The Argentine Cases have held that this change of policy was not 
envisaged by the legal framework governing the investments and violated obligations 
entered into with regard to investments. 147 
143 Sempra Award pars 283-285 
144 US-Argentina BIT, article 11(2)(c), the full text of the US-Argentina BIT 1s provided at Appendix 4 
145 Enron Award par 274; LG&E Award par 170 
146 Sempra Award par 310 
147 Sempra Award par 311- 314; CMS Award par 303; LG&E Award par 175; Enron Award par 277; Sempra Award par 
314; there was no umbrella clause in issue m Meta/par S.A and Buen Aire SA. v Argentine Republic IC SID Case No 
ARB/0315. The CMS Award finding in relat10n to the umbrella clause was annulled by the ad hoe annulment 
committee. See below 3.5.3 
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c) Fair and equitable treatment 
The application of the fair and equitable treatment standard required under article II(2)(a) 
of the US-Argentine BIT has established Argentina's liability in four of the five decided 
Argentine Cases. 148 The provision states that "[i]nvestment shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment". 149 The consideration of this standard by tribunals in the 
Argentine Cases has emphasized the relevance of the host state's obligation to maintain a 
stable and predictable legal and business environment in line with the investor's 
legitimate expectations. The CMS Award explained the balance sought by this provision 
as follows: 
There can be no doubt. .. that a stable legal and business environment is an essential 
element of fair and equitable treatment. 150 •.• 
It is not a question of whether the legal framework might need to be frozen as it can 
always evolve and be adapted to changing circumstances, but neither is it a question of 
whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to 
the contrary have been made. The law of foreign investment and its protection has been 
developed with the specific objective of avoiding such adverse legal effects. 151 
Consistent with this approach, the LG&E Award affirmed that the fair and equitable 
standard consists of the host State's consistent and transparent behavior, free of 
ambiguity that involves the obligation to grant and maintain a stable and predictable legal 
framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations of the foreign investor. 152 This 
approach was reflected in the awards in the remaining cases. 153 
148CMS Award par 281; LG&E Award par 132; Enron Award par 268; Sempra Award 304; The tnbunal in the Meta/par 
Award agreed with the reasoning in the LG&E Award but d1stmgmshed 1t and the Enron Award because in this case 
which mvolved two Chilean companies there was no bid, license, permit or contract of any kmd between Argentina and 
the claimant and thus no legitimate expectations were entertamed by the claimant to be breached by Argentma. See, 
Meta/par Award par 187 
149 US-Argentina BIT, article 11(2)(a), the full text of the US-Argentma BIT 1s provided at Appendix 4 
15
° CMSAwardpar274 
151 CMS Award par 277 
152 LG&E Award par 133 
153 Enron Award par 267; Sempra Award par 303; Metalpur Award par 184 
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1.5 Conclusion 
The Argentine Cases provide a striking example of multiple proceedings emerging from 
the same set of facts. The cases are based on BIT provisions common to the majority of 
BITs internationally, and the claims for protection in the Argentine Cases could be 
repeated in any number of states and circumstances. For this reason the international 
community will carefully watch the outcome of the Argentine Cases and determine what 
influence they will have on ICSID. A consistent approach by tribunals in the Argentine 
Cases to substantive BIT protection will foster certainty for parties. Unfortunately, a full 
analysis of the awards to date, demonstrates that this has not occurred. In contrast to the 
consistency demonstrated in the tribunal's consideration of investor's claims, the next 
chapter examines the tribunals' treatment of Argentina's defence of necessity, which has 
been addressed divergently and randomly. 
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Inconsistent Interpretations of Argentina's Defence 
2.1 Introduction 
A key element of the Argentine Cases is Argentina's defence of necessity. Argentina has 
argued that its actions during the economic crisis were implemented under a state of 
emergency, and has claimed a defence of necessity under the relevant BITs and 
customary international law. The first award in the Argentine Cases, CMS v Argentina, 
rejected Argentina's plea of necessity under both the BIT and customary international 
law. This approach was followed in two subsequent awards. Eighteen months after the 
CMS Award, in a case with virtually identical facts, the tribunal in LG&E v Argentina 
handed down a diametrically opposed decision and held that a temporary state of 
necessity was established under the BIT. The tribunal in LG&E v Argentina also 
recognised the satisfaction of the defence at customary international law in support of its 
findings. 
The significant divergence in the tribunal's consideration of these defences had a 
significant impact on the outcome of each case and merits closer analysis. Inconsistent 
awards question the legitimacy of ICSID arbitration and undermine confidence in ICSID 
tribunals to accurately resolve disputes. 
The analysis in this chapter centres on the CMS and LG&E Awards. The conflicting 
consideration of Argentina's defence under the BIT (hereinafter the "Treaty Defence") 
principally arises from a failure to consider the relationship between the different sources 
of international law and the general principles for their interpretation and application. 
This chapter sets out these general principles, before comparing and contrasting the 
Treaty Defence as considered by the tribunals in the CMS and LG&E Awards. An 
analysis of the tribunals' approaches to the defence of necessity at customary 
international law will then be undertaken. 
41 
Chapter 2 
2.1.1 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic 
A major sector subject to Argentina's privatisation regime was the gas industry. Within 
the legal framework enacted to govern this sector, 1 Transportadora de Gas del Norte 
("TGN"), an Argentine incorporated company, obtained a licence to transport gas. Blocks 
of state-owned shares in TGN were sold to private investors. CMS, a US company, 
became a 29.42% shareholder in TGN. According to enabling legislation and a licence 
issued by the government, the tariffs of the contract were to be recouped in US dollars, 
adjusted periodically according to the US Producer Price Index ("PPI") and converted 
into pesos at the time of billing. 
The economic crisis in Argentina precipitated a variety of measures by the Argentine 
government. Through emergency legislation the government limited the capacity of 
depositors to withdraw funds, abolished convertibility and no longer calculated tariffs in 
US dollar adjusted to the US PPL CMS alleged that the measures adopted by Argentina 
during the 2001 crisis caused it loss of income and the ability to pay debts denominated 
in US dollars. CMS alleged that Argentina's suspension of TGN's tariff adjustment, and 
Argentina's emergency law which altered the regime under which TGN's tariffs were 
calculated in US dollars and converted into pesos, violated the US-Argentina BIT. CMS 
claimed that Argentina violated the US-Argentina BIT by expropriating CMS's shares 
without compensation, by failing to treat its investment fairly and equitably, by acting in 
a discriminatory and arbitrary manner, and by failing to observe licence obligations 
regarding CMS's investment as required under the BIT's umbrella clause. 
The tribunal rejected CMS's claims of expropriation and discriminatory and arbitrary 
treatment. However, it held that Argentina had violated the fair and equitable treatment 
1 Instruments included the 1992 Gas Law (Law 24.076 of 7 June 1991 on the Regulation of Natural Gas, Boletin 
Oficzal de la Republ1ca Argentina, 12 June 1992); the Gas Decrees (Decree 1738/92of18 September 1992, Boletin 
Oficzal de la Republica Argentina, 28 September 1992; Decree 2255/92 of 2 December 1992, Boletin Oficzal de la 
Republica Argentina, 7 December 1992); Information Memorandum on the Initial Pubhc Tender Offer 1993 
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standard and the umbrella clause in the US-Argentina BIT, and awarded US$133.2 
million plus interest to CMS. 
Following an annulment application by Argentina, the ad hoe committee annulled the 
tribunal's findings of liability for breach of the umbrella clause on the grounds that the 
tribunal failed to state the reasons for its decision. This decision had no material affect on 
the damages payable under the award as damages were awarded by the tribunal on 
alternate grounds. 
2.1.2 LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v 
The Argentine Republic 
The claimants, three US-based corporate investors, invested in Argentina's newly 
privatised natural gas market in the 1990s by purchasing stakes in gas distribution 
companies. Argentina guaranteed that gas tariffs would be calculated in US dollars, 
adjusted regularly to cover costs and provide a reasonable rate of return, and would not 
be subject to price controls without compensation. The claimants alleged that measures 
adopted during the Argentine crisis interfered with their investments in violation of the 
US-Argentina BIT. These measures included: freezing tariff adjustments; calculating 
tariffs in Argentine pesos instead of dollars; and mandating the renegotiation of gas 
distribution licenses under the threat of rescission. 
The tribunal held that Argentina's acts were not arbitrary under the BIT, nor did they 
amount to expropriation. It held that Argentina had breached the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in the BIT, and that its. abrogation of certain contractual undertakings 
gave rise to liability under the umbrella clause. Importantly, the tribunal excused 
Argentina from compliance with BIT obligations for a 17 month period on the basis that 
it established a state of necessity under article XI of the US-Argentina BIT. Argentina 
was, however, held liable for damages related to violations of the US-Argentina BIT 
occurring outside the 17 month period, and the tribunal awarded damages in the amount 
ofUS$57.4 million including interest. 
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2.2 Different Sources of International Law 
2.2.1 Applying international law to ICSID arbitration 
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention allows parties to a dispute to choose the law 
applicable to the substance of an arbitration administered by ICSID.2 Where there is no 
agreement between the parties, tribunals are governed by the second sentence of article 
42(1): 
... [I]n the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict oflaws) and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable. 
Debate has surrounded the interpretation of article 42(1) and what it means in regard to 
the application of international law. Interpretations range from a restricted application of 
international law in a complementary or corrective role3 to a role that calls for the 
application of international law to safeguard the principles of }us cogens.4 Recently 
ICSID tribunals have adopted a flexible approach, evidenced in the leading statement by 
the annulment committee in Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, 5 which 
interprets article 42(1) as allowing for the application of both domestic law and 
international law depending on the facts of the case: 
What is clear is that the sense and meaning of the negotiations leading to the second 
sentence of Article 42(1) allowed for both legal orders to have a role. The law of the host 
State can indeed be applied in conjunction with international law if this is justified. So 
too international law can be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other 
ambit. 6 
2 ICSID Convention, article 42(1 ): 
The tnbunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules oflaw as may be agreed by the parties. 
3 Gaillard E & Banifatemi Y, "The meaning of"and" in Article 42(1), Second Sentence of the Washmgton 
Convention: The Role oflntemat1onal Law in the ICSID Ch01ce ofLaw Process" (2003)18 ICSID Review- F/L/357, 
389 & 393 
4 CMS Award par 115 
5 Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No ARB/98/4 (Decision on Annulment), 41 ILM 933 
(2002) (Wena v Egypt) 
6 Wen a v Egypt par 941 
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Although simple in form, this interpretation essentially allows for the application of any 
international law rule considered relevant. It provides no tools for determining how or 
why a certain rule applies over another, neither in determining the priority between 
different sources of international law, nor in determining how the complex web of 
international law rules are to be applied. 
2.2.2 Prioritising between different sources of international law 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice7 is regarded as the appropriate starting 
point for assessing the applicable source of international law.8 Article 38(1) reads: 
1. The court whose function it is to decide a matter in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
A treaty is an express agreement between parties and creates a binding obligation on its 
parties. Where states are party to a treaty which expressly regulates the issues of a dispute 
between them, the treaty provides the primary source of applicable law and articulates the 
legal obligations between them.9 The obligation to abide by a treaty stems from the 
principle pacta sunt servanda (pacts must be respected), and entitles states to require that 
obligations be respected and to rely upon those obligations being complied with. 10 The 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 (entered into force 24 October 1945) 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; 
T.S. 993; 39 AnL Supp. 215 (1945) 
8 Triggs GD, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, Lexis Nexts, Butterworths, Australia, 2006, 
4. This approach has been evidenced by cases in the International Court of Justice, ad hoe War Cnmes tribunals and 
arbitral bodies. 
9 Ibid, 496; Shaw M, International Law, 5th edition, Cambndge Umvers1ty Press, Cambridge, 2003, 84 
10 Nuclear Tests Cases, ICJ Reports, 1974 at 253, 668 cited 111 Shaw M, above n9, 811; Thirlway H, "The Sources of 
International Law" m Evans M D (eel), International Law, 2nd Ed1tton, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 119 
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rule of pacta sunt servanda is reaffirmed at article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).11 
2.2.3 Lex specialis 
Where there are several rules potentially applicable to a dispute or question of law, but 
there are specific rules gove?Iing a particular issue, the maxim lex specialis derogat legi 
generali (hereinafter lex specialis) requires that the more specific rule prevails over a 
general rule. 12 Treaty rules between states as lex specialis have priority over general rules 
of customary international law between the states. 13 That a specific law, such as a treaty 
rule, has priority over customary law is justified by the fact that such a law, being more 
concrete, often takes better account of the particular features of the context in which it is 
being applied, and may often better reflect the intent of the parties subject to the law. 14 
This allows a state to derogate from customary law by concluding a treaty with different 
obligations. 15 The leading application of this principle is articulated in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases: 
The first question to be considered is whether the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf is binding on all Parties in this case ... Clearly if this is so then the 
provisions of the Convention will prevail in the relations between parties and would take 
precedence of any rules having a more general character, or derived from another source. 
On that basis the Court's reply to the question put to it. .. would necessarily be to the 
effect that as between the Parties the relevant provisions of the Convention represented 
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980) UN Doc. NConf.39/27; 1155 
UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AnL 875 (1969)). Argentma 1s party to the Vienna Convention, its accession to the 
Convention was approved by Law 19865of10 March 1972 (signed by Argentma on 23 May 1969), Boletm Oficzal de 
la Republzca de Argentzna, 11 January 1973 
12 Shaw M, above n9, 116; International Law Commission, "Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentat10n oflnternat10nal Law: Difficulties ansmg from the D1vers1ficat10n and Expansion oflnternatlonal Law", 
NCN.4/L702, 18 July 2006, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 2006 at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/enghsh/draft%20art1cles/l 9 2006.pdf 
13 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports, 1982; 67 ILR 4 par 31; Mzlztary and Paramzlztary Actzvzties m 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of Amenca) Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986) at 3, 137; 76 ILR 
at 349, 471 cited m Shaw M, above n9, 116 
14 International Law Commission, above nl2, par 7 
15 Malanczuk P & Akehurst MB, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to lntematzonal Law, 7th Rev. Edition, Routledge, 
London, 1997,57 
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the applicable rules oflaw- that is to say constituted the law for the Parties- and its sole 
remaining task would be to interpret those provisions in so far as their meaning was 
disputed or appeared uncertain, and to apply them to the particular circumstances 
involved. 16 
A treaty has priority over general principles of international law. However, it does not 
exist in isolation from international law. The clearest example is that states cannot 
provide for a treaty which authorises acts contrary to }us cogens. 17 hnportantly, rules of 
international law are also used to interpret treaties constituting a lex specialis. The 
guiding principles of treaty interpretation are those set by the template of articles 31 and 
32 the Vienna Convention, 18 which are accepted as reflecting the customary international 
16 North Sea Contmental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v 
Netherlands) ICJ Reports 1969, 3 at 24; 41 ILR 29 
17 Vienna Conventton, article 53 provides: 
A treaty 1s void if, at the time of its conclusion, 1t conflicts with a peremptory norm of general internat10nal law. 
For the purposes of the present Conventton, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recogmzed by the mtemational commumty of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogatton 1s 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law havmg the same 
character. 
18 Vienna Convention: 
Article 31 General rule of mterpretatzon 
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith m accordance with the ordmary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty m their context and m the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the mterpretatton of a treaty shall comprise, in addit10n to the text, mcludmg 
its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relatmg to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connex10n with the 
conclus10n of the treaty; 
(b) any mstrument which was made by one or more parties m connex10n with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an mstrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken mto account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regardmg the interpretatton of the treaty or the application of 
its prov1s10ns; 
(b) any subsequent practice m the applicat10n of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regardmg its mterpretation, 
( c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relat10ns between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term 1f1t 1s estabhshed that the parties so mtended. 
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretatzon 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of mterpretation, mcludmg the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the c1rcumstances of its conclusion, m order to confirm the meanmg resulting from the 
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law principles of treaty interpretation. 19 The very structure of articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention places the treaty text at the centre of any treaty interpretation. Article 
31 (3)( c) of the Convention allows for "other rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties" to be taken into account when interpreting a treaty. It is 
important to recognise, though, that these rules do not exist as overriding principles, as 
this is a role reserved for principles of jus cogens. 20 
2.2.4 Separation of sources 
The principle of lex specialis serves to prioritise between legal obligations but it does not 
substitute or render obsolete other sources of law. The principle of separation of sources 
in well established in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: 
... even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in 
content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of 
treaty-law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain separate 
existence. 21 
This means that where a defence is available under treaty and customary international 
law, the treaty takes priority as lex specialis, but the defence at customary international 
law maintains its existence as an independent defence to liability and requires separate 
consideration by the tribunal. 22 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the mterpretat1on according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meamng ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which 1s manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
19 Indonesia/Malaysia Case, ICJ Reports, 2002 at 37; Libya/Chad Case, ICJ Reports, 1994 at 6, 21-2; 100 ILR at 1, 
20-1 cited in Shaw M, above n9, 839 
20 McLachlan C, "Investment Treaties and General Intemat10nal Law" (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 361, 373 
21 Milztary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) Ments, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986 par 95 
22 Where customary mtemational law provides for a stricter test than the treaty there 1s often no need for a separate 
resort to custom. 
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2.3 Argentina's Defence under Treaty and at Customary International 
Law 
Argentina's central defence for breaches of its treaty obligations in the Argentine Cases is 
that the political, social and economic crisis it suffered at the relevant time allowed it to 
take action contrary to its obligations, as such measures were implemented under a state 
of necessity.23 The defence is pleaded on two separate grounds: under the relevant BIT 
clauses, and under customary international law. 
The CMS Award held that Argentina was unable to establish the defence of necessity 
either under the treaty, or under the principles of customary international law. In contrast, 
the LG&E Award held that Argentina was able to establish the Treaty Defence, and that 
the establishment of the customary international law defence supported this conclusion. 
The conflict in the interpretation and application of these defences is more surprising 
when one considers the overlap of arbitrators and witnesses in each case. ICJ Judge 
Fransisco Rezek served as Argentina's appointed arbitrator in both cases and the tribunals 
in both proceedings heard submissions on the issue in question by the same expert 
witnesses.24 
2.3.1 Interrelationship between treaty and customary international law 
In order to address the defence of necessity, under treaty and at customary international 
law, a tribunal must first consider how these sources of international law interrelate to 
each other and how this affects their application to the dispute. The Treaty Defence 
23 LG&E Award pars 201-203; CMS Award pars 304-308 
24 Former ICJ Judge Fransisco Rezek served as Argentina's appomted arbitrator in both proceedings Jose Alvarez, 
Ann-Mane Slaughter, Wilham Burke-White and Noureil Roubmi all submitted expert opm10ns on necessity before 
both tribunals. This overlap of arbitrators 1s not hm1ted to the CMS and LG&E Awards; tribunals m the Argentine 
Cases to date are: CMS Award, Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The honourable Marc Lalonde P C., O.C., Q.C., H.E. Judge 
Francisco Rezek, Enron Award, Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Albert Jan Van den Berg and Pierre Yves Tschanz. Sempra 
Award, Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The honourable Marc Lalonde P.C., O.C., Q.C. and Dr. Sandra Morelli Rico, LG&E 
Award, Tatiana de Maekelt, H.E. Judge Francisco Rezek and Albert Jan Van den Berg. 
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relevant to the CMS and LG&E proceedings 1s provided at Article XI of the US-
Argentina BIT: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of the measures necessary 
for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
. . 25 
secunty mterests. 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful 
Acts26 (ILC Articles) is widely recognised as reflecting the defence of necessity at 
customary international law.27 Article 25 provides: 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness 
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: is 
the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril; and does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole; 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: 
a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity: 
or 
b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
The defences are found in different sources of law, one is from treaty and the other is a 
principle of customary international law. They have a different operation and content. 
The customary international law defence provides an excuse for breaching an obligation 
at international law and removes liability after the fact, whereas the Treaty Defence is a 
threshold requirement which provides that if measures are "necessary" then other 
25 The US-Argentina BIT is relevant to the CMS, LG&E, Sempra and Enron Awards Article XX of the Belgmm-
Luxembourg Economic Union-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (August 26, 1992) was relied on in a s1m!lar 
manner in Camuzz1 International S.A v Argentina ARB/0317 (2005). See Appendix 1 for the relevant BITs in the 
Argentme Cases 
26 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Jnternatwnally WrongfUl Acts, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, at par. 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001) (ILC Articles) 
27 Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Pro1ect Case (Hungary/ Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, [1997] ICJ Reports 7 pars 
51-52: "The Court considers ... that the state of necessity 1s a ground recognized by customary mtemational law for 
precludmg the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an mtemational obligation." See also, Legal 
Consequences of the Constructzon of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opmmn, 9 July 2004, 
[2004] ICJ Rep. 136, par 140. This positmn was accepted in both the CMS Award par 315 and LG&E Award par 245 
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obligations under the treaty do not apply.28 The Treaty Defence is unqualified and allows 
states the freedom to take measures necessary for the maintenance of public order or the 
protection of its own security interests. In contrast, the customary international law 
defence operates on very narrow grounds, and is subordinated to four conditions 
including that acts be "the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against 
a grave and imminent peril". 
Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT establishes a treaty-based defence, a !ex specialis, 
which is distinct from the defence of necessity at customary international law. Any 
decision regarding Argentina's defences must begin with the Treaty Defence, construed 
in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation. The defence of necessity at 
customary international law should then be considered as a separate, alternate defence. 
2.3.2 Applying international law in the CMS Award 
The tribunals in the CMS and LG&E Awards diverged significantly on their approach to 
prioritising and applying international law. This had a significant impact on how they 
addressed the Argentina's defences both under the treaty and at customary international 
law. 
The CMS tribunal approached the application of international law to the dispute by 
adopting the position established in Wena v Egypt. 29 While this established that 
international law may be applied when relevant, the tribunal did not consider the basis on 
which international law principles would be applied to the dispute or how different 
sources of international law - that is, the treaty and customary international law 
principles - would interrelate. This led to a confused application of international law to 
the dispute, with no clear interrelationship or hierarchy between them. 
28 CMS Gas Transm1ss10n Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/08 (Decision on Annulment) 
par 129 
29 CMS Award par 116 citing Wena v Egypt par 941 
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In reference to applicable laws to the dispute, both national and international, the tribunal 
held that "[a]ll of these rules are inseparable and will, to the extent justified, be applied 
by the tribunal".30 The tribunal went no further in establishing or clarifying the 
relationship between different sources of international law. In regard to Argentina's 
defence it stated: 
The Respondent also invoked in support of its contention the existence of a state of 
necessity under both customary international law and the provisions of the Treaty. In so 
doing, the Respondent has raised one fundamental issue in international law.31 
This indicates from the outset that the tribunal in the CMS Award regarded the 
application of international law to Argentina's defence under the BIT and customary 
international law as one and the same. 
2.3.3 Applying international law in the LG&E Award 
In contrast to the approach in the CMS Award, the LG&E Award began with a clear 
statement on the hierarchy of applicable laws to the dispute: 
In order to settle this controversy, the present Tribunal shall apply first the Bilateral 
Treaty; second and in the absence of explicit provisions therein, general international law, 
and third, the Argentine domestic law ... 32 
And further: 
Applying the rules of international law is to be understood as comprising the general 
international law, including customary international law, to be used as an instrument for 
the interpretation of the Treaty. For example, where a term is ambiguous, or where 
further interpretation of a Treaty provision is required, the Tribunal will turn its attention 
to its obligations under articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, signed in 1969. 33 
3° CMS Award par 117 
31 CMS Award par 308 (author's emphasis) 
32 LG&E Award par 99 
33 LG&E Award par 89 
52 
Chapter 2 
Although the tribunal made no reference to the principles of pacta sunt sevanda, lex 
specialis or article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the hierarchy 
of applicable laws established by the tribunal reflects these principles. 
2.4 Treaty Defence 
This section compares and contrasts the tribunals' consideration of the Treaty Defence in 
the CMS Award with the LG&E Award. 
2.4.1 Treaty Defence in the CMS Award 
a) Merging the Treaty Defence with customary international law 
The CMS Award by considering Argentina's defence with an analysis of the defence of 
necessity at customary international law, 34 before turning to article XL It did not 
recognise the Treaty Defence as a lex specialis, nor did it give any consideration to this 
principle. The principle of lex specialis was only mentioned twice in the CMS Award and 
then only in context of a summary of the Argentina's arguments, as follows: 
and 
... ICSID's jurisprudence is uniform in respect of the application of the Treaty as !ex 
specialis, complemented by customary international law where necessary. 35 
[article XI provides] in the respondent's view, for the !ex specialis governing emergency 
situations.36 
The tribunal neglected this principle despite its specific inclusion by the International 
Law Commission in article 55 of the ILC Articles in the context of the defence of 
necessity: 
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of 
an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility ofa State are governed by special rules of international law.37 
34 On the application of the customary international law defence see below 2.5 
35 CMS Award par 102 citmg CMS Reply par 60 
36 CMSAwardpar344 
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Disregarding the /ex specialis under the treaty, the tribunal merged the Treaty Defence 
with the defence at customary international law, and examined "whether the state of 
necessity or emergency meets the conditions laid down by customary international law 
and the treaty provisions".38 By reading the strict requirements of the customary 
international law defence into the treaty regime, it reduced the treaty to a mere treaty-
based reiteration of the customary international law defence of necessity. 
Two subsequent awards in the Argentine Cases, Sempra v Argentina and Enron v 
Argentina, followed the CMS Award on its interpretation of the Treaty Defence.39 
Although these cases gave greater consideration to the concept of the Treaty Defence as 
/ex specialis than the CMS Award, they ultimately rejected this approach and followed 
the approach of the CMS tribunal, imposing customary international law rules in the 
purported application of article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.40 
(i) Sempra v Argentina 
The tribunal in Sempra recognized that "a treaty regime specifically dealing with a given 
matter will prevail over more general rules of customary international law".41 Despite 
acknowledging the principles of /ex specialis, the Treaty Defence was not given priority 
because, according to the tribunal: 
[the treaty] did not deal with the legal elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of 
a state of necessity ... the rule governing such questions will be thus found under 
customary international law. 42 
Furthermore: 
37 ILC Articles, above n26 
38 CMS Award par 374 (author's emphasis) 
39 Two of the arbitrators m these awards were also members of the Tnbunal m the CMS Award, Professor Francisco 
Orrego Vicuna and the Honorable Marc Lalonde P.C., O.C., Q.C. 
40 While the reasomng in one award cannot be taken as the reasonmg m the other. Given the absence of explanation in 
the CMS Award, the similarity in the issues m quest10n, and the repetition of arbitrators, some parallels m the reasomng 
can be implied. 
41 Sempra Award par 378 
42 Sempra Award par 3 78 
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In view of the fact that the Treaty does not define what is to be understood by an 
"essential security interest", the requirements for a state of necessity under customary 
international law ... become relevant to the matter of establishing whether the necessary 
conditions have been met for its invocation under the Treaty.43 
Essentially the Sempra Award stepped from the treaty to customary international law 
because the treaty lacked the requisite elements to establish the defence. 
(ii) Enron v Argentina 
Similarly, the tribunal in Enron considered the principle of lex specialis, agam 
disregarding its application to the Treaty Defence: 
... the treaty regime is different and separate from customary law as it is lex specialis. 
This is no doubt correct in terms that a treaty regime specifically dealing with a given 
matter will prevail over more general rules of customary law. Had this been the case here 
the Tribunal would have started out its considerations on the basis of the Treaty provision 
and would have resorted to the Articles on State Responsibility only as a supplementary 
means. But the problem is that the Treaty itself did not deal with these elements. The 
Treaty thus becomes inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as the 
conditions for the operation of state of necessity are concerned.44 
The reasoning of the tribunals in Sempra and Enron is circular. By searching for elements 
of customary international law in the Treaty Defence and then reverting to customary 
international law when those elements were not found, the tribunals presumed from the 
outset that the position at customary international law had priority. This fails to consider 
the lex specialis of the Treaty Defence and uses the treaty as a mere pointer to customary 
international law. 
b) Textual similarities in the defences 
The merging of the Treaty Defence and the defence of necessity at customary 
international law may stem from similarities in the language in the provisions, in 
43 Sempra Award par 3 75 
44 Enron Award par 334 
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particular, the use of the terms "necessary" and "security interests" in the Treaty Defence 
vis-a-vis "necessity" and "essential interests of state" in article 25 of the ILC Articles.45 
The relevant sections in this regard are, in the Treaty Defence: 
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
protection of its own security interests 
and the ILC Articles: 
Necessity may not be invoked by a state unless ... does not seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State. 
The leap from the Treaty Defence to customary international law on the basis of similar 
language ignores not only the textual differences between the defences, but also the 
principles of treaty interpretation at customary international law. 
There is no rule of treaty interpretation, absent an explicit reference, which directs 
enquiry to "similar" customary international law principles. Article XI makes no 
reference to the ILC Articles or to customary international law.46 Primarily, any treaty 
must be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".47 The 
North Sea Continental Shelf Case established that a lex specialis must be interpreted "in 
so far as their meaning was disputed or appeared uncertain".48 Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention allows us recourse to "any relevant rules of international law applicable to 
45 Enron Award par 333 states: 
... the Treaty does not define what 1s to be understood by essential security interest. . The specific meaning of 
these concepts and the conditions for their apphcat10n must be searched for elsewhere ... because there 1s no 
specific gmdance to this effect under the Treaty. This 1s what makes [sic] necessary to rely on the requirements 
of state of necessity under customary mternational law, as outlined above m connection with their expression in 
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsib1hty, so as to evaluate whether such reqmrements have been met m 
this case 
46 The ILC Articles were estabhshed in 2001. But reference could have been made to earlier drafts of the articles or to 
pnnc1ples of customary mternat10nal law 
47 Vienna Convention, article 31 (I) provides: 
A treaty should be mterpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordmary meamng to be given to the 
terms of the treaty m their context and in light its object and purpose. 
48 FRG v Denmark, FRG v Netherlands ICJ Reports 1969, 3 at 24; 41ILR29 
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the relations between the parties"49 and, although this may include principles of 
customary international law, they do not supersede the treaty rules but are used to 
interpret those rules. An example of this is the interpretation of the term "necessary". 
The term "necessary" has been interpreted on various occasions in international courts 
and tribunals. 50 A strict interpretation, which relied on customary international law 
principles, was undertaken by the ICJ in Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project Case, deciding 
that an act is "necessary" for the purposes of the necessity defence at customary 
international law ifit is the only means to secure an essential state interest.51 Also, in the 
Oil Platforms Case, the ICJ examined a clause relating to the use of force in the US-Iran 
FCN Treaty52 again using the requirements of customary international law. It held that 
the "requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must 
have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any 
measure of discretion". 53 
A considerably broader interpretation of "necessary" was adopted by the European Court 
of Human Rights when considering the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms54 and whether "the protection of morals in a democratic society 
necessitated measures taken" by the state. The term "necessary" was compared with other 
terms in the convention, and was placed in context between "indispensable" and "useful". 
The court concluded that "it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment 
49 Vienna Convention, article 31 (3)( c) 
5° For a detailed d1scuss1on on interpreting treaty terms in this context see Burke-White W & Von Staden A, 
"Investment Protection m Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Apphcatlon of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral lnvesttnent Treaties" University of Pennsylvama Law School, Pubhc Law Research Paper No. 
07-14, Prepubhcatton draft, 28-48 at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=980107 ( 1 May 2008) 
51 This case confirmed the reqmrements of the defence of necessity at customary mtemat1onal law 
52 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, US-Iran art. XX, August 15, 1955 (entered into force 
16 June 1957) 8 U.S.T. 899, 284 U.N.T.S.93 cited m Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, note 22 
53 Oil Platforms (Iran v US), Judgment, 1996 ICJ 803 ( 12 December) par 73 cited in Burke-White W & Von Staden A, 
above n50, note 164 (author's emphasis) 
54 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms CETS No 005, Rome, 4/11/1950 entry mto 
force 3/9/1953 
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of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of "necessity'' in this 
context". 55 
A further interpretation of "necessary'' is found in jurisprudence under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT) in the Thailand Cigarettes Case.56 In that 
case Thailand banned foreign cigarettes, but allowed the sale of domestic produced 
cigarettes on the grounds that such restrictions were "necessary to protect human health", 
a measure it justified under article XX(b) of GATT.57 The Panel held that the import 
restrictions "could be considered to be 'necessary' in terms of article XX(b) only if there 
were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent 
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health 
policy objectives". 58 
The above jurisprudence illustrates the wide scope for interpreting a treaty term. Previous 
interpretations given to treaty terms are relevant to the special context of those 
agreements and are only binding on the parties to those disputes.59 A direct reference to 
customary international law, as occurred in the CMS Award, gives customary 
international law unjustified priority and disregards other equally valid interpretations 
from other sources oflaw. 
55 Handyside v United Kingdom, 24 Eur. CT.H.R. (ser. A) at 47 (1976) cited in Burke-White W & Von Staden A, 
above n50, 31 
56 Report of the Panel, Thmland-Restrictwn on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 75, DS 1 O/R (Oct. 5, 
1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (371h Supp) at 200, 222 (1990) cited m Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, 32 
57 Article XX(b) GATT, states in part: 
. nothmg m this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: .. . 
(b) necessary to protect human ... life or health. 
58 Report of the Panel, Thmland-Restrictwn on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 75, DS 1 O/R-37S200 
(Oct. 5, 1990), GA TT B.I.S.D. (371h Supp) at 200, 222 (1990) par 75 
59 Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, 32 
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c) Imposing additional elements on the Treaty Defence 
The merging of the Treaty Defence with the defence of necessity at customary 
international law imposed additional requirements on the operation of the Treaty 
Defence. This included the requirements that the state actions be the "only way" for the 
state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and -imminent peril, and that the 
State has not "contributed to the situation of necessity."60 The interpretation given by the 
tribunal also failed to respect the breadth of article XL By limiting its consideration to 
safeguarding an "essential security interest", it disregarded two other limbs of the 
defence, namely "the maintenance of public order" and the "maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security''.61 
d) Compensation 
The merging of the Treaty Defence and customary international law defence in the CMS 
Award also affected the tribunal's interpretation of compensation.62 The tribunal in CMS 
v Argentina considered that the "plea of necessity may preclude wrongfulness of an act, 
but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the right which had to be 
sacrifi~ed". 63 It relied on article 27 of the ILC Articles to establish this position:64 
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is without prejudice to 
a) compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance: 
precluding wrongfulness no longer exist; 
b) the question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question. 
60 The tnbunals consideration of these elements are discussed below 2.5 1 
61 Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT. The full text of the US-Argentma BIT is prov1d~ at Appendix 4. Compare this 
mterpretatton with the LG&E Award which held that the Treaty Defence was established on two grounds; the 
mamtenance of public order and the protection of its own security interests. See below 2.4.2d) 
62 CMS Award par 379. Because the tnbunal held that a state of necessity was not established, the tnbunal's comments 
m this regard were ob1ter dicta. 
63 CMS Award par 388 
64 CMS Award par 390 
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Article 55 of the ILC Articles sets out the principles of !ex specialis.65 This principle 
applies where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act or its legal consequences are determined by special rules of international 
law. Where they do not, the ILC specifically refers to the continued residual operation of 
the ILC Articles, stating that "article 55 makes it clear that the present articles operate in 
a residual way".66 
The relevant question is whether the Treaty Defence requires the subsidiary application 
of article 27(b) of the ILC Articles to determine the question of compensation. Again this 
is a question of treaty interpretation: 
[O]ne of the corollaries of the "general rule of interpretation" in the Vienna Convention is 
that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter 
is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of 
a treaty to redundancy or inutility. 67 
Article XI of the BIT is drafted to allow states to take "measures necessary" in certain 
situations. Requiring compensation to be paid when such measures are taken, particularly 
in response to an economic crisis, nullifies the effect of the Treaty Defence. The !ex 
specialis defence established under article XI of the BIT removes liability from a state in 
particular circumstances. The defense is conclusive and reference to customary 
international law or article 27(1) of the ILC Articles in a residual role is not required and 
is inappropriate. 
65 ILC Articles, article 55: 
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by 
special rules of mternational law 
66 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on Respons1b1hty of States for Internat1onally Wrongful Acts with 
Commentaries" Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two, 2001, 140 
67 Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 
(Apnl 29, 1996). 35 l.L.M. 603, 627 (1996) cited in Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, 14 
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e) Misapplication of the Treaty Defence 
The parties to the US-Argentina BIT expressly established a specific defence under the 
treaty which exists independently from the defence of necessity at customary 
international law. The CMS Award does not interpret the Treaty Defence in this light but 
rather as a restatement of, or reference to, the defence of necessity at customary 
international law. If the parties' intention was to merely restate customary international 
law, one could expect this to be reflected in the text, for example, "this agreement is 
without prejudice to the defence of necessity at customary international law as provided 
for in article 25 of the ILC Articles".68 Treating article XI as a mere reiteration of the 
customary international law defence renders the inclusion of article XI superfluous. 
2.4.2 Treaty Defence in the LG&E Award 
The LG&E Award applied the Treaty Defence as lex specialis, applying it independently 
from the defence of necessity pleaded at customary international law. The decision 
upholds the notion that state parties have the ability to agree to allocate risk outside of the 
framework provided by customary international law and to provide state parties with 
more or less protection than that available at customary international law. 69 This approach 
encompasses the breadth of article XL It allows for the analysis of arguments in relation 
to both "the maintenance of public order" and the protection of "security interests".70 
a) Establishing a lex specialis 
Although no specific reference was made to the principle of !ex specialis in the LG&E 
Award, the treaty defense established by article XI of the BIT was given precedence over 
68 This clause is not stnctly necessary as the defence at customary mtematlonal law exists regardless of its inclus10n of 
the treaty. Professor Burke-White notes tlte inconsistent reasonmg of the tnbunal in tlte Enron Award in this regard, 
which requires an exphc1t textual reference for a clause to be accepted as self-judging, but deems it appropriate to mfer 
the mcorporation of the necessity elements from customary mtemat10nal law without such a reference. see Burke-
Wh1te W & Von Staden A, above n50, note 157 
69 Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, 69 
70 Argentma did no plead "maintenance or restoration of international peace or security" which is the third element of 
the Treaty Defence 
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the defence of necessity at customary international law. The tribunal correctly maintained 
the distinction between treaty and customary international law, dismissing arguments by 
the claimant that sought to merge elements from the customary international law defence 
of necessity with the Treaty Defence: 
Claimants contend that the necessity defence should not be applied here because the 
measures implemented by Argentina were not the only means available to respond to the 
crisis. The Tribunal rejects this assertion. Article XI refers to situations in which a State 
has no choice but to act. A State may have many several responses at its disposal to 
maintain public order or protect its essential security interests.71 
This interpretation differs from that in the CMS Award, which imposed elements from the 
customary international law defence of necessity on the Treaty Defence, defeating its 
application. 
b) Compensation 
The LG&E tribunal was consistent in its treatment of the Treaty Defence as lex specialis 
when considering the question of damages.72 Holding that Argentina was not liable for 
damages during the period of the emergency: 
Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness 
of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability.73 
The tribunal regarded article 27 of the ILC Articles as inapplicable to the Treaty Defence, 
observing, obiter dictum, that in any event article 27 does not provide a conclusive 
answer to the question of compensation and does not specify the circumstances in which 
compensation would be payable. 74 
71 LG&E Award par 239 (author's emphasis) 
72 LG&E Award par 266 
73 LG&E Award pars 261 & 266 
74 LG&E Award par 260 citing Crawford J, The Internatwnal Law Commissions' Articles on State Respons1b1lity, 
Cambndge University Press, 2002, 178. The observat10ns in the CMS Annulment Decision were similar to those in the 
LG&E Award, par 146: 
Article XI, if for so long as it applied, excluded the operation of the substantive provisions of the BIT. That 
being so, there could be no possibility of compensation bemg payable dunng that period 
62 
Chapter 2 
c) Applying principles of treaty interpretation 
Despite undertaking to interpret the treaty in accordance with its obligations under the 
Vienna Convention, including where necessary customary international law,75 there is no 
evidence of their application in the LG&E Award in the consideration of the Treaty 
Defence. Had the tribunal been satisfied that all terms of the BIT were clear on a textual 
reading and could be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose", 76 a statement to this effect would have made the tribunal's reasoning clearer 
and clarified that the treaty was interpreted in accordance with the principles of 
international law. The tribunal came close to this when considering the question of 
compensation and article 27 of the ILC Articles where its application was dismissed 
because "the Tribunal's interpretation of Article XI of the Treaty provides the answer".77 
But again, a reference to applicable principles of treaty interpretation would make the 
tribunal's reasoning clearer. 
d) The Treaty Defence established 
The tribunal considered that evidence of the conditions in Argentina as of December 
2001 constituted the "highest degree of public disorder and threatened Argentina's 
essential security interests'',78 ultimately holding that "all of these devastating conditions 
- economic, political, social - in the aggregate triggered the protections afforded under 
Article XI of the Treaty to maintain order and control the civil unrest".79 Argentina was 
excused under article XI of the BIT from complying with other BIT obligations during a 
prescribed period because: 
75 LG&E Award mcluding pars 89, 99 & 206 
76 As required under the Vienna Convention, article 31 
77 LG&E Award par 260 
78 LG&E Award par 231 
79 LG&E Award par 237. The proceedmg paragraphs m the award summanse the economic, political and social cns1s m 
Argentma, refemng to the drop in Argentina's Gross Domestic Product, the loss of deposits m the banking system, the 
rise of unemployment to 25% and that almost half the population were hvmg below poverty. 
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from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003 Argentina was in a period of crisis during 
which it was necessary to enact measures to maintain public order and protect its 
essential security interests.80 
The approach taken in the LG&E Award is more convincing than that in the CMS Award 
from both a legal and policy perspective. It applies relevant legal principles and maintains 
the Treaty Defence established under the US-Argentina BIT as separate from the defence 
of necessity at customary international law and allows the states, in this case Argentina, 
greater freedom of action in cases of emergency.81 
2.5 Customary International Law Defence of Necessity 
The division between treaty law and other sources of international law is well 
established. 82 While treaty rules between states as !ex specialis have priority over rules of 
customary international law, it does not follow that customary rules become irrelevant. 
Having established that Argentina was excused from responsibility for violation of its 
obligations under article XI of the BIT, the LG&E Award addressed the second ground of 
defence pleaded by Argentina, the defence of necessity at customary international law.83 
The tribunal's consideration of the defence was obiter dictum however, it is important to 
consider how it was applied and to compare this interpretation with that adopted in the 
80 LG&E Award pars 226-229. These dates comcide with the freezing of funds on bank accounts and the elect10n of 
President Ktrchner, events which in the opimon of the tnbunal mark the beginnmg and end of the penod of extreme 
crisis The tribunal did not consider the mitial date for the state of necessity to be the date of the emergency law (6 
January 2002) reasonmg that the emergency had already started when the law was enacted. The state of emergency has 
still not been !tfted by Argentina. Indeed the country has issued a record number of emergency decrees smce 1901, 
emergency penods m Argentma bemg longer than non-emergency penods. 
81 Burke-White W & Von Staden A, above n50, 70. This thesis is concerned with the effects of the Argentine Cases on 
IC SID arb1trat1on and this chapter focuses on the emergence of conflictmg JUnsprudence m those cases. For an 
interestmg d1scuss1on on alternate methodologies for addressing the confl1ctmg app!tcat10n of the Treaty Defense and 
the defence of necessity at customary mtemat10nal law see: Kurtz J, "Adjudging the Exceptional at International Law: 
Security, Public Order and the Fmanctal Cns1s", Institute for International Law and Justice Working Papers 2008/6, 
New York Umvers1ty School of Law at htto://www.nlj.org/pub!tcations/2008-6Kurtz.asp (30 June 2009). 
82 See above at 2.2.2 
83 LG&E Award par 245 
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CMS Award. 84 The next section compares the interpretations of the defence of necessity 
adopted by the two tribunals. 
2.5.1 Customary international law defence in the CMS Award 
a) The "only way" criterion 
A key element of the customary international law defence of necessity is the requirement 
in article 25(1)(a) of the ILC Articles that measures adopted be "the only way for a State 
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril". 85 The tribunals in 
the Argentine Cases to date have agreed in principle on this requirement but have 
diverged on the crucial question of whether Argentina's measures responding to the crisis 
satisfy this criterion. 
Traditionally the "only way" requirement has been interpreted strictly. The ILC 
commentary states that the plea of necessity is "excluded if there are other (otherwise 
lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient"86 and that 
"the requirement of necessity is inherent in the plea: any conduct going beyond what is 
strictly necessary for the purpose will not be covered". 87 In the Gabcikovo Nagymaros 
Project Case the ICJ rejected the defence of necessity on the grounds that unilateral 
suspension and abandonment of a project was not the only course available in the 
circumstances. The court came to this conclusion after considering the amount of work 
already undertaken on the project, the money spent and the possibility of remedying 
84 This is particularly important for the remainmg Argentme Cases. Not all BITs will contam a separate defence of 
necessity as provided for m article XI of the US-Argentma BIT, nor does the existence of a treaty defence remove the 
defence at customary mtemational law. See above 2.2.4 
85 ILC Articles, article 25(1)(a) (author's emphasis) 
86 CMS Award pars 323-324 
87 
"Draft Articles on Responsib1hty of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries" Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two at 83 note (15) 
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problems by other means. 88 The stringency of the test was reaffirmed by the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion on Israel's Security Wall where it specifically endorsed article 25(l)(a) 
and found: 
that [it] was not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was 
the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked 
as justification for that construction.89 
In line with early interpretations, the CMS tribunal interpreted the "only way" 
requirement restrictively. It considered that "a variety of alternatives, including 
dollarization of the economy, granting of direct subsidies to the affected population or 
industries and many others" were available to Argentina and thus precluded satisfaction 
of the "only way" requirement.90 The tribunal avoided any analysis of the appropriateness 
I 
of these alternatives on the grounds that establishing which of these policy alternatives 
would have been better was beyond the scope of its task. 91 
The tribunal's failure to consider the suitability of policy alternatives available to 
Argentina leaves the threshold for the "only way" criterion restrictively high, and 
essentially bars this defence for use in an economic crisis. 92 The circumstances in which a 
government will have only one policy measure at its disposal are rare, if not non-
existent,93 a point acknowledged by the tribunal in Sempra v Argentina: 
A rather sad global comparison of experiences in the handling of economic crises shows 
that there are always many approaches to addressing and resolving such critical events. It 
88 Gabc1kovo Nagymaros Pro1ect Case at 55 cited m Intematmnal Law Commission, "Draft Articles on Respons1b1hty 
of States for lntemat10nally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries" Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 
II, Part Two, 2001, 83 note (15) 
89 Advisory Opinion on Israel's Security Wall at par 140 cited m Reimsch A, "Necessity m International Investlnent 
Arb1trat10n -An Unnecessary Split ofOpm10ns m Recent IC SID Cases? The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 
191, 199 
9° CMS Award pars 323, 324 
91 CMS Award par 324 
92 Remisch A, above n89, 200 
93 Waibel M, "Two World ofNecess1ty in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E'(2007) 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 637, note 57 and accompanying text 
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is therefore difficult to justify the position that only one of them was available in the 
Argentine case.94 
To hold that there were other ways of safeguarding relevant essential interests without 
considering whether these means would have been effective, or whether they were 
reasonable in the circumstances, leaves open the possibility that: those solutions were 
entirely inappropriate; may not have provided a resolution to the situation; or may have 
been entirely unreasonable in the circumstances. 
b) The "no contribution" requirement 
The defence of necessity is excluded if the state invoking necessity contributed to the 
situation of necessity.95 The CMS Award held that Argentina could not satisfy this 
requirement. 96 This was based on the sweeping assertion that: 
[Argentina's] policies and their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis and 
the emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel additional difficulties they do not 
exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in the matter.97 
The tribunal undertook no analysis or scrutiny of the degree of contribution made by 
Argentina, nor did it indicate what level of contribution is sufficient to negate the 
defence.98 The tribunal acknowledged that a state relying on the defence of necessity in 
the case of an economic crisis will almost always have contributed to the crisis: 
... similar to what is the case in most crises of this kind the roots extend both ways and 
include a number of domestic as well as international dimensions. This is the unavoidable 
consequence of the operation of a global economy where domestic and international 
factors interact.99 
94 Sempra Award par 350 
95 ILC Articles, articles 25(2)(b) 
96 CMS Award par 328 citing International Law Commiss10n, "Draft Articles on Respons1b1hty of States for 
Intemat1onally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries" Yearbook of the International Law Comm1sswn, Vol. II, Part Two, 
2001, 84 note (20) 
97 CMS Award par 329 
98 Reinisch A, above n89, 204 
99 CMS Award par 328 
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This acknowledgement essentially excludes a state from relying on the defence of 
necessity under customary international law in the case of an economic emergency. 
2.5.2 Customary international law defence in the LG&E Award 
a) The "only way" criterion 
The LG&E Award acknowledged the customary international law requirement that "the 
act must be the only means available to the state in order to protect an interest" .100 The 
tribunal also recognised the strictness ofthis test: 
[this] requirement implies that it has not been possible for the State to avoid by any other 
means, even a much more onerous one that could have been adopted and maintained the 
respect of international obligations. The State must have exhausted all possible means 
before being forced to act as it does. 101 
In spite of this, the tribunal approached the "only way'' element in a flexible manner. It 
interpreted Argentina's "economic recovery package" as one measure and did not break 
down the package into individual parts. This allowed the tribunal to conclude that: 
... an economic recovery package was the only means to respond to the crisis. Although 
there may have been a number of ways to draft the economic recovery plan, the evidence 
before the Tribunal demonstrates that an across the board response was necessary, and 
the tariffs on public utilities had to be addressed. 102 
The interpretation in the LG&E Award allows a state to react flexibly by choosing among 
several "necessary and legitimate measures"103 and maintains the viability of the defence 
in circumstances of economic crisis. 104 On the other hand, allowing the defence to be 
invoked where measures taken were not the "only way" to respond to the crisis 
circumvents the exceptional nature of the defence at customary international law, and 
100 LG&E Award par 250 
101 LG&E Award par 250 (citations omitted) 
102 LG&E Award par 257 
103 LG&E Award par 200 
104 Reimsch A, above n89, 201 
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potentially allows the defence to be established even if the specific elements of measures 
adopted were inadequate or inappropriate to respond to the situation. 
b) The "no contribution" requirement 
In contrast to the CMS Award, the LG&E Award held that "there is no serious evidence in 
the record that Argentina contributed to the crisis resulting in a state of necessity''. 105 The 
LG&E tribunal avoided analysing Argentina's contribution to the crisis by altering the 
burden of proof for this defence and placing it on the claimant: 106 
The Tribunal considers that. .. Claimants have not proved that Argentina has contributed 
to cause the severe crisis faced by the country. 107 
As a general principle of law, the burden of proof falls on the party invoking the 
exception. On this basis, the existence of each element had to be proved by Argentina as 
the party relying on the exception. 108 To require otherwise would leave the investor with 
an unreasonable burden to prove that a potential defence should not apply, which for all 
practical purposes, would be impossible to prove. 
2.5.3 Unsatisfactory application of the customary international law defence 
The tribunals' application of the defence is inadequate in both awards. The impact on the 
LG&E Award was minimal, as Argentina's defence was established under the Treaty 
Defence. Arguably the customary international law defence was interpreted to support 
this holding, or at least revealed an attempt by the tribunal to maintain the applicability of 
the defence to an economic crisis. The CMS Award's consideration of the customary 
international law defence was fundamental, as the tribunal read both limbs of Argentina's 
defence to rest on this highly exceptional defence. 
105 LG&E Award par 257 
106 Waibel M, above n93, 642 
107 LG&E Award par 256 
108 Schill SW, "International Investment Law and the Host State's Power to Handle Economic Crises - Comment on 
the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina" (2007) 24(3) Journal of Intematzonal Arbitration 265, 280 
69 
Chapter 2 
The customary international law defence of necessity is an exceptional defence and both 
tribunals recognised the need for care in its application to avoid abuse. If the strict 
conditions of the defence are loosely applied, a state could invoke necessity to elude its 
international obligations. The approaches in the CMS and LG&E Awards to the defence 
correctly identify the requisite elements of the defence but diverge on their application. 
The shortfalls in the tribunals' analysis of the defence stem from the difficulty of 
establishing causes and effects of a sovereign debt crisis, which are debated by 
economists indefinitely. 109 They also highlight that if the defence of necessity under 
customary international law is to maintain a role in an economic context, some 
consideration of adequacy of measures and proportionality is required. 110 The lack of 
jurisdiction to assess the adequacy of states macro-economic policies also contributes to 
the tribunal's failure to analyse the strict requirements of the defence in any depth. 111 
2.6 Binding Precedent in ICSID Awards 
There is no rule of binding precedent under the ICSID Convention; awards are binding 
only on the parties to the award. 112 While this principle is recognised by tribunals, 113 as a 
matter of practice, the reference by tribunals to earlier awards suggests that tribunals will 
carefully consider previous awards before making a decision. This was clearly put by the 
tribunal in El Paso Energy International Company v The Republic of Argentina: 
... the present Tribunal knows of no provision ... establishing an obligation of stare 
decisis. It is, nonetheless, a reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, 
notably those established within the ICSID system, will generally take account of the 
precedents established by other arbitration organs, especially those set by other 
international tribunals. The present Tribunal will follow the same line, especially since 
109 For an mterestmg discussion on the appropriateness of the defence of necessity to financial cnses see, Waibel M, 
aboven 93 
110 Reinisch A, above n89, 201 
111 Waibel M, above n93, 642 
112 ICSID Convention, article 53(1) 
113 Enron v Republic of Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/O 1/3 (Decision on Junsdict10n) par 8 
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both parties, in their written pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily relied on 
precedent. 114 
There are arguments that the doctrine of binding precedent should be formalised in ICSID 
arbitrations, and some tribunals have sought to incorporate this doctrine in their awards, 
holding that arbitrators: 
pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals ... subject to 
compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of 
consistent cases [and] a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of 
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of 
States and investors towards certainty of the rule oflaw. 115 
Setting aside the question of whether or not a system of formal precedent should be 
established, 116 some consideration of earlier decisions, particularly in a situation where 
the facts and legal issues of cases are virtually identical, is desirable. How earlier 
decisions are used calls for a balanced approach: 
The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has rendered its decision independently, without 
considering itself bound by any other judgments or arbitral awards. Having reached its 
conclusions, however, the Tribunal thought it useful to compare its conclusion with the 
conclusions reached in other recent arbitrations conducted pursuant to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and arising out of claims under contemporary bilateral investment 
treaties. We summarize a few of these decisions here, and confirm that we have not found 
or been referred to any decisions or awards reaching a contrary conclusion. 117 
This statement illustrates an awareness of earlier cases and a respectful consideration of 
the conclusions they have drawn. 
114 El Paso Energy International Company v The Republzc of Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 (Dec1S1on on 
Jurisdiction) par 39. See also, AES Corporation v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/17 (Dec1s10n on Junsd1ct1on) pars 
17-33, repeatmg the arguments of the claimant stated· 
decisions, treated more or less as if they were precedents, tends to say that Argentma's objections to the 
JUrisd1ct10n of this Tribunal are moot 1f not even useless since these tnbunals have already determined the 
answer to be given to identical or similar object10ns to Junsd1ction. 
115 Smpem SpA v Bangladesh ICSID Case no ARB/05107 (Dec1s10n on Jurisdict10n) par 67 cited m McLachlan C, 
above n20, 3 79 
116 This pomt 1s well debated by scholars see for example, Kaufmann-Kohler Gabrielle, "Arb1tral Precedent: Dream, 
Necessity or Excuse?" Freshfields Lecture (2007) 23 Arbitration International 357 
117 Gas Natural SDG, SA v The Argentine Republzc, ICSID Case No ARB/03/10 (Decision on Jurisdiction) cited D1 
Pietro D, "The Use of Precedents m ICSID Arbitration: Regulanty or Certamty?"(2007) 10 (3) International 
Arb1tratwn Law Review, note 22 
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In order for ICSID awards to contribute to the development of international law 
principles, tribunals must give appropriate regard to earlier decisions. A striking aspect of 
the LG&E Award is its selective reference to the CMS Award. The award cites the CMS 
Award in support of its findings on a number of occasions. 118 However, on the issue of 
Argentina's defence, where the tribunal diverges significantly from the CMS Award, it 
avoids any reference to the earlier decision. Although not bound by earlier awards, the 
failure to refer to the reasoning in the CMS Award on this issue raises doubts as to 
whether the LG&E tribunal's divergent opinion can be defended. It also fails to establish 
a complete and clear interpretation of the relevant legal issues. This approach is 
objectionable because it creates confusion on the interpretation of a significant area of 
law and makes it difficult for subsequent tribunals to rely on this jurisprudence either in a 
formal or informal context. 
The Sempra Award also referred selectively to previous ICSID awards relating to the 
defence of necessity. Acknowledging that the LG&E and CMS Awards had come to 
different findings regarding Argentina's defence, the tribunal followed the CMS Award 
based on its assessment of facts, remarking that "[t]his tribunal...is not any more 
persuaded ... about the crisis justifying the operation of emergency and necessity", 119 
neatly avoiding following or distinguishing "the differences in the legal interpretation"120 
made in the LG&E Award. 
Despite the lack of formal precedent in arbitration, the recourse to earlier awards by 
practitioners in order to advise and represent clients,121 and the use of early awards as an 
118 For example, m relation to fa1r and equitable treatment LG&E Award pars 125, 127-128; and m relation to the 
mterpretation of the umbrella clause LG&E Award par 171 
119 Sempra Award par 346 
120 Sempra Award par 346 
121 See Frank S D, "The Leg1t1macy Crisis In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pnvattzmg Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decis10ns" (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521, note 438, where she quotes vanous leading 
practitioners m their use of mvestment awards to interpret similar provis10ns m mvestment treaties. 
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informal precedent, is well established. 122 The pronouncement of conflicting arbitral 
awards in regard to substantive issues makes it difficult to formulate rules of general 
application; there should consequently be efforts to adhere to common principles in 
regard to both procedural and substantive issues, thus formulating rules of general 
application. 
2. 7 Impact of Inconsistency 
The inconsistencies in the CMS and LG&E Awards raise concerns that the Argentine 
Cases will be a major source of inconsistent ICSID awards. 123 The LG&E Award 
indicates that tribunals will not necessarily follow the informal precedent established by 
earlier tribunals. Furthermore, the expectation that Argentina will settle claims in light of 
the first few rulings seems unlikely following the conflicting awards. The very 
inconsistency of the awards could, to this end, prolong proceedings. Indeed, since the 
LG&E Award and the CMS Annulment Decision, Argentina has lodged annulment 
proceedings against both the Sempra and Enron Awards. 124 Arbitrator on several ICSID 
panels, Brigitte Stem, who wrote an article in 1980 on the lack of uniformity in arbitral 
122 Examples of tnbunals c1tmg previous awards in support for awards are numerous. See, CMS Award pars 110 & 116 
citing respectively Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed SA v United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 
and Wena v Egypt 
123 Inconsistency in arbitral awards 1s not particular to the Argentme Cases. Particular concerns over mcons1stency were 
raised followmg the high profile Lauder Arbitrations which involved two arbitral tribunals arriving at different 
conclus10ns over an identical dispute claimed under two separate BITs: CME v Czech Republzc and Ronald Lauder v. 
Czech Republic Case RH 2003. 55; UNCITRAL Award September 2001. Another well known example 1s the SGC 
Arbitrations where awards brought by an mvestor against two independent states were irreconcilable. The cases 
mvolved the mterpretat10n of the "umbrella clause". In the first case SGC Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A v. 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan IC SID Case No ARB/01/13 the Tnbunal came to the conclusion that an umbrella clause 
cannot transform a failure to pay fees under a concess10n contract mto a treaty breach. The Tribunal in the second case 
SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance SA v Republzc of Philippines ICSID Case No ARB/02/6 (29 January 2004) 
came to the opposite conclusion. 
124 The Secretary-General registered apphcat10ns against the Sempra Award on 30 January 2008 and the Enron Award 
on 22 May 2008 athttp://icsidworldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (30 May 2008). Applications for annulment have not 
been published however given the awards close reliance on the CMS Award it 1s likely that the divergent and more 
favourable reasonmg in the LG&E Award has influenced the applications for annulment. 
73 
Chapter 2 
law titled "The Arbitrations, One Problem, Three solutions" referred to the potential in 
the Argentine Cases for "20 arbitrations, one problem and 20 solutions". 125 
The Argentine Cases will be consulted by states and investors alike for guidance as to 
how a state may lawfully respond to national emergencies. The consideration of these 
issues in the early Argentine Cases provides conflicting guidance. The fact that these are 
the first of over 40 cases to address these issues accentuates the influence these cases will 
have. 
The possibility of inconsistent awards in IC SID arbitration means that parties may benefit 
from having more than one avenue to access arbitration. Lawyers may advise investors to 
structure investments in ways to capture potential inconsistencies. For example, a US 
citizen investing in Argentina through a French company potentially has the benefit of 
both the US-Argentina BIT and the French-Argentina BIT, and therefore a greater 
expectation of benefiting from a favourable interpretation of at least one of those treaties 
in the event a dispute arises. 126 
Lack of clarity and consistency of rules of law and their application has a detrimental 
effect on those governed by those rules and their ability and desire to adhere to those 
rules. It upsets predictability and prevents reliance on the system by its clients; 
individuals, companies and governments cannot anticipate how to comply with the law 
and plan their conduct accordingly. 127 Investors become unable to predict whether 
coverage afforded by investment treaties will in fact be awarded to them, while states are 
left to explain why they are subject to damage for awards for millions of dollars in one 
case but not another. 128 The Argentine cases may influence the view that predictability of 
ICSID arbitral awards is so incalculable that the risks of proceeding with arbitration 
125 Quoted m Goldhaber MD, "Wanted: A World Investment Court" (2004) 1 (3) July Transnational Dispute 
Management 
126 This scenano 1s at the centre of the Lauder Arb1trat1ons see above note 123. Franck S D, above nl21, 1534 
127 Ibid, 1584 
128 Ibid, 1558 
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outweigh the potential benefits. A tribunal's ability to interpret a treaty provision so 
restrictively as to deprive a state of a legal mechanism designed to reallocate risks in 
exceptional circumstances, 129 such as occurred in the CMS Award, means that states may 
need to reconsider the benefits of concluding or renewing BITs. 
The first awards in the Argentine Cases have not generated a smooth beginning for the 
assessment of applicable international law rules and the defences of necessity under 
treaty and customary international law. It remains to be seen whether tribunals in the 
remaining cases will be guided by the decision in the LG&E Award enabling the 
establishment of an informal precedent and a settling of legal principles, or whether the 
divergence of opinion on the issues in Argentine Cases will persist over the next few 
years. What is clear is that ICSID will not benefit from the latter. Conflicting awards 
regarding the Treaty Defence and the defence of necessity at customary international law 
mean that Argentina was able to establish a defence in one case but not in others. This 
logically leads to a consideration of the review options available for ICSID awards, the 
subject of the following chapter. 
129 Burke-White W, "The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liab1hty Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the IC SID 
System" (January 24, 2008) University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics, Research Paper 
No. 08-01, 75 at http://ssm.com/abstract=I088837 (I May 2008) 
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Chapter 3 
Review of ICSID Awards 
Chapter 2 examined the inconsistencies between early awards in the Argentine Cases, 
focusing on the tribunals' consideration of Argentina's defences of necessity. The 
existence of contradictory rulings in virtually identical cases suggests that at least one 
award is incorrect. Hence the need to consider the options available to parties seeking a 
review of ICSID awards. This chapter considers the grounds of review available under 
the ICSID Convention, with a particular focus on annulment proceedings which have 
been instituted in a number of the Argentine Cases. 
The grounds for annulment are limited to an exclusive list of procedural errors under 
article 52 and the ICSID Convention provides no review for errors of substance. The first 
decision on annulment in the Argentine Cases against the CMS Award (hereinafter the 
"CMS Annulment Decision") underlines the narrow scope for annulment of ICSID 
awards. In spite of errors in the award identified by the committee, the award remains 
binding on the parties. This emphasises that currently the ICSID system requires a 
demonstrably incorrect award to retain its binding force. 
This chapter explores the debate regarding the adequacy of the annulment procedure and 
the balance between the competing objectives of finality and accuracy. Against this 
background it analyses the CMS Annulment Decision. The chapter proceeds sequentially 
through the committee's decision, not to reconsider the parties' substantive arguments, 
but to demonstrate how the committee has applied the procedural ground for annulment. 
It discusses the potential impact of the Argentine Cases on the ICSID annulment 
mechanism and the contribution the cases may make to the development of a more 
comprehensive review of IC SID awards. 
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3.2 Review of Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards 
The breadth of review of decisions in legal systems varies considerably. The review of a 
decision, judgment or award can occur at two levels. The first level is a review of 
process, the second a review of substance. A review of process refers to the framework in 
which a decision is made, including the powers and composition of a tribunal. A review 
of substance concerns the content of a decision and the correctness of the determination 
of the facts of a dispute and the application of law to those facts. 1 
Traditionally the general policy of arbitration, in both a domestic and international 
context, is that an arbitral award is final and binding. Any review is limited to questions 
of procedure, thus adhering to and protecting the finality of a tribunal's award. 2 There is 
no coherent system for the review of arbitral awards in investment treaty arbitration and 
the extent of review permissible depends on the system under which an award is rendered 
and enforced. 3 Of those systems, IC SID arbitration abides most closely to the 
presumption of finality, by offering only a very limited scope for review of its arbitral 
awards. 
The ICSID process is self-contained and the ICSID Convention does not allow for review 
of awards by domestic courts or authorities, at any stage, or in relation to any aspect of 
the proceedings.4 The review of ICSID awards is limited to the grounds provided in the 
ICSID Convention: 
1 Walsh T, "Substantive Review ofICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality" 
(2006) 24(2) Berkley Journal of International Law 444, 451 
2 Feldman MB, "The Annulment Proceedmgs and the Finality ofICSID Arbitral Awards" (1987) 2 ICSID Review 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 85, 85 
3 The maJonty of mvestment treaty arbitrations are conducted under IC SID. A stgmficant number are also conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules, see above, Chapter 1, n43 
4 ICSID Convention, article 26: 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise states, be deemed consent to 
such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy .. 
For a discussion on the enforcement of ICSID Awards see below 4.2.2(b) 
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i) rectification of any clerical, arithmetical or similar error;5 
ii) interpretation of a dispute concerning the meaning or scope of the award;6 
iii) revision of an award on the ground that new facts have emerged which may affect the 
award decisively and were unknown to the tribunal and to the party seeking to introduce 
these facts; 7 or 
iv) the grounds for annulment under article 52 are met.8 
5 ICSID Convention, article 49(2): 
(2) The Tribunal upon the request of a party made within 45 days after the date on which the award was 
rendered may after notice to the other party decide any question which it had omitted to decide m the award, 
and shall rectify any clerical, anthmet1cal or similar error in the award. Its decis10n shall become part of the 
award and shall be notified to the parties m the same manner as the award. The periods of time provided for 
under paragraph (2) of Article 51 and paragraph (2) of Article 52 shall run from the date on which the dec1S1on 
was rendered. 
6 ICSID Convent10n, article 50: 
(1) If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning or scope of an award, either party may 
request mterpretation of the award by an apphcat1on in wnting addressed to the Secretary-General. 
(2) The request shall, 1f possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be 
possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted m accordance with Sect10n 2 ofth1s Chapter. The Tribunal may, if 
it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award pendmg its dec1s10n. 
7 IC SID Convention, article 51. Revision of awards is by the same or a new tribunal. The new elements must be ones of 
fact and not law and the facts must be of such a nature that they would have led to a different decision had they been 
known to the tribunal. 
8 ICSID Convention, article 52: 
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application m writing addressed to the Secretary-
General on one or more of the following grounds: 
(a) that the tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the tribunal has mamfestly exceeded its powers; 
( c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or 
( e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which 1t 1s based. 
(2) The application shall be made withm 120 days after the date on which the award was rendered except that 
when annulment 1s requested on the ground of corruption such apphcat10n shall be made within 120 days after 
discovery of the corruption and in any event within three years after the date on which the award was rendered. 
(3) On receipt of the request the Chairman shall forthwith appomt from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoe 
Committee of three persons. None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal 
which rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality as any such member, shall be a natmnal of the State 
party to the dispute or of the State whose national 1s a party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the 
Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have acted as a conciliator m the same dispute. The 
Committee shall have the authority to annul the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in 
paragraph ( 1 ). 
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Annulment is the highest level of review of an ICSID award. Whereas rectification 
(article 49(2)), interpretation (article 50) and revision (article 51) can be made by the 
tribunal which rendered the award, a request for annulment (article 52) is submitted to an 
ad hoe committee of three arbitrators appointed by the chairman of ICSID's Arbitration 
Council. The committee may not include any person who served on the original tribunal, 
or who is of the same nationality of any member of that tribunal or either party to the 
d. 9 procee mgs. 
In contrast to ICSID, an investment treaty award rendered under other arbitration rules, 
such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the ICC Arbitration Rules, is not subject to 
an internal annulment procedure. These awards do, however, face potential review by 
domestic courts, whether in the country at the seat of arbitration or the country where 
enforcement of an award is sought.10 The extent an arbitral award can be thus reviewed 
is limited by the relevant state's arbitration statute. 11 In most jurisdictions scope for 
review is narrow and limited to questions of legitimacy of process, though some countries 
allow for review on issues of law. A significant number of states base their arbitration 
statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model 
Law). 12 In addition to a number of procedural grounds, article 36(1 )(b) of the Model Law 
(4) The provisions of Articles 41-45, 48, 49, 53 and 54, and of Chapters VI and VII shall apply mutatzs 
mutandis to proceedmgs before the Committee. 
(5) The Committee may, if it considers that the ctrcumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award 
pending its decision. If the applicant requests a stay of enforcement of the award in his application, enforcement 
shall be stayed provtsionally until the Committee rules on such request. 
(6) If the award is annulled the dispute shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to a new Tnbunal 
constituted m accordance with Section 2 ofth1s Chapter 
9 ICSID Convention, article 52(3). This ensures a fresh committee is established, but removes the aspect of choice used 
by the parties when establishing the tnbunal under articles 31 (2) and 40(2). 
1° Franck S D, "The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Intematmnal Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions" (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521, 1551 & 1555 
11 Walsh T, above nl, 451 
12 The Model Law 1s designed to assist states m reforming and modermzing thetr laws on international commercial 
arbitration. It is not a treaty but a template which states are able to adopt if they chose. The Model Law reflects 
worldwide consensus on key aspects of intemat10nal arbitration practice having been accepted by states of all regions 
and the different legal or economic systems of the world. See, UNCITRAL Model Law on Intematzonal Commercial 
Arbitration (amended 2006) at htto.//www.unc1tral.org/pd£'enghsh/texts/arb1tration/ml-arb/07-86998 Ebook.pdf (6 
November 2008) 
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permits national courts to decline to enforce an award ifthe subject matter of the dispute 
is not capable of settlement by arbitration or, if recognition or enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to public policy. 13 A state's grounds for review of arbitral awards can 
be wider than those suggested under the Model Law. Illustrative is the position in the 
United Kingdom under the Arbitration Act 1996, which provides that a party may appeal 
to the court on a question of law when the decision of the tribunal is "obviously wrong" 
or "of general public importance" and is "at least open to serious doubt" .14 
Parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 1958 (the "New York Convention") have additional grounds by which to block 
enforcement of awards. The New York Convention provides for limited grounds on 
which national courts can decline to recognise and enforce an award. In contrast to 
ICSID, the New York Convention allows a national court to refuse to recognise and 
enforce an award if it would "be contrary to the public policy of that country" .15 
13 UNCITRAL Model Law on lntematwnal Commercial Arb1tratwn (amended 2006), article 36(1 )(b) cited m Baldwm 
E, Kantor M & Nolan M, "L1m1ts to Enforcement ofICSID Awards" (2006) 23(1) Journal oflnternatwnal Arbitratwn 
1, 4 
14 Arbitratwn Act 1996 (United Kingdom) section 69 - this is a non-mandatory fall back prov1s1on, which only applies 
to the extent that the parties have not made their own arrangements regulatmg this issue, for example an agreement to 
arbitrate under the ICC Rules has the effect of excluding the right to appeal to the court on a point oflaw because the 
rules provide that the parties waive their nght to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can be validly be made; 
ICC Rule, Article 28(6) in Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Col/ms on The Conflict of Laws, 14th Ed1t1on, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2006, 728; Indonesia provides another example, it specifically allows an award to be set aside 1f1t 
"contains contradictory dec1s10ns" Sudgargo Gaetama, Indonesia, m Paulsson Jed., "Intemat1onal Handbook on 
Commercial Arb1trat1on" at annex I-4, art. 643 cited m Franck S D, above nl 0, notes 114 & 124 
15 New York Convention, article V : 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom 1t 1s 
mvoked, only 1f that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement 1s 
sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement 1s not vahd under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failmg any 
indicat10n thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party agamst whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedmgs or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
( c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not fallmg within the terms of the submission to 
arbitrat10n, or it contams decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, proVIded that, 
if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the 
award which contains decmons on matters submitted to arbitrat10n may be recognized and enforced; or 
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3.3 Annulment under ICSID 
The exclusive grounds for annulment under article 52 of the ICSID Convention are that: 
(a) the tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
( c) there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; 
( d) there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or 
(e) the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
The most frequently used grounds for annulment are those in paragraphs (b) and ( e) 
above, this chapter focuses on these grounds. 
3.3.1 Distinguishing annulment from appeal 
Annulment under the ICSID Convention is a procedural review, not a substantive review 
or an appeal on the merits of an award. This distinction is clear from the wording of 
article 53, which provides that "the award shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in the ICSID Convention". Annulment 
proceedings thus constitute an "other remedy" provided for under the Convention. 16 The 
practical difference between annulment and appeal is also clear from its respective 
outcome: the result of a successful annulment application is the invalidation of the 
original decision; in contrast, a successful appeal results in the modification of a decision. 
In other words, a decision maker exercising the power to annul has two choices, to leave 
(d) The composition of the arb1tral authority or the arbitral procedure was not m accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, or, falling such agreement, was not m accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or 
( e) The award has not yet become bmdmg on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
authonty of the country m which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recogmtion and enforcement of an arb1tral award may also be refused if the competent authonty m the 
country where recogmtton and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference 1s not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; 
or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public pohcy of that country. 
16 Schreuer C, The ICSJD Convention· A Commentary, Cambridge Umvers1ty Press, Cambridge (200 I), 891 par 8 
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the original decision intact or to declare it void; an appeals body may, on the other hand, 
substitute its own decision on the merits for a decision it finds to be deficient. 17 
An ICSID tribunal's mistake of law or fact cannot justify the annulment of an award as 
neither of these grounds constitutes a ground for annulment under article 52. The role of 
the ad hoe committee is to examine the procedural propriety of the award. 18 The 
annulment procedure was drafted as an exceptional remedy to ensure that the arbitrators 
do not exceed their jurisdiction and that proceedings conform to minimum standards of 
procedural justice.19 
The language used in article 52 - "manifest", "serious" and "fundamental" - suggests on 
ordinary principles of interpretation that the powers of an ad hoe committee were 
intended to be extremely limited.20 The ad hoe committee in Maritime International 
Nominees Establishment v Republic of Guinea (hereinafter the MINE Case) described the 
limited function of annulment proceedings in the following terms: 
Article 52(1) makes it clear that annulment is a limited remedy. This is further confirmed 
by the exclusion of review of the merits of awards by Article 53. Annulment is not a 
remedy against an incorrect decision. Accordingly, an ad hoe Committee may not in fact 
reverse an award on the merits under the guise of applying article 52.21 
Despite its exceptional nature, the first two awards referred to annulment committees in 
the 1980s were annulled.22 These decisions were considered to have exceeded their 
mandate, going beyond the safeguard of procedural regularity and penetrating the merits 
17 Ibid, 891par10 
18 Franck S D, above nlO, 1546 
19 ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States (1965) 4 ILM 524 cited in Feldman MB, above n2, 10 
20 Redfern A, "IC SID Losmg its appeal" (1987) 3 Arbitration International 98, 102 
21 Maritime Internatwnal Nominees Establishment v Republic of Gum ea ICSID Case No ARB/84/4 (Decision on 
Annulment) (MINE Case); see also, Schreuer C, above n16, 892 par 12 
22 Klocknerlndustrie-Anglagen GmbH and others v Umted Republic of Cameroon & Societe Camerounaise des Engrais 
ICSID Case No ARB/81/2 (Decis10n on Annulment); Amco v Indonesia ICSID Case No ARB/81/1 (Decision on 
Annulment), 25 (1986) ILM 1439 
82 
Chapter 3 
of the disputes they examined,23 improperly crossing the line between annulment and 
appeal.24 
The use of annulment proceedings as a quasi-appeal generated concerns regarding the 
finality and legitimacy of ICSID awards25 and critics argued that ICSID arbitration would 
degenerate into an inconclusive battle between arbitrations, with all cases resulting in two 
proceedings.26 The former Secretary-General of ICSID, Ibrahim Shiliata, commented 
that: 
If the parties, dissatisfied with an award made it practise to seek annulment, the 
effectiveness of the IC SID machinery might become questionable and both investors and 
Contracting States might be deterred from making use ofICSID arbitration.27 
The early annulment decisions have been dismissed as a "breaking in" period of 
inexperience among arbitrators and lack of "any previous interpretation of the 
[Washington] Convention and a lack of sufficiently clear or consistent indications from 
prior international practice" .28 Subsequent ad hoe committees have confirmed the limited 
nature of annulment proceedings, which is illustrated below. 
3.3.2 Manifest excess of power (article 52(l)(b)) 
The parameters of an ICSID tribunal's power lie in the ICSID Convention and any other 
additional agreements between the parties.29 Any tribunal which goes beyond these 
parameters exceeds its powers. In order to constitute a ground for annulment, an excess 
of power must also be "manifest", which relates not to the gravity of the excess of power, 
23 Knull W H & Rubins N D, "Betting the Farm on International Arb1trat10n: Is tt ttme to offer and appeal option?" 
(2000) 11 American Review of International Arb1tratwn 531, 552 
24 Schreuer C, "Three Generations oflCSID Annulment Proceedmgs" m Gaillard E & Banifatemi, Y (Eds) LAI 
lnternatwnal Arbitration Series NO. 1, Annulment of ICSID Awards Juns Pubhshing, 2004, 17, 18 
25 There ts no appeal from the decision of an ad hoe committee annullmg an award. The only option for a disgruntled 
party 1s to resubmit the case for arbttratton by a new tribunal under ICSID Convention article 52(6). 
26 Feldman MB, above n2, 7 
27 IC SID, Report of the Secretary of State to the Administrative Council ICSID Doc. No. AC/86/4 Oct 2 1986 Annex A 
28 Klocknerlndustrie-Anglagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon & Soc1ete Camerounaise des Engrais 
ICSID Case No ARB/81/2 (Dec1s1on on Annulment) par 118 cited m Knull W H & Rubins N D, "Bettmg the Farm on 
lntemattonal Arbitration: Is it time to offer and appeal option?" (2000) 11 American Review of lnternatwnal 
Arbitration 531, 553 
29 Schreuer C, above nl6, 932 par 135 
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but to the ease with which it is perceived.30 It requires that an excess of power be self-
evident and not the product of elaborate interpretations one way or another.31 
In establishing whether a tribunal has exceeded its powers, ad hoe committees will turn to 
the well established concept of excess of powers of arbitral tribunals in public 
international law.32 An award by a tribunal that lacks jurisdiction is an obvious example 
of an excess of power. 33 Article 25 of the IC SID Convention deals with the elements of 
jurisdiction; a deficiency in meeting any of these requirements would mean there is no 
jurisdiction over a dispute.34 For example, a dispute which did not arise directly out of an 
30 Ibid, 933 par 138, the reqmrement that an excess of powers be manifest means that not every excess of power or 
departure from a rule of procedure is sufficient to annul an award, making it a narrower ground for control of awards 
than those contamed m other arbitration regimes, 
31 Wena v Egypt par 25 
32 For example the ad hoe committee in Klockner referred to the Permanent Court of Arb1trat10n's award m Orinco 
Steamship Company Permanent Court of Arb1trat10n, October 25, 1910 (The Hague Court Reports at 226) as 
establishing the defimtlon of excess of powers: 
"The excess of power may consist not only m deciding a question not submitted to the arbitrators, but also m 
m1smterpretmg the express prov1s10ns of the Agreement governing the manner m which they are to reach their 
decision, notably with regard to the statutes or pnnc1ples oflaw to be applied ... Excess of power can take the 
form of the failure of the arbitrator to apply the rules set forth m the arb1trat10n agreement or m the application 
of other rules" 
33 Schreuer C, above n16, 936 par 147 
34 ICSID Convention, article 25: 
(1) TheJunsd1ction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute ansing directly out of an investment, 
between a Contractmg State (or any constituent subd1v1s1on or agency of a Contractmg State designated to the 
Centre by that State) and a nat10nal of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
umlaterally. 
(2) "Nat10nal of another Contractmg State" means: 
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contractmg State other than the State party to the dispute on 
the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the 
date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, 
but does not include any person who on either date also had the nationality of the Contractmg State party to the 
dispute; and 
(b) any JUndical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute 
on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any Jundical 
person which had the nationality of the Contractmg State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of 
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contractmg State for the 
purposes of this Convent10n. 
(3) Consent by a constituent subd1vis1on or agency ofa Contracting State shall reqmre the approval of that State 
unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is reqmred. 
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time ofratification, acceptance or approval ofth1s Convention or at any 
time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which 1t would or would not consider 
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investment, a dispute where there was no consent to arbitration, or if the investor's 
nationality requirements are not met, would all serve as the basis for a claim that there 
has been an excess of power and grounds for annulment under article 52(1 )(b ). 35 
Failure to apply the proper law to arbitration has also been held to constitute a manifest 
excess of power and ground for annulment. 36 The clearest example is where the parties 
agree to apply a certain law to a dispute, such as the laws of Argentina, and the tribunal 
applies a different law, such as the law of Germany. Ad hoe committees have drawn a 
distinction between the failure to apply a law and error in its application. An assessment 
of the latter reopens the merits in the proceedings and turns an annulment into an 
appeal. 37 The reasoning for this ground of annulment was explained by the ad hoe 
committee in the MINE Case: 
[A] tribunal's disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation from the 
terms ofreference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function. Examples of 
such derogation include the application of rules oflaw other than the ones agreed by the 
parties, or a decision not based on any law unless the parties had agreed on a decision ex 
aequo et bono. If the derogation is manifest, it entails a manifest excess of power. 
Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished from erroneous application 
of those rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for 
annulment.38 
The concept of an excess of a power as a ground of control to arbitral awards is not 
unique to ICSID arbitration, however the requirement that such excess of power be 
"manifest" requires a strictness of interpretation which reinforces the protection of the 
principle of finality of IC SID awards. 
submitting to the junsd1ction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to 
all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent reqmred by paragraph(!). 
35 Schreuer C, above n 16, 93 7 par 149 
36 Klocknerindustne-Anglagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon & Soczete Camerounazse des Engrazs 
I CS ID Case No. ARB/81/2 (Decis10n on Annulment) (Klockner), Amco v Indonesia ICSID Case No ARB/81/1 
(Decision on Annulment) par 515, 25 ILM 1439(1986); MINE Case (Dec1s1on on Annulment) par 87 
37 Wena v Egypt par 22 
38 MINE Case (Decision on Annulment) pars 5.03-5.04 
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3.3.3 Failure to state reasons (article 52(1)(e)) 
Under article 48(3) of the ICSID Convention a tribunal is required to state reasons39 and 
the failure to state reasons is grounds for annulment under article 52(1)(e). Although the 
provision of reasons for an arbitral or judicial decision is widely regarded as a 
prerequisite for the orderly administration of justice,40 its inclusion as a mandatory 
requirement is not universal. The provision of reasons is thought to improve the quality of 
the arbitral decision and is widely regarded as a rule of international public policy. The 
argument against the provision of reasons is that without this requirement awards would 
be issued more speedily and were less subject to challenge. 
International arbitration rules generally require reasons to be given for an award either 
always41 or always unless otherwise agreed between the parties.42 The codification of the 
requirement to state reasons does not identify the standard of the reasons to be provided 
or indicate how a tribunal will satisfy that standard.43 
Annulment for the failure to state reasons in ICSID awards was interpreted in the MINE 
Case, and subsequently in Vivendi v Argentina44 and Wena v Egypt,45 as limited to the 
scrutiny of the legitimacy and integrity of the process of the decision and not extending to 
consider the adequacy of a tribunal's reasoning.46 The purpose of the requirement is to 
explain to the reader of the award how and why the tribunal came to its decision. This is 
emphasised by the fact that the remedy for this ground need not be the annulment of the 
39 ICSID Convention, article 48(3): 
The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tnbunal, and shall state the reasons on which 1t 1s 
based 
40 Schreuer C, above nl 6, 984 par 265 
41 ICC Article 25(2); ICAC paragraph 41(1) 
42 UNCITRAL Rules Article 32(3) 
43 For a detailed discussion on the proV1s10n of and adequacy of reasons m mternational mvestment arbitration awards 
see Alvarez G & Reisman (eds), The Reasons Requirement m lnternatwnal Investment Arb1tratwn: Critical Case 
Studies, Martmez N11hoff Publishers, 2008 
44 Compaii[a de Aguas de! Aconquifa SA. and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/97 /3 
pars 64, 65 
45 Wena v Egypt pars 81-83 
46 Walsh T, above nl, 453 
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award, but an ad hoe committee may itself be able to explain the reasons lacking from the 
original decision.47 
There is a fine balance to this ground for annulment, because questioning the presence of 
a statement of reasons easily becomes a substantive test of the adequacy and correctness 
of those reasons, thus blurring the division between annulment and appeal. 48 Ad hoe 
committees aware of this danger have sought to carefully define the difference between 
grounds for annulment and a review of the legal merits of an award: 
The adequacy of the reasoning is not an appropriate standard of review under paragraph 
l(e), because it almost inevitably draws an ad hoe committee into an examination of the 
substance of the tribunal's decision in disregard of the exclusion of the remedy of appeal 
by article 53 of the Convention. A Committee might be tempted to annul an award 
because that examination disclosed a manifestly incorrect application of the law, which, 
however, is not a ground for annulment. 
In the Committee's view, the requirement to state reasons is satisfied as long as the award 
enables one to follow how the tribunal proceeded from Point A. to Point B. and 
eventually how it came to its conclusion, even if it made an error of fact or oflaw.49 
3.4 Annulment v Finality in Arbitral Awards 
There is ongoing debate about the adequacy of the current IC SID annulment provisions.50 
The perception of adequacy or otherwise of annulment provisions rests on the value 
placed on two conflicting principles at work in the review process: the principle of 
finality, and the principle of correctness. These principles are directly related to the level 
of review allowed. A review of process upholds the notion of finality and allows for the 
quick and economical settlement of disputes. In contrast, the principle of correctness is an 
elusive goal tied to substantive review which takes time and effort and may involve 
several layers of control.51 
47 Wena v Egypt par 83 
48 Schreuer C, above n16, 990 par 279 
49 MINE Case (Decision on Annulment) par 88 cited m Wena v Egypt par 77 
so See generally, Knull W H & Rubins ND, above n23, 531; Franck S D, above nlO; & Walsh T, above nl 
51 Schreuer C, above n16, 893 par 14 
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The ICSID Convention is drafted to ensure the finality of ICSID Awards. This is evident 
from the limited grounds of annulment and the clear distinction drawn between 
annulment and appeal.52 In this way ICSID adopts the traditional approach to arbitration, 
promoting finality as one of its main advantages over judicial settlement. In a judicial 
system, cases containing legal error are theoretically controlled by courts of appeal. It is 
argued that the exercise of comparable control in ICSID arbitration cannot be exercised 
without the control becoming more damaging to the system than the decisions which 
provoked the appeal.53 For this reason, errors by arbitrators in ICSID proceedings are an 
accepted risk and form part of the price of arbitration. 54 
Others argue that the pre-eminent goal in investment arbitration is to remove the decision 
making from the hands of untrustworthy domestic courts and that this, along with factors 
such as ease in enforceability, plays a greater role in the choice of arbitration than its final 
and binding nature. 55 In IC SID arbitration, where the stakes are high both in terms of 
money and public interest, the lack of an appeals process, potentially allowing for 
inconsistent or incorrect decisions, is inappropriate. Investment treaty disputes often 
involve major infrastructure, mining, manufacturing and other large contracts which 
attract international finance and participation. These projects may last for decades, 
involve resources vital to a state's wellbeing, and carry investments of hundreds of 
thousands or even thousands of millions of dollars. Although finality may be considered 
an advantage by some parties, when it comes at the risk of a party having to live with 
flawed or inconsistent awards on the same or very similar questions or facts, its appeal is 
greatly weakened and parties are less likely to accept these awards. 56 
52 IC SID, Report of the Secretary of State to the Administrative Council IC SID Doc. No. AC/86/4 Oct 2 1986 Annex A 
cited in Redfern A, above n20, 118 
53 Feldman M B, above n2, 14 
54 Knull W H & Rubms ND, above n23, 535; Goldhaber MD, "Wanted: A World Investment Court" (2004) 1(3) July 
Transnatwnal Dispute Management 
55 Goldhaber M D, above n54 
56 Knull W H & Rubins ND, above n23, 537 
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IC SID awards are often based on principles of public law and are published as public law 
decisions. 57 This contrasts with commercial arbitration disputes which often remain 
confidential and are limited to issues of private law.58 The consideration of public 
international law principles by ICSID tribunals, such as the customary international law 
defence of necessity and BIT defences, gives ICSID awards a wider audience than the 
mere parties to the dispute. Therefore, the legal reasoning of ICSID awards must form 
part of a coherent legal jurisprudence which is accurate and correct. The lack of a 
substantive review of IC SID awards means that if a tribunal decides an issue incorrectly, 
that decision remains final and binding despite its inaccuracy. 
3.4.1 Moving towards an appeal? 
The debate regarding the need for a higher review for ICSID arbitral awards has become 
more significant as international investment arbitration has increased. Disillusionment 
with arbitration has been expressed in scholarly articles59 and evidenced in headlines of 
business publications: "Happy endings not guaranteed; Arbitration doesn't always live 
up to its Billings";60 "Wanted: A World Investment Court: All-powerful global 
institutions may be out of fashion. But, as recent arbitration rulings show, they may be 
exactly what the world needs."61 Dissatisfaction with ICSID's current annulment 
procedure is also evident in state practice. 
57 Gnffith G, "The role of arbitrators m pubhc law and the mterface between private and public law" ICC International 
Arbitration Practitioner's Symposium, London, 3 July 2008 
58 ICSID Convention, article 48 concerns the publication ofICISD Awards. This provision was slightly modified on 10 
Apnl 2006. Article 48(5) provides: 
The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly 
include m its publications excerpts of the legal reasonmg of the Tnbunal. 
Although the entire award 1s not publtshable without the parties consent, under this provision the legal reasonmg of the 
tribunal will be publtshed which assists in developing international law and transparency 
59 See generally, Franck S D, above nlO; Knull W H & Rubins ND, above n23 
60 Business Week, 20 November 2000 cited m Knull W H & Rubms N D, above n23, 532 
61 Goldhaber M D, above n54 
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Investment agreements between some states have recently included provision for the 
development of ad hoe appeal mechanisms.62 The US Trade Act 2002 sets out a number 
of objectives with respect to foreign investment, including negotiating an appellate 
mechanism for investment disputes under free trade agreements. 63 As a consequence US 
Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Singapore, the Dominican Republic, Morocco and the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT include the following or similar language regarding an appellate 
mechanism: 
Within three years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall 
consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review 
awards rendered under Article ... in arbitrations commenced after they establish the 
appellate body or similar mechanism. 64 
The development of ad hoe appeal mechanisms in individual agreements is likely to 
fragment the dispute resolution system and fuel the inconsistent interpretation and 
application of investment laws. It also risks such a provision being used as a bargaining 
tool in negotiating bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements, while 
potentially creating grounds for Most Favoured Nation ("MFN") provisions to allow for 
an appeal system in treaties that had not envisaged one. 65 Decisions of ad hoe appeal 
bodies may, moreover, be perceived as creating precedent and influencing case law. An 
unchecked system created by states on an ad hoe basis with no international agreement 
potentially presents a greater threat to the development of investment treaty law than that 
under ICSID. 
62 Orgamzation for Cooperation of Economic Development, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
an Overview, Working Papers on International Investment Number 2006/1, 9 
63 19 U.S.C. par.3802 (b )(3)(G)(iv) cited m Orgamzatton for Cooperat10n of Economic Development, Improving the 
System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: an Overview, Workmg Papers on Intemat10nal Investment Number 
2006/1, 9 
64 US Model BIT 2004 at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Sectors/Investment/Model BIT/asset upload file847 6897.pdf cited m OCED, 
"Improvmg the system of Investor-State dispute settlement: an overview" Workmg Papers on International Investment 
Number 200611, 9 
65 Orgamzation for Cooperation of Economic Development, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement. an Overview, Workmg Papers on International Investment Number 2006/1, 10. An MFN provision enables 
mvestors to profit from more favourable provis10ns given to nat10nals ofthtrd states, see Chapter 1 n22 
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A joint meeting between the OECD Investment Committee and ICSID debated the 
possibilities of an appellate mechanism in investor-state arbitration. The discussions 
focused on developments with respect to the creation of an appeal mechanism, and its 
advantages and drawbacks. 66 It was agreed that if international appellate procedures were 
to be introduced for investment treaty arbitrations, it would be better addressed through a 
single ICSID mechanism rather than by the ad hoe mechanisms established under 
emerging treaties.67 
The IC SID Secretariat recently tabled a suggested draft for an appeals facility. 68 It 
envisaged an appeals panel composed of 15 persons, each from a different country, of 
recognised authority and with demonstrated expertise in law, international investment and 
investment treaties. 69 Under the proposal an award could be challenged for a clear error 
of law and serious errors of fact in addition to the five grounds of annulment currently set 
out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.70 
3.4.2 Maintaining the status quo 
Despite the disquiet, amendments to the ICSID Convention on April 10 200671 did not 
include an appeals facility or any changes to the current annulment procedure. The idea 
was rejected as premature,72 but the ICSID Secretariat did commit to "continue to study 
66 Ibid, 9 
67 Ibid. See also, ICSID Secretanat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration Discussion Paper, 
Para 10, 22 October, 2004 at http://www.worldbank.org/tcsid/l11ghhghts/tmprove-arb.pdf (22 July 2008); ICSID 
Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulatwns, Working Paper of the ICSID Secretanat, 12 May, 
2005, par 4 at http://www.worldbank.org/tcsid/h1ghhghts/052405-sgmanual.pdf (22 July 2008) 
68 ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbztratwn D1scuss1on Paper, 22 October 
2004, Annexure "Possible Features of an IC SID Appeals Facility" par 5, at 
http://wwwworldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf (22 July 2008) 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, par 7 
71 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Apnl 10 2006, ICSID/15 at 
http.//www.worldbank.org/tcs1d/basicdoc/CRR English-final.pdf 
72 ICSID Secretanat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper of the ICSID Secretanat, 
12 May, 2005, par 4 at http://www.worldbank.org/ics1d/h1ghhghts/052405-sgmanual.pdf (22 July 2008) 
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such issues to assist member countries when and if it is decided to proceed towards the 
establishment of an ICSID appeal mechanism".73 
Perhaps the main issue is whether an appeals facility has the support of the Contracting 
States to the ICSID Convention. The rejection of an appeals facility in the 2006 
amendments, coupled with the notoriously slow progress by international working 
committees in amending international agreements, 74 suggests that unless and until 
dissatisfaction with the established regime has an emerging groundswell of support that 
threatens its continued existence, it is improbable that states will agree to substitute an 
appeals procedure for the limited grounds of annulment in article 52.75 For that to occur, 
the correctness and accuracy of ICSID awards would need to be seriously called into 
question. In addition, those inaccuracies would need to be experienced by all Contracting 
States, particularly the more powerful states, thus tipping the balance of ICISD arbitration 
away from finality to accuracy. 
3.5 Annulment Proceedings in the Argentine Cases 
The lack of a substantive review for ICSID awards explicitly means that demonstrably 
wrong decisions remain un-reviewable for legal error.76 Acknowledging ICSID's limited 
jurisprudence, it should be recognized that incorrect awards is not a common criticism of 
ICSID. In fact, only one ICSID award is often cited for its alleged incorrectness, SGC v 
Pakistan. 77 
73 Ibtd 
74 The lack of agreement by the Workmg Committee at UNCITRAL over the last decade m agreeing to an amended 
definition of"agreement m writing" for the UNCITRAL Model law is cited as an example ofthts slow process in 
Griffith G, "Investment Awards: Annulment Enforcement and Appeals" BI/CL Investment Treaty Forum, May 9 2008 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 SGC Societe Generate de Surveillance SA v lstamzc Republzc of Pakistan ICSID Case No ARB/01/13 and SGS 
Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A v Republic of Philippines ICSID Case No ARB/02/6. This may be in part due to 
the limited jurisprudence under ICSID. 
92 
Chapter 3 
Argentina has applied for annulment in all awards thus far in the Argentine Cases 78 and 
has signaled its intention to apply for the annulment of any further adverse awards 
rendered against it in the Argentine Cases. 79 The CMS Annulment Decision is the only 
annulment decision to date, and it identifies a number of significant alleged errors in the 
tribunal's reasoning. This exposes the failings of the ICSID annulment procedure when 
faced with an incorrect award. 
3.5.1 CMS Annulment Decision 
Argentina requested the annulment of the CMS Award pursuant to article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention and argued that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers and/or failed to 
state the reasons on which it was based. The ad hoe committee made its decision in 
accordance with the strict limitations of article 52, refusing to annul the award on all but 
one of the grounds claimed by Argentina. 
The decision brings the debate over the adequacy of ICSID's annulment provisions into 
the spotlight. It is not the substantive part of the decision which generates this debate; the 
annulment provisions were applied restrictively and in accordance with previous 
interpretation and current literature. Rather, it is the committee's obiter dicta remarks 
which cause concern. The committee used the annulment forum to identify legal errors in 
the CMS Award which did not fall within the grounds for annulment. The significance of 
the identified errors was substantial and could, according to the committee, "have a 
decisive impact on the operative part of the award"80 . Yet, as the committee was 
constrained by the limited procedural grounds of annulment under the IC SID Convention, 
it refused to annul the sections of the award infected by error. The result is that Argentina 
remains bound by the award. 
78CMS Annulment Deciszon; Azurix Corp v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/1; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa 
Assets, P L v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/3; Sempra Energy lnternaczonal v Argentina ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/16; LG&E v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 
79 Griffith G, above n74 
8° CMS Annulment Decision par 135 
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3.5.2 The tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers 
The first ground for annulment claimed by Argentina is that the tribunal manifestly 
exceeded its powers, so that the award should be annulled in whole or in part under 
article 52(1)(b). 
a) Jus standi, jurisdiction, and manifest excess of power 
Argentina claimed that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by: (1) exercising 
jurisdiction over claims by a company's shareholder for income lost by the company;81 
and (2) authorising CMS, which was not a party nor even mentioned in any of the 
applicable instruments, to claim a breach of obligations under the umbrella clause.82 The 
claims were based on arguments that CMS as a shareholder had no standing to bring 
claims in its own right but that any claims belonged to the parent company, TGN. It 
follows that if CMS lacked standing to bring the action, the tribunal had exceeded its 
powers by exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. 
It is established that an arbitral tribunal's lack of jurisdiction, whether partial or total, 
comes within the scope of an "excess of powers" under article 52(1)(b).83 In assessing 
this ground of annulment, the ad hoe committee recalled that the applicable jurisdictional 
provisions are those of the ICSID Convention and the relevant BIT. It disregarded 
national laws as irrelevant to the question of standing and jurisdiction and added that: 
Nothing in general international law prohibits the conclusion of treaties allowing "claims 
by shareholder independently from those of the corporation concerned ... even if those 
shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholder"84 
Jurisdiction of ICSID is determined by article 25, which relevantly provides: 
81 CMS Annulment Decision pars 46-48 
82 The committee did not consider whether the award should be annulled for excess of powers on this ground because 1t 
annulled this sect10n of the award for failure to state reasons under article 52 (l)(e). See, CMS Annulment Decision par 
97 
83 Klockner/ndustrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon & Societe Camerounmse des Engrms 
ICSID Case No ARB/81/2 (Decision on Annulment) par 4 
84 CMS Annulment Decision par 69 citing CMS v Argentina (Decision on Junsd1ct10n) par 48 
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The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre.85 
The ad hoe committee turned to the tribunal's consideration of the terms of Argentina-US 
BIT as the relevant instrument expressing the parties' consent to ICSID arbitration and as 
providing the definition of investment. Article 1(1) of the Argentina-US BIT defines 
"investment" as: 
(a) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as 
equity, debt, am.I servil.:e an<l investment contracts; and includes without limitation: 
(ii) A company or shares of stocks or other interests in a company or interest in the assets 
thereof 
86 
The committee saw the definition as compatible with the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention and indicated that "investments made by minority shareholders are covered 
by the actual language of the definition, and also recognized by ICSID arbitral tribunals 
in comparable cases". 87 CMS made a capital investment in TGN covered by the BIT and 
asserted causes of action under the BIT in connection with that protected investment. On 
this basis the committee confirmed that CMS must be considered an investor within the 
meaning of the BIT and thus under the ICISD Convention. The committee concluded that 
the tribunal had not exceeded its powers by deciding that CMS had standing before 
ICSID and for exercising jurisdiction over its claims for breaches of the US-Argentina 
BIT.8s 
85 ICSID Convention article 25, See full text above n34 
86 US-Argentina BIT, see full text at Appendix 4 
87 CMS Annulment Deczswn par 73 
88 CMS Annulment Deczswn par 75 
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b) Non application or erroneous application of the proper law 
Argentina also argued that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to apply 
the proper law to the dispute. This ground of annulment was claimed in relation to 
various aspects of the award: failing to give effect to the treaty article XI; rejecting 
Argentina's defence of necessity under customary international law; failing to apply the 
governing law; transforming the "fair and equitable" and "umbrella" clauses into strict 
liability provisions and by not determining the ordinary meaning of the terms "fair and 
equitable". 
The failure to apply the proper law to arbitration has been held to constitute a manifest 
excess of power and therefore ground for annulment. 89 There is an important distinction 
between failure to apply the law and error in its application, and the ad hoe committee 
were mindful of this distinction when considering Argentina's submissions.90 
(i) Necessity 
Argentina pleaded its defence against CMS's claims on two grounds: the defence of 
necessity under Article XI of the BIT, and on the doctrine of necessity at customary 
intemational law.91 In its application for annulment Argentina claimed that the tribunal's 
failure to distinguish between the application of the Treaty Defence from the defence of 
necessity at customary international law and the tribunal's failure to correctly interpret 
the defence constituted a manifest excess of power. 
Although the committee identified a series of errors and lacuna in the tribunal's 
application of the defence, it recalled its limited jurisdiction under article 52 of the IC SID 
Convention and restricted its power to annul awards to the express grounds provided. 
Ultimately holding that: 
89 Klocknerlndustne-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republzc of Cameroon & Soc1ete Camerounazse des Engrais 
ICSID Case No ARB/81/2 (Decision on Annulment) 118; AmcoAward (Decision on Annulment) par 515, and MINE 
Case (Dec1s1on on Annulment) par 87 
9° CMS Annulment Decision par 52 
91 See generally, Chapter 2 
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although applying [the law] cryptically and defectively, it applied it. There is accordingly 
no manifest excess ofpowers.92 
The committee emphasized the difference between exercising its powers of annulment 
and conducting an appeal on the merits, stating that "if the committee was acting as a 
court of appeal it would have to reconsider the A ward in this ground". 93 
(ii) Compensation 
In relation to compensation following the establishment of the defence of necessity94 the 
committee held that the tribunal's comments were obiter dicta and had no bearing on the 
operative part of the award. These statements could therefore not constitute a manifest 
excess of power.95 
...., 
(iii) Fair and equitable treatment 
Argentina contended that the tribunal transformed the umbrella clause and the "fair and 
equitable treatment" provisions into strict liability clauses.96 In regards to "fair and 
equitable treatment" the committee held that the tribunal had evaluated the challenged 
measures in light of the circumstances and did not transform the clause into a strict 
liability clause.97 The committee implied its disagreement with the tribunal's holdings on 
this ground by emphasizing that it is not an appeal body: 
The Committee has no jurisdiction to control the interpretation thus given by the tribunal 
to that Article, still less to reconsider its evaluation of the facts. It is sufficient for the 
Committee to hold that the Tribunal did not manifestly exceed its powers.98 
92 CMS Annulment Dec1swn par 136 
93 CMS Annulment Decision par 135 
94 See above 2.4.l ( d) 
95 CMS Annulment Decision par 144-150 
96 Again the committee did not discuss the arguments in relation to the umbrella clause because it annulled this section 
of the award for failure to state reasons under article 52 (l)(e). See below 3.5.3 
97 CMS Annulment Decision par 85 
98 CMS Annulment Dec1swn par 85 (footnotes omitted) 
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3.5.3 The award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based 
The requirement to state reasons is based on the tribunal's duty to identify and 
communicate the factual and legal premises leading the tribunal to its decision. If these 
reasons are not given, there is room for a request for annulment under Article 52(1)(e).99 
Argentina argued that the CMS Award should be annulled for failure to state the reasons 
in relation to: (1) its decision on jurisdiction; (2) Argentina's defence under the BIT and 
at customary international law; (3) its calculation of damages; (4) and the umbrella 
clause. 
In relation to Argentina's defence and the calculation of damages, the committee 
undertook a careful examination of the tribunal's reasons. 100 It concluded that although 
the tribunal should have been more explicit in its reasoning, 101 both parties had 
understood the award and "a careful reader can follow the implicit reasoning of the 
tribunal" .102 Although agreeing that the reasoning contained some gaps and even some 
errors, the CMS Annulment Decision emphasised that the correctness of the reasoning is 
not under examination: 
It is sufficient to note that the Tribunal did - step by step and methodically, whether 
rightly or wrongly-interpret and apply Article XI. 103 
Argentina's application for annulment was successful on one ground. The committee 
annulled the tribunal's findings for liability under the umbrella clause of the BIT on the 
grounds that it failed to state reasons. In reaching this conclusion the committee was 
careful to examine the tribunals' reasons on a step by step basis and to consider a number 
of possible interpretations before concluding: 
... it is quite unclear how the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion ... which makes it 
impossible for the reader to follow the reasoning on this point. It is not the case that 
99 Wena v Egypt par 79 
10° CMS Annulment Deciswn par 120-127 
101 CMS Annulment Deczswn par 125 
102 CMS Annulment Deciswn par 127 
103 CMS Annulment Decision par 118 
98 
Chapter 3 
answers to the questions raised can be reasonably inferred from the terms used in the 
decision; they cannot.104 
The decision provides some guidance as to the level of reasoning required by an ICSID 
tribunal. However, the victory was a hollow one for Argentina. The umbrella clause 
added nothing to the overall treaty obligations as damages were awarded on alternate 
grounds. As a result, the annulment of this part of the award had no effect on the amount 
of damages awarded to CMS. 
3.5.4 An indirect review 
The CMS Annulment Decision contains frequent reference to the limited mandate of the 
ICSID Convention annulment provisions and to the committee's lack of power to review 
the CMS Award for errors oflaw or fact: 
the Committee is conscious that it exercises its jurisdiction under a narrow and limited 
mandate conferred by article 52 of the ICSID Convention .. .in these circumstances the 
Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own appreciation of 
the facts for those of the tribunal. .. 105 
And further 
The Committee has no jurisdiction to consider whether in doing so, the Tribunal made 
any error of fact or law. 106 
Although cognisant of its limitations, in an interesting twist the committee contradicted 
itself by entering into a detailed consideration of errors of law made by the tribunal. The 
committee took the opportunity to analyse what it expressly acknowledged it had no 
power to change, the substance of the award. In so doing, it overstepped its mandate and 
inappropriately used the annulment forum. 
The focus of this indirect review was on the application of the Treaty Defence and the 
defence of necessity at customary international law. On these issues the committee 
identified a number of errors and lacuna in the tribunal's interpretation. It did this despite 
104 CMS Annulment Decision par 97 
105 CMS Annulment Decision par 158 
106 CMS Annulment Decision par 121, see also pars 41, 43, 45 & 136 
99 
Chapter 3 
a lack of power to enforce its interpretation of the issues in question. The value and effect 
of this aspect of the CMS Annulment Decision warrants consideration. 
a) A tool to shape the law 
As the first annulment decision m the Argentine Cases, the decision provides a 
clarification on the interpretation of the two grounds of necessity central to the Argentine 
Cases. Recognizing its inability to enforce its interpretation, it appears that the committee 
used the annulment forum as a tool to shape the law and influence the remaining 
Argentine Cases: 
As Argentine [sic] noted, the present arbitration was the first in a long series relating to 
the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002. Accordingly the Committee will seek to clarify certain 
points of substance on which, in its view, the Tribunal made manifest errors oflaw. 107 
In this way, the adoption of the reasoning in the CMS Annulment Decision by future 
tribunals may prevent the repetition of inconsistent interpretations seen in the early 
Argentine Cases. A clear and correct interpretation of legal principles may also slow the 
flow of annulment applications in the Argentine Cases. Although the committee may be 
regarded as having overstepped its boundaries, the failure to identify errors in the CMS 
Award could have been interpreted as a "rubber stamp" to the decision approving the use 
of the CMS Award as a precedent in future cases. The implications of this would be 
magnified by the fact that the CMS Award sets the stage for over 40 arbitrations against 
Argentina with virtually identical facts. 
The influence the committee's "clarifying comments" is likely to have on the defence of 
necessity in the remaining Argentine Cases is limited. Firstly, the structure of the 
annulment mechanism means the statements are obiter dicta. Secondly, the strength of 
the obiter dicta statements is limited by the absence of a system of binding precedent 
under ICSID. In this regard the ad hoe committee's own lack of reference to other 
decisions, including the LG&E Award, weakens the strength of any persuasive authority 
107 CMS Annulment Decision par 45 
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the decision may have. 108 Thirdly, the committee's decision forms part of annulment 
proceedings. This means that the committee was not presented with the necessary 
evidence and facts to undertake a merits review. Instead the CMS Annulment Decision 
was based on submissions by the parties intended to sustain or defend an annulment 
application on the limited grounds provided under article 52. This risks the committee's 
interpretation being incomplete or even incorrect. 
b) Politically unenforceable 
The decision by the annulment committee to highlight errors in the CMS Award which, in 
the words of the committee, "could have had a decisive impact on the operative part of 
the award" 109 makes compliance with the award by Argentina politically difficult. 
Argentina is faced with a final binding decision which has been acknowledged as 
incorrect by three independent legal experts appointed by the same body which requires it 
to comply with the awards obligationsY0 Argentina's motivation to comply with the 
award in these circumstances has been undermined. On this point, the CMS Annulment 
Decision may help justify and ease the political consequences of non-compliance by 
Ar . 111 gentma. 
c) Underlining the inadequacy of the annulment mechanism 
The CMS Annulment Decision confirms that some of Argentina's criticism and its 
dissatisfaction with the CMS Award are justified, albeit being beyond the grounds of 
annulment under article 52. The use of the annulment forum to provide an indirect legal 
review of the CMS Award and to clarify the interpretation of international law principles 
provides a salient example of the limitations of ICSID's annulment procedures and 
108 For example, the committee's comments m relat10n to compensation at par 146: "article XI, 1fand for so long as 1t 
applted, excluded the operation of the substantive prov1s1ons of the BIT. That bemg so, there could be no poss1b1ltty of 
compensation bemg payable during that penod" are d1rectly supported by the LG&E Award par 266 
109 CMS Annulment DeclSlon par 135 
110 The members of the ad hoe committee m CMS Annulment Decision were. Judge Gilbert Guillaume (President); 
Judge Nabil Elaraby; and Professor James Crawford 
111 See 4.2.1 (b) for a discussion on the consequences of non-compliance with I CS ID awards 
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strengthens calls to review the ICSID annulment provisions. The CMS Annulment 
Decision has exposed a demand for "greater coherence and consistency in the case law 
emerging under investment treaties"112 and the need for a forum where this can be 
ensured. 
3.6 Conclusion 
As the CMS Annulment Decision did not annul parts of the CMS Award which it 
recognized as containing legal errors, Argentina is now bound to comply with an 
incorrect award. The similarities in the reasoning in the Sempra and Enron Awards means 
this result may be repeated in their annulment proceedings. 113 
The open criticism of the tribunal's reasoning in the CMS Annulment Decision exposes a 
weakness in the ICSID review mechanism. The perception that ICSID requires parties to 
accept and be bound by a legally incorrect award may well generate dissatisfaction with 
ICSID, and cause parties to question the adequacy of the ICSID award review 
mechanisms. 
Whether the Argentine Cases will provide the impetus for a change to the annulment 
mechanism will depend on the level of exposure powerful states perceive themselves to 
have to incorrect awards. Although the Argentine Cases present a significant body of case 
law under ICSID, Argentina is only one state. Being a developing state also limits the 
influence of the cases, because a developing state's role in ICSID proceedings is more 
likely to be as a defendant host state than a home state to an investor. While statistics 
show that state/investor success rates are equal under ICSID proceedings, 114 the 
likeli~ood of repeated proceedings are more likely to be instituted against a defendant 
host state. 
112 Walsh T, above nl, 458 
113 See above chapter 2, n 125 
114 Ex Secretary-General ofICSID Roberto Dafimo stated that outcomes ofICSID arbitrations are equally diVIded, 
almost exactly 50/50 m awards for investors and for States: Dafiino R, Openmg Remarks of the 
OECD/ICSID/UNCT AD SYMPOSIUM Making the most of International Investment Agreements a Common Agenda 
Paris, France, 12 December 2005, 3 
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In order for powerful home states to perceive adverse ICSID decisions as a significant 
risk, they would need to anticipate adverse ICSID decisions being made against their 
investors, 115 or even against themselves as defendants. This scenario is increasingly more 
likely; for example, the introduction of carbon emissions trading legislation in State A 
effecting State B's investment in State A could, if in breach of BIT obligations, trigger 
the institution of ICISD proceedings. Until powerful states are exposed to negative 
rulings under ICSID, the likelihood of a change to annulment provisions is unlikely. The 
Argentine Cases may nonetheless contribute to changing state attitudes and may 
influence a long term change. In the short term, the CMS Annulment Decision serves as a 
warning to tribunals to provide coherent and consistent legal reasoning. 
Having considered the reasoning of awards in chapter 2, followed by an analysis of the 
grounds for reviewing awards in this chapter, the thesis now turns to the question of 
compliance with awards in the Argentine Cases. The next chapter considers Argentina's 
resistance to complying with its obligations under ICSID awards in the Argentine Cases. 
115 Walsh T, above nl, 444 
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Compliance with ICSID Awards in the Argentine Cases 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have examined the ICSID awards and annulment decisions 
handed down in the Argentine Cases. Despite the issues identified in those chapters, 
Argentina is now bound by a final award in CMS v Argentina. ICSID proceedings, 
however, have been met with severe criticism from Argentine government officials and 
legal commentators. Challenges have been made to ICSID arbitration on a number of 
levels, from Argentina's obligations to comply with awards, to the ICSID Convention's 
constitutionality under the Argentine Constitution. The avoidance of obligations under 
ICSID awards will likely have repercussions beyond the Argentine Cases, setting a 
precedent of non-compliance in ICSID arbitration and potentially weakening the appeal 
of the system to its users. 
This chapter considers the strength of Argentina's challenges to compliance with ICSID 
Awards against the mechanisms for compliance, recognition and enforcement provided 
by the ICSID Convention. It also assesses the validity of challenges to the ICSID 
Convention under the Argentine Constitution. The chapter aims to assess the impact of 
Argentina's response on the remaining Argentine Cases and the broader implications of 
its response on investment treaty arbitration under ICSID. 
The chapter begins by providing the framework for the compliance, recognition and 
enforcement of awards under ICSID. Against this framework it outlines Argentina's 
potential challenges to compliance with ICSID Awards, beginning with an analysis of 
challenges made within the rules of the I CS ID Convention, before considering challenges 
developed outside the ICSID Convention's framework, including the Convention's 
constitutionality and the potential for a review of ICSID Awards by Argentine courts. 
Finally, the chapter considers how Argentina's response to ICSID Awards in the 
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Argentine Cases may affect its position in relation to future investment, as well as 
considering the effects it may have on ICSID arbitration. 
4.2 Compliance, Recognition and Enforcement under ICSID 
Recognition and enforcement ofICSID Awards is dealt with under Section 6, Chapter IV 
of the ICSID Convention, which addresses the effects of a final award on the parties to 
the arbitration (article 53), recognition and enforcement of an award (article 54) and 
immunity of a foreign state from execution (article 55). The successful party in ICSID 
proceedings may either be a state or a private party. 1 In view of Argentina's role as the 
respondent in the Argentine Cases, this chapter concentrates on issues surrounding the 
state party as the unsuccessful respondent, the award debtor. 
4.2.1 Binding nature of awards under article 53 
a) Obligation of compliance 
Once an ICSID award is rendered, the parties have an international law duty under the 
articles of the ICSID Convention to comply with it. The legal basis of this duty is 
provided in article 53: 
(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to 
any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by 
and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent enforcement shall have been 
stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention. 
(2) For the purposes of this Section, "award" shall include any decision interpreting, 
revising or annulling such award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 52. 
Article 53 establishes the finality of the award and the self-contained nature of the ICSID 
review system. An award, once rendered, may not be subject to review outside the 
1 Ex Secretary-General ofICSID Roberto Daiiino stated that outcomes ofICSID arb1trat10ns are equally diVlded, almost 
exactly 50/50 in awards for investors and for States: Daiimo R, "Opening Remarks of the OECD/ICSID/UNCT AD 
SYMPOSIUM" Making the most of International Investment Agreements: a Common Agenda, Pans, France, 12 
December 2005, 3 
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measures provided for in the ICSID Convention.2 Each party is bound by the obligation 
to "abide by and comply" with the terms of the final award, except where enforcement 
has been stayed under the ICSID Convention article 52(5).3 
The self-contained nature of the ICSID arbitration is one of its distinctive features and 
provides it with a clear advantage over other arbitration mechanisms.4 This feature is 
supported by article 26 of the ICSID Convention: 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, 
be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A 
Contracting State may require the exhaustion oflocal administrative or judicial remedies 
as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. 5 
The exclusion of any remedy outside the ICSID Convention protects ICSID awards from 
attack or review from local courts.6 A Contracting State's court is obliged to dismiss an 
action that seeks the annulment or any other form of review of an IC SID award outside of 
those permitted by the IC SID Convention. 7 
In addition to the obligation of compliance under article 53, article 54(1) imposes an 
obligation on each Contracting State (regardless of whether or not it is a party to the 
2 The relationship of article 53 to the Convention's system of review is summanzed in: I CS ID, Report of the Executive 
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(1965) 4 ILM 524, par 41: 
Article 53 declares that the parties are bound by the award and that 1t shall not be subject to appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in the Convention. The remedies provided for are revision (Article 51) 
and annulment (Article 52). In addition, a party may ask a Tnbunal which had omitted to decide any question 
submitted to it, to supplement its award (Article 49(2)) and may request interpretation of the award (Article 50). 
3 ICSID Convention, article 52(5): 
The Committee may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award pending its 
dec1s1on. If the applicant requests a stay of enforcement of the award m his application, enforcement shall be 
stayed provisionally until the Committee rules on such request. 
4 Awards made under other arbitration systems including ICC or UNCITRAL are potentially subject to review 
procedures by courts in the arbitration or the enforcement forum. Schreuer C, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, 1083. See, above 3.2 
5 ICSID Convention, article 26 (author's emphasis) 
6 MINE Case par 84 cited m Schreuer C, above n4, 1084 par 19 
7 Amerasinghe CF, "Submissions to the Junsdiction of the International Centre for Settlement oflnvestment Disputes" 
1973/4, 5 Journal of Man time Law and Commerce 211, 244/5 cited in Schreuer C, above n4, 1084 par 16 
106 
Chapter 4 
particular proceedings) to recogmse an ICSID award and to enforce the monetary 
obligations of that award: 
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories 
as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal 
constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide 
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgement of the courts of a 
constituent state. 8 
Enforcement proceedings under article 54 are not a required step in compliance with an 
ICSID award because the obligation to comply with an award exists under article 53.9 
Article 54(1) provides a legal safeguard in the event that a party fails to comply with 
pecuniary obligations of an award under article 53. The limitation of article 54's 
application to the "pecuniary obligations", and not to all orders of the tribunal, supports 
this interpretation. 10 
The requirement to cease diplomatic protection unless a Contracting State has failed to 
"abide by and comply with" an award under article 27 of the ICSID Convention also 
supports the interpretation of article 54 as a safeguard to non-compliance. 11 Article 2 7 of 
the ICISD Convention repeats the language "abide by and comply with" from article 53, 
implying that failure to comply with obligations under article 53 is the point at which 
diplomatic protection is reintroduced. This protection can be used concurrently with 
enforcement proceedings under article 54. 12 
8 ICSID Convent10n, article 54(1 ). See full text below, 4.2.2 
9 Pro£ Dr. Tawtl G, Speaker (Commentator) "The Enforcement oflnvestment Treaty Awards· Getting to Judgement" 
Workmg Group A: Arbitration Treaties/ Treaty Arbitration, The Internatwnal Counc1/for Commercial Arbitratwn, 8-
10 June 2008, Dublin 
10 Ibid. 
11 ICSID Convention, article 27: 
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protect10n, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute 
which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted 
to arbitrat10n under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have faded to abide by and 
comply with the award rendered m such dispute. 
12 Schreuer C, above n4, 1103 par 11 
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During the negotiation of the IC SID Convention there was a general expectation that non-
compliance by states would not be a practical problem and that voluntary compliance 
would be a natural consequence of a Contracting State's obligations under article 53. 13 
The chair of the consultative sessions regularly expressed the view that Contracting 
States would honour an ICSID award without the need for further litigation. 14 The fact 
that compliance with awards in accordance with article 53 (hereinafter "direct 
compliance") has been the norm in ICSID Arbitration confirms this interpretation. 15 
b) Consequences of non-compliance 
Direct compliance with an ICSID award is encouraged by a range of legal and non-legal 
factors. Primarily, the losing party has a public international law duty, by way of treaty 
obligation, to comply with an award. 16 Obligations under the ICSID Convention and 
respective BITs are reinforced by the most fundamental principle of international treaty 
law, pacta sunt servanda. The whole point of making a binding agreement is that each 
party should be able to rely on its performance by the other party. 17 
Direct compliance with ICSID awards is encouraged by the possibility of two types of 
legal action. The first is enforcement proceedings under article 54, 18 the second is ICJ 
proceedings under article 64. 19 The result of successful proceedings in the ICJ would be a 
judgment finding the state in violation of article 53 of the IC SID Convention.20 
13 Ibid, 1188 par 32 
14 A Broches was Chair of the Consultative Sessions referred to by Pro£ Dr. Tawil G, Speaker (Commentator) "The 
Enforcement oflnvestment Treaty Awards: Getting to Judgement" above n9 
15 Boralessa A, "Enforcement in the United States and Umted Kmgdom ofICSID Awards Against The Republic of 
Argentina: Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face" (2004)17 New York International Law Review 53, 66; 
Baldwm E, Kantor M & Nolan M, "Limits to Enforcement ofICSID Awards"(2006) 23(1) Journal of International 
Arbitration 1, 5-6 state that they are only aware of four cases involving decisions as to judicial enforcement ofICSID 
awards under article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
16 ICSID Convention, article 53 
17 The Vienna Convent10n restates this principle at article 26, which reads· "Every treaty m force is bmdmg upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them m good faith''. See above Chapter 2 n I 0 & 11 and accompanymg text. 
18 This remedy is available against either a state party or an mvestor; see below 4.2.2b) 
19 This remedy is only available agamst a State party; ICSID Convention, article 64 provides: 
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Parallel to the institution of proceedings is the re-emergence of diplomatic protection 
from the creditor state under article 27 of the ICSID Convention, which may compel a 
state to comply with an award.21 Diplomatic protection may involve countermeasures, 
such as withholding payments due to the debtor state, the freezing of assets, or the 
referral of the dispute to the ICJ. The advantages of diplomatic protection are, however, 
limited by a number of political elements, including: the willingness of the investor's 
state to become involved in the dispute; the relationship between the investor and its 
home state and the power the aggrieved investor may have to drive that state to negotiate 
on its behalf; and the relationship between the Contracting States and the level of 
influence or power the claimant's state has to negotiate with the other. 
In addition to legal pressures, a number of non-legal factors influence compliance. The 
need for foreign investment creates strong pressure on states to comply with ICSID 
awards; in this sense, direct compliance provides evidence of a stable investment climate 
and affects a state's standing in the international business community.22 While an 
increase in competition among states to attract foreign investment and a weak economy 
may increase this pressure, a state's risk profile from the point of view of a foreign 
investor will only be one factor in the business decision making.23 ICSID's status as part 
Any dispute arismg between Contractmg States concerning the mterpretatton or applicatton ofth1s Conventton 
which 1s not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the application of 
any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another method of settlement. 
20 Schreuer C, above n4, 1089 par 37 
21 ICSID Convention, article 27: 
( 1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an mternat10nal claim, in respect of a dispute 
which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted 
to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contractmg State shall have failed to abide by and 
comply with the award rendered in such dispute. 
(2) D1plomat1c protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1 ), shall not mclude mformal d1plomat1c exchanges 
for the sole purpose offac1htating a settlement of the dispute. 
22 History of the Conventton Vol. II pp.273, 425, 428, 430 cited m Schreuer C, above n4, 1088 par 32 
23 Von Moltke K & Mann H, Towards a Southern Agenda on International Investment· Discusswn Paper on the Role 
of International Investment Agreements International Institute for Sustainable Development, May 2004, 4 at 
http://www.nsd.org/pdf/2004/mvestment sai pdf(2 October 2008) 
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of the World Bank Group and state concerns about future loans is also often cited as a 
motivating factor in compliance with ICSID awards.24 
4.2.2 Recognition and enforcement under the ICSID Convention 
In the event that an award debtor fails to directly comply with its obligation to abide by 
and comply with an award, article 54 of the ICSID Convention provides for recognition 
and enforcement of I CS ID awards by the courts of all Contracting States. It also provides 
for certain procedural directions relating to this general obligation: 
Article 54: 
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention 
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State. A Contracting State with 
a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may 
provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgement of the courts 
of a constituent state. 
(2) A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a Contracting State 
shall furnish to a competent court or other authority which such State shall have 
designated for this purpose a copy of the award certified by the Secretary-General. Each 
Contracting State shall notify the Secretary-General of the designation of the competent 
court or other authority for this purpose and of any subsequent change in such 
designation. 
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgements in force in the state in whose territories such execution is sought. 
The obligation to recognise and enforce an award applies to all Contracting States, and 
recognition and enforcement may be sought in any Contracting State, including the state 
party to the arbitration or the state of the investor. A party seeking recognition and 
enforcement has the possibility to choose the forum most appropriate for this purpose, a 
choice determined primarily by the availability of assets suitable for execution.25 
24 The Secretary General ofICSID, who 1s also usually the World Bank's general counsel, has commumcated with 
recalcitrant parties remindmg them of their obligations to comply with awards: Peterson L, "Arb1trat1on- striking a 
difficult balance" Foreign Direct Investment: London, I April 2006; see also, Schreuer C, above n4, I 088 par 33 
25 Considerat10ns of sovereign immumty from execution will also be relevant. See below 4.2.2c) 
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a) Recognition 
Recognition of an award simply involves a domestic court recogmsmg an award as 
binding or res judicata. 26 Recognition under the ICSID Convention constitutes the 
ultimate phase of the arbitral process and the state is deemed to have waived any defence, 
including immunity, from the jurisdiction of the recognising court on the basis that this 
would be inconsistent with the consent given by that state to ICSID arbitration.27 The 
ICSID Convention deprives state courts or authorities of any discretion in this matter; 
ICSID awards are binding and must be recognized in all Contracting States.28 
Recognition is the preliminary step to enforcement and establishes the legal nature of the 
award in the domestic legal system, providing the basis for enforcement.29 
b) Enforcement 
Like other international bodies, ICSID lacks the power to enforce its own binding awards. 
Absent direct compliance by the award debtor, it depends on national courts to enforce its 
awards.30 The self-contained nature of the ICSID awards extends to enforcement and an 
award must be enforced " ... as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State". A 
domestic court or authority before which execution is sought may not re-examine the 
merits of an award, nor may it examine the fairness or propriety of the proceedings. 31 
26 Res judzcata means matter already Judged, it is used in both civil law and common law legal systems, to refer to a 
case in which there has been a final judgment and that is no longer subject to appeal. 
27 Delaume G, Highet K & Kahale G III, "France- Recogmtion ofICSID Awards - Sovereign Immumty" (1992) 
American Journal of International Law, 139 
28 Ibid. 
29 The author will use the terms enforcement and execution mterchangeably as is done in the Convention. See the 
discussion regardmg the use of "execution and enforcement" in Schreuer C, above n4, 1088 pars 61-68 
30 Boralessa A, "Enforcement m the United States and United Kmgdom of ICSID Awards Against The Republic of 
Argentma: Obstacles that Transnat10nal Corporations May Face"(2004) 17 New York International Law Review 53, 64 
31 Schreuer C, The ICSID Convention A Commentary Cambndge University Press, Cambndge, 2001, 1127 par 75 
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This contrasts with enforcement of non-ICSID awards which may, depending on the 
particular rules, be reviewed under domestic law and applicable treaties. 32 
A public policy defence was expressly ruled out as a defence under the ICSID 
Convention during drafting. It was defeated on the ground that the exception would have 
to be granted to all states, including that which was party to the dispute, which would in 
tum damage the binding nature of the award. 33 The existence of reviewable features of 
other non-ICSID awards and the rejection of these elements during the ICSID 
Convention's preparation34 support the interpretation that domestic authorities charged 
with enforcement under article 54 have no discretion to review the award. 
The failure of a Contracting State to recognise and enforce an award would put it in 
breach of its treaty obligations and carries with it the consequences of state responsibility, 
including diplomatic protection and the right of the investor's state to refer the dispute to 
the ICJ under article 64.35 If recognition and enforcement proceedings are unsuccessfully 
brought in the court or authority of the state which is party to the proceedings, that state 
would be in breach of two obligations: article 53 to abide by and comply with the award; 
and article 54 to recognise and enforce the award. 
c) Sovereign immunity from execution 
The simple recognition process is not intended to interfere with rules of sovereign 
immunity when execution of an award is sought. Under article 55 of the ICSID 
Convention the laws relating to state immunity from execution in the forum that 
enforcement is sought are applicable. 
32 Notable 1s the Conventwn on the Recogmtwn and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (New York 
Conventwn) which provides a number of grounds on which enforcement of an award may be refused, mcludmg if 
contrary to local pubhc policy. See above 3.2 
33 BoralessaA, aboven15, 74 
34 Schreuer C, above n4, 1128 par 70 
35 Ibid, 1110 par 28 
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Article 55: 
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or any foreign State from execution. 
Sovereign immunity is a plea against the jurisdiction of the court; it has nothing to do 
with the merits of the dispute.36 A state pleading sovereign immunity argues that a court 
must withhold its jurisdiction on the basis that jurisdiction cannot be assumed over a 
sovereign state. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has developed to reflect the 
changing role of the state in the international community and its increasing subjection to 
the rule of law. The doctrine has moved from a doctrine of absolute immunity, which was 
an absolute bar to jurisdiction by domestic courts against foreign sovereigns, to a lesser 
standard of restrictive immunity which permits courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain 
commercial acts of states.37 
In 2004 the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UN Convention on State 
Immunity).38 The convention is based on the doctrine of restrictive immunity, and while 
the rules and the exceptions set out in the convention are broadly recognised in state 
practise the UN Convention of State Immunity has not been ratified by all states, and thus 
it is still necessary to when ascertaining the current law relating to state immunity to 
construe the provisions of the convention by reference to the extent to which they are 
supported by state practise as evidenced in legislation and case law of relevant 
jurisdictions.39 
36 Somarajah M, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law Intemat1onal, The Netherlands, 2000, 
291 
37 Fox H, "Intemat10nal Law and restramts on the exercise of junsdict10n by nat10nal courts of states" in Evans M D 
(ed), above nl 7, 364. Not all states have moved towards a doctrine ofrestnctive immunity; Chma and Vietnam for 
example still adhere to a preference for absolute immumty: SomaraJah M, above n36, 292 
38 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/Enghsh/Notpubl/Enghsh _3_13.Pdf (19 July 2009) 
39 Fox H, "International Law and restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts of states" in Evans M D 
(ed), above nl 7, 368. State rmmumty is the subject ofleg1slat1on m many states mcluding the State Immunity Act 1978 
(UK); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (USA); Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Australia). The purpose 
here however is to identify the doctrme of sovereign immumty as a potential hurdle to enforcement of awards in the 
Argentine Cases, not to discuss the detailed apphcatlon of any particular state's sovereign 1mmumty laws. For a 
detailed study on the Jaws of state immumty see Fox H, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd Edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008 
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An ICSID award can only be executed against assets that are not protected by sovereign 
immunity from execution.40 State property, which is recognised as in use for sovereign 
purposes such as diplomatic and military property and the property of central banks, is 
generally immune from seizure.41 Other requirements may include that executable assets 
are for commercial as opposed to official use, while some states require a specific link 
between the underlying claim and the property that is subject to execution.42 
Sovereign immunity is a procedural bar to execution and has no bearing on the award 
itself.43 It does not relieve a state of its obligations under the ICSID Convention, 
including its obligation to comply with the terms of the award under article 53(1). The 
right to bring further enforcement proceedings in another Contracting State is also not 
lost, although a cost/benefit analysis of further proceedings may mean that further 
enforcement proceedings are not pursued. For example, a German investor prevented 
from enforcing an award in Canada on grounds of sovereign immunity is still able to seek 
enforcement of that award in another jurisdiction such as Australia. 
4.2.3 Complying with ICSID Award obligations in the Argentine Cases 
A final award in ICSID arbitration proceedings is binding on the parties and must be 
complied with in accordance with obligations under article 53. In the event an award 
debtor fails to directly comply with an award, the award creditor may institute 
recognition and enforcement proceedings under article 54 and may also, or alternatively, 
seek diplomatic protection under article 27. While on its face obtaining compliance with 
an ICSID award is straightforward, in the Argentine Cases compliance is far from certain. 
40 ICSID Convention, article 55 
41 Fox H, "Intemat10nal Law and restramts on the exercise of Jurisdiction by nat10nal courts of states" m Evans MD 
(ed), aboven17, 381 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 370 For a recent decision on the scope ofimmumty m the context of an ICSID award seeAJG Capital Partners 
Inc and another v Republic of Kazakhstan (Natwnal Bank of Kazakhstan zntervenzng)[2005] EWHC 2239 
(Comm)[2006] 1 All ER 
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There has been wide ranging debate regarding how Argentina should and will respond to 
awards rendered in the Argentine Cases. The legal grounds for non-compliance have been 
debated by academics, practitioners and government representatives.44 Despite the 
rhetoric, the Argentine government has not formally denounced or restricted its consent 
to the ICSID Convention45 and at the time of writing the CMS Award is the only final 
award in the Argentine Cases which has not been complied with. Potential challenges to 
the awards can be addressed in two categories: the avoidance of obligations using the 
rules of the ICSID Convention; and the avoidance of obligations based on arguments 
external to the ICSID Convention. 
44 Rosattt H, "Los tratados bilaterales de mvers16n, el arb1traJe mternac1onal obhgatorio y el s1stema constituc1onal 
argentino" La Ley 2003-F, 1283; Rosatti H D, "Globahzation, Statism and Law (Argentma and ICSID)" (translat10n) 
(2004) 2(3) Transnatwnal Dispute Management; Perotti J, "Consideraciones de! caso argentmo ante la1unsd1cc16n del 
CIADI" Centro Argentmo de Estudios Internacionales, at www.caei.com.ar, Alfaro C & Lorent1 P, "The Growmg 
Opposition of Argentma to ICSID Arb1tral Tribunals, A Conflict between International and Domestic Law?" 2005, 6(3) 
The Journal of World Investment and Trade; Granato L, "Protecci6n del inversor extranJero y arb1traje internac1onal en 
los Tratados Btlaterales de Invers16n" Workmg Paper no. 3, Centro Argentmo de Estudios Internacionales: Derecho 
Intemac1onal, 98 at http://www.caei.com ar/es/programas/dt!mverson.pdf(lO July 2008); Miguel M H, "Caso 
Cartellone: 1,es tamb1en una cahda manta para Calvo?" (2005) 3 IABA Law Review/Rev1sta Juridica de la FIA; Na6n, 
Horac10 A. Grigera, "Arbitrat10n and Latin America: Progress and Setbacks" (2005) 21 (2) Arbitration International; 
Berges, M A "Const1tutionahdad o Inconstttut1onalidad de la Jurisdicci6n de! CIADI y sus eventuales laudos" 
E!Drnl.com Biblioteca Jurid1ca Online; Gonzales Campana G, "Desnaturahzac1on de! arb1tra1e administrativo" (2004) 
August, La Ley Sup.Adm 8 
45 The I CS ID Convention provides a number of opportumttes for a state to hm1t its consent to ICSID 1unsd1ction. These 
prov1s10ns are not retrospective and would not affect matenally affect the Argentme Cases. However the non adoption 
of these hm1tations 1s md1cattve of Argentina's stance towards ICSID arbitration. The relevant articles are: 
article 25 ... 
(4) Any Contractmg State may, at the time ofratificat10n, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any 
time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which 1t would or would not consider 
submitting to the 1unsd1ctton of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to 
all Contracting States Such not1ficat1on shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph ( 1 ). 
article 26 
Consent of the parties to arb1trat1on under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to 
such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contractmg State may reqmre the exhaustion oflocal 
admmistrative or judicial remedies as a cond1t10n of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. 
article 71 
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by wntten notice to the depositary ofth1s Convention. 
The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of such notice. 
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4.3 Avoiding Compliance Using the ICSID Framework 
4.3.1 Re-interpreting compliance, recognition and enforcement 
As discussed above, article 54 of the ICSID Convention is a security provision in the 
event of non-compliance with an ICSID award. Contrary to the well established 
interpretation of the compliance and enforcement mechanisms under ICSID,46 Argentina 
has recently argued that enforcement proceedings under article 54 are a necessary step in 
obtaining compliance with an award.47 The interpretation of articles 53 and 54 of the 
ICSID Convention is fundamental, as complying with awards' obligations directly relates 
to the value of ICSID arbitration as a mechanism for the resolution of investment 
disputes. 
While recognising the unequivocal and unconditional international law obligation in 
article 53 of the ICSID Convention to abide by and comply with the terms of the award,48 
Argentina claims that "article 53 does not suffice to describe the obligations and effects 
of the award for the state party to the dispute".49 It does not agree that "Article 54 only 
applies after the losing state fails to pay an award pursuant to Article 53",50 and instead 
asserts that an investor "has to follow the procedures provided for in the laws concerning 
enforcement of judgements in force in Argentina".51 This interpretation implies that 
46 Schreuer C, above n4, 1087: 
the [Article 53] obligation is mdependent of any procedural obstacles that may arise in the course of 
enforcement. Article 54 refers to the law of the State in which recognition and enforcement are sought. But any 
difficulties that may arise under that law in no way affect the obhgatlon of a party to comply with an award 
47 Letter from Argentina, Procuracion de! Tesoro de la Nac10n, to Claudia Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the ad hoe 
Committee, 2 June 2008, Re Siemens AG v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/02/08); Peterson L, "CMS 
Energy urges Argentma to pay ICSID award" Investment Treaty News, (11 January 2008) at 
http://www.usd.org/pdf/2008/itn ianl 1 2008.pdf 
48 Letter from Argentma, Procurac10n del Tesoro de la Nacion, to Claudia Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the ad hoe 
Committee, 2 June 2008, Re Siemens AG v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/02/08) 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Letter from Osvaldo Gughemlmmo, Procurador Del Tesoro de la Nac10n, Government of Argentma, to Claudia 
Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the ad hoe Committee, 7 April 2008, Re Siemens AG v Argentina (ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/08) at 4 cited m Letter from Lisa J. Gosh, Actmg Assistant Legal Advisor, Office oflntemational Claims and 
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Argentina will not directly comply with ICSID award obligations but will wait until the 
award creditor institutes enforcement proceedings against it. Essentially arguing that 
enforcement proceedings under article 54 of the ICSID Convention must be instituted 
before it will comply with the terms of the award. 
To justify this interpretation, Argentina claims that article 54 protects ICSID awards from 
"ordinary" (non-ICSID award) enforcement proceedings under Article V of the New York 
Convention52 and local law public policy exceptions, and for this reason enforcement 
proceedings must be instituted before compliance is required: 
Absent this provision [article 54], a public official or a State that has been condemned to 
pay an award or a court of such State would regard an ICSID award as an "ordinary" 
foreign arbitral award. 53 
This argument fails to acknowledge the final and binding nature of ICSID awards 
established by other provisions of the ICSID Convention, namely articles 5354 and 26,55 
and therefore does not substantiate why article 54 is a necessary step to compliance with 
an ICSID award. Argentina's interpretation challenges the accepted interpretation of the 
ICSID Convention that the obligation to comply with an award exists under article 53 and 
that there is no need for an award to be brought before any court of any state unless the 
award debtor fails to comply with its obligations. Only then, and only in relation to 
"pecuniary obligations", will an award creditor bring enforcement proceedings under 
article 54. 
Investment Disputes, to Claudia Frutos-Peterson, Secretary General of the ad hoe Committee, Re Siemens AG v 
Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/02/08) Annulment Proceedmg, 2 
52 For a discussion on grounds for avo1dmg enforcement under the New York Conventwn see above 3.2 
53 Letter from Argentina, Procurac10n de! Tesoro de la Nac10n, to Claudia Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the ad hoe 
Committee, 2 June 2008, Re Siemens AG v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/02/08) 
54 ICSID Convent10n, article 53 in relevant part: 
... the award ... shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided form this 
Convent10n 
55 ICSID Convent10n, article 26 m relevant part: 
... consent... shall be deemed consent.. .to the exclusion of any other remedy. 
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4.3.2 Support for Argentina's interpretation 
Argentina's interpretation could be attributed to the lack of clarity from tribunals and ad 
hoe committees when addressing enforcement issues.56 For example, the ad hoe 
committee in the CMS Annulment Decision stated that "the effect of a stay is that the 
award is not subject to enforcement proceedings under article 54 of the ICSID 
Convention pending the outcome of the annulment application". 57 This statement is 
correct; a stay will prevent enforcement proceedings under article 54. Yet it implies that 
the obligation to comply with an award lies with article 54 when it is in fact found at 
article 53. The ad hoe committee later clarified this, stating that the provision of a bank 
guarantee would convert the undertaking of compliance under article 53 of the ICSID 
Convention into a financial guarantee". 58 
The express preservation of a state's immunity from execution under article 55 of the 
ICSID Convention could also be interpreted as requiring enforcement proceedings as an 
essential step in obtaining compliance of an award. However, article 55 does not place a 
requirement on the parties to consider questions of sovereign immunity; instead it is an 
option reserved for states in the event they seek to claim it. 
4.3.3 Pleading sovereign immunity in the Argentine Cases 
In order to levy execution against the assets of Argentina under article 54, an award 
creditor will need to consider where Argentina holds its assets, identify which assets 
serve as objects of the execution, and the rules and procedures governing execution of 
those assets. This will allow it to assess the forum offering the least resistance to 
enforcement of its award.59 Identification of assets is complicated by privacy and 
56 As compliance with an award occurs after a tnbunal has made its award, enforcement 1s not an issue widely dealt 
with by tnbunals. 
57 CMS Decision on Respondent's Request for a Stay of Enforcement par 35 
58 CMS Decision on Respondent's Request for a Stay of Enforcement par 39 
59 Delaume G, "State Contracts and Transnational Arb1trat10n" (1981) 74(4) The American Journal of lnternatwnal 
Law 784, 817 
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confidentiality of banking laws,60 and the variance in sovereign immunity laws from state 
to state makes forum shopping a distinct reality in enforcement proceedings in the 
Argentine Cases. It may be that Argentina has no significant executable assets outside its 
own jurisdiction, or none in the Contracting State where execution is sought. It would be 
guesswork to suggest which Contracting State's sovereign immunity rules are relevant to 
the Argentine Cases. 61 
Sovereign immunity is a significant hurdle to the enforcement of arbitral awards, and 
trends indicate that courts will permit the plea of sovereign immunity to avoid potential 
conflicts with other states.62 It is often not legal considerations, such as the distinction 
between commercial and government acts, but a court's unwillingness to participate in 
sensitive foreign policy issues which is the decisive factor. 63 There may be policy reasons 
such as the fear of provoking a flight of capital from the jurisdiction, or a court may be 
disinclined to support the interest of foreign parties in whom they have no interest by 
enforcing an award against a state with whom they may well have close relations. 64 
Significant challenges to enforcement by use of the sovereign immunity defence in the 
Argentine Cases may encourage future investors to devise ways of avoiding this situation 
in the future. A potential measure would be for investors to require the question of 
sovereign immunity be dealt with expressly in the contract with a state. 65 While the 
60 Boralessa A, above nl 5, 79 
61 A state must be a signatory of the ICSID Conventton and therefore a "Contractmg State". For a thorough analysis of 
the sovereign immumty rules m the Umted Kingdom and the United States see Boralessa A, above n 15. A good 
summary of the Umted States position 1s also provided by Delaume G, above n59, 485 
62 SornaraJah M, above n36, 296 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, 297 
65 Delaume provides an example: 
The consent to [ICSID arbitration] shall not preclude any party to this agreement from takmg any prov1s10nal 
measures or pursuing any provisional remedies, such as attachment or similar proceedings, which may be 
available to such party under the laws of any 1unsd1ct1on, pending the mstitution of any arbitration proceedings 
pursuant to this Agreement or pending the rendering, execution and payment m full of any arbitral award made 
by the Arbitral Tribunal. 
The [Government] hereby agrees that, should [the investor] bring any judicial proceedmg in relat10n to any 
matter ansing under this Agreement, includmg without !Imitation any arb1trat1on proceeding and any action to 
enforce any arbitral award, no immunity from such1ud1cial proceeding, from attachment of the [Government's] 
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desire to attract direct investment and the need to display an attractive investment climate 
to increase investor confidence may prompt a state to accept this position, 66 it is a 
restrictive provision and states may be reluctant to include it, or may limit its 
effectiveness to certain types of property. 
At a bilateral or multilateral treaty level, it is unlikely that a waiver of immunity would be 
accepted, especially given the implications this would have under the presence of a Most-
Favoured-Nation ("MFN") clause. Furthermore, while a waiver of immunity clause may 
increase the chances of execution, the validity and enforceability of such a clause will 
ultimately depend on the law in force in the forum where execution is sought.67 
4.3.4 Enforcement proceedings in the Argentine Cases 
Argentina has responded to requests for payment of the CMS Award with a request that 
CMS pursue enforcement of the award under article 54 of the ICSID Convention.68 
Implicit in Argentina's insistence on the institution of enforcement proceedings is that 
they will not be followed by straightforward compliance, as otherwise such proceedings 
would be unnecessary. 
property or from execution of judgement shall be claimed by or on behalf of the [Government] or with respect 
to its properties, any such immumty bemg hereby waived by the [Government] 
Delaume G, above n59, 795 
66 Boralessa A, above n 15, 104 
67 In the United States a waiver would have limited effect because under its sovereign immunity Jaws a state does not 
have the power to waive 1mmumty of non-commercial assets. In the Umted Kingdom commercial assets do not enjoy 
1mmumty so a waiver is dev01d oflegal meanmg, regardmg non-commercial assets, with some hm1ted except10ns, 
1mmumty can be waived. Boralessa A, above nl5, 114 
68 Peterson L, "CMS Energy urges Argentma to pay ICSID award" Inveshnent Treaty News, 11 January 2008 at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn janl 1 2008.pdf(2 October 2008). 
Osvaldo Gughelmmo (Procurador Del Tesoro de la Nacion) makes reference to this when discussing the exercise of the 
option to purchase shares awarded under the CMS Award: 
Argentina will make use of this opt10n when the company complies with all the reqmrements to execute the 
award in accordance with the rules ofICSID (author's own translation) 
Ongmal text reads: "La Argentme va a hacer uso de la opc10n cuando la empresa cumpla con todos los reqms1tos para 
e1ecutar el laudo conforme a !as reglas del CIADI"; "Se vende unjmcio contra Ja Argentma por u$sl 80 m1llones" at 
http-//totalnews.com.ar/mdex2.php?optlon=com content&task=view&id=l4196&po 4/07/2008; This position was also 
adopted by Argentina in Siemens AG v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/02/08) 
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Insisting on enforcement proceedings before compliance could be part of a strategy to 
delay payment as long as possible while the remaining Argentine Cases are pending, or to 
provide the basis on which to claim sovereign immunity. Alternatively, if enforcement 
proceedings are instituted in Argentina, they could be used as the basis from which 
Argentina seeks review of ICSID awards in their national courts.69 Whatever the reason, 
the requirement for enforcement proceedings before compliance with an award 
challenges the well established interpretation of articles 53 and 54 and provides a 
precedent for award debtors to draw out the process of complying with a final ICSID 
Award. 
4.4 Avoiding Compliance From Outside the ICSID Framework 
Strategies to avoid compliance with ICSID awards based on arguments from outside the 
provisions of the IC SID Convention have also been developed. One of the key arguments 
posed challenges the constitutionality of the ICSID Convention under the Argentine 
Constitution. This argument has two alternative grounds: an alleged failure to comply 
with Argentina's legal requirements when ratifying and entering into the ICSID 
Convention; and alleged breaches of public policy principles protected under the 
Argentine Constitution. Arguments to allow ICSID Awards to be subject to a review by 
Argentine Courts have also been explored. 
4.4.1 The unconstitutionality of an international treaty 
a) General principles under international law 
There are two longstanding views regarding the domestic unconstitutionality of an 
international treaty: first, the "constitutionalist" view that the violation of an internal law 
invalidates the consent of the state to be bound by the treaty (it is ultra vires);70 and 
second, the "internationalist" view that when consent with apparent authority of the state 
69 See below 4.4.3 
70 SomaraJah M, above n36, 109 
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is given, the state is bound by that consent even if a prescription of internal law has not 
been complied with.71 
The position at international law is well established. The international law obligation to 
abide by and comply with treaty obligations is reinforced by the principle pacta sunt 
servanda. This is supported by the principle of customary international law that a state 
may not rely on its national law to justify a failure to carry out an international obligation, 
which is restated at article 27 of the Vienna Convention: 
Article 27: Internal law and observance of treaties 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Article 46 
This principle has been consistently applied by international tribunals 72 and has been 
interpreted a applying to all internal laws including a state's constitution: 
Pursuant to international law, all obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled in good faith; 
domestic law may not be invoked to justify nonfulfilment. These rules may be deemed to 
be general principles of law and have been applied by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice even in cases involving 
constitutional provisions. 73 
An exception to this rule is permitted under article 46 of the Vienna Convention: 
Article 46: Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties 
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude 
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule 
of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any state conducting itself 
in the matter in accordance with normal practise and in good faith 
Therefore, while not providing an absolute bar to reliance on internal law as grounds for 
the invalidity of a treaty, the circumstances in which a state can rely on its own laws to 
71 Ibid. 
72 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, AdVIsory Op1mon, 1925, PCIJ, Ser B, No 1 O; The Inter-Amencan 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opmion on Intemat10nal Respons1b11ity for the Promulgation and Enforcement of 
Laws m Violat10n of the Convention, OC-14/94, Ser A, No 14, par 35, 116 ILR 320 
73 The Inter-Amencan Court of Human Rights, Advisory Op1mon on International Responsibility for the Promulgat10n 
and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convent10n, OC-14/94, Ser A, No 14, par 35, 116 ILR 320 cited in Denza 
E "The Relationship between International and Nat10nal Law" Chapter 14, Evans MD ( ed), above nl 7, 425 
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avoid compliance with an international obligation under the doctrine of ultra vires are 
limited. 
A policy justification for not permitting a state entity to rely on the ultra vires doctrine to 
resile from an agreement to arbitrate was provided by Judge Keba Mbaye of the ICJ, at a 
seminar on international arbitration: 
For a long time the French speaking countries of Africa, following French example, had 
thought that they could avoid arbitration by citing procedural rules forbidding them to 
agree to internal [international] arbitration ... this situation was sapping the confidence of 
economic partners of these countries. It was a question of pure good faith. A state must 
not be allowed to cite the provisions of its law in order to escape from an arbitration that 
it has already accepted. 74 
Rather than minimising the importance of national laws, this principle maximises the 
responsibility of states to uphold their commercial commitments, providing certainty to 
international commercial agreements with states.75 
\, 
b) General principles under Argentine law 
The power to enter into treaties is an executive power within the Constituci6n de la 
Nacion Argentina (Constitution of the Argentine Nation) 1853 (hereinafter the "Argentine 
Constitution").76 Parliament examines all proposed treaty actions and passes legislation 
ratifying those treaties. A treaty acquires the status of domestic law once parliament has 
adopted a law authorizing its ratification and no further law specifically incorporating 
international law into the domestic system is required. 77 A further balance in the 
74 SornaraJah M, above n36, 108 
75 Romero S, "ICC Arbitration and State Contracts" (2002) 13 /CC lntematwnal Court of Arbitration Bulletin 34, 35 
76 Consfltuc16n de la Nacion Argentina (The Constitution of the Argentine Nation) 1853, revised 1994 at 
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/consnac/consnac.htln (6 November 2008) 
77 Buergenthal T, "Internac10nal Tribunals and Nacional Courts: The Internationalization of Domestic AdJuducat1on" in 
RudolfBernhardt, Ulnch Beyerlin & Michael Bothe Spnnger Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung Volkerrecht, 
Europarecht, Staatsrecht. Festschnftfiir Rudolf Bernhardt 1995, 688, 699. This system ofmcorporation reflects the 
monist theory of the relationship between internat10nal law and nat10nal law Argentina 1s not a pure momst system, as 
this would place mternatJonal rules at the apex of its legal hierarchy with its constitution and other laws below 1t. 
Instead Argentma places mternat10nal treaties below the constJtut1on in its legal hierarchy. The classification of a state 
as "momst" or "dualist" does not assist in pred1ctmg how its courts will approach the complex quest10ns which anse m 
litigation involvmg international law; Denza E "The Relationship between International and National Law" Chapter 14, 
Evans MD (ed), above nl 7, 429 
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Argentine Constitution is the judiciary' s oversight of the system; constitutional control is 
not entrusted to the Congress or the Executive, but rests with the judiciary and in last 
resort with the National Supreme Court, which can declare a law unconstitutional.78 
The Argentine Constitution was amended in 1994 (hereinafter the Constitutional 
Reform). The Constitutional Reform introduced a number of modifications regarding the 
hierarchy of international treaties in Argentina's legal system. As a general rule, it 
established that international treaties are subordinated to the Constitution but prevail over 
other laws and normative measures. 79 Thus the Argentine Constitution sets up its legal 
hierarchy as being: (1) the constitution (2) international treaties and (3) domestic laws.80 
International treaties are therefore subordinated to the constitution but prevail over other 
laws.81 
The Constitutional Reform established categories of international treaties as follows: 82 
1) Human Rights Treaties; 
2) Integration Treaties; 
3) Treaties not included under the previous items concluded with other nationals or 
international organizations; 
78 1) a lawsuit must be filed with the court, m which unconstitutionality is claimed by a party to that lawsmt; (1i) the 
courts cannot declare unconstitutional acts issued by other governmental branches-"non-Justifiable questions", (1iI) 
filmg of the request 1s m the due procedural form; (1v) that both the claimant and the defendant have standing as to the 
constltut1onal question, and (v) that the nghts are not affected by the statute oflim1tations. See, Torricelli M, "El 
sistema de control constitutional Argentmo", Lexis Nexis, Argentma, 2002 eh 11-B cited m Alfaro C & Lorentl P, "The 
Growmg Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals, A Conflict between International and Domestic Law" 
(2005) 6(3) The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 421 
79 Argentme Const1tut10n, sect10n 75.22 
80 Argentme Constitution, sect10n 75.22 
81 The hierarchy of the mternational treaties was established before the Constitutional Reform in the Supreme Court 
dec1s1ons of Ekmed;ian, Mzguel A c/Sofovzch, Gerado y Otros (Fallos 315:1492, de! 07/07/92). Prior to this, decisions 
treaties and federal statutes had been accorded the same normative ranking in Argentina with the later m time 
prevailmg m the case of conflict. The interpretation was followed m Fibraca Constructora S CA c/Comisi6n Mixta de 
Saito Grande (Fallos 316:1669 de! 07/07/93) and Hage/in, Ragnarc!Estado Nacional (Fallos 316"2176, de! 22712/93). 
An mternational treaty's hierarchy over domestic laws 1s also established under article 27 of the Vzenna Conventwn to 
which Argentina 1s a party see above 4.4.la) & Chapter 2 n12 
82 Rosattl H D, "Globalization, Stat1sm and Law (Argentma and ICSID)" (translation) (2004) 2(3) Transnational 
Dispute Management, 12 
This thesis will not discuss items 4 & 5 as they are not relevant 
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4) Concordats with the Holy See; and 
5) Conventions concluded by the provinces with notice to national congress. 
This categorisation affects both the general hierarchical position of treaties relative to the 
Argentine Constitution and a treaty's incorporation into the Argentine legal system. 
Human Rights Treaties are given constitutional hierarchy; they are not subordinate to the 
principles of the Constitution but are equal to it. Human Rights treaties have direct entry 
to Argentina's legal system.83 The remaining categories of treaty follow the general 
principle above and are accorded a position superior to national legislation but below the 
Constitution.84 "Integration" treaties require legislation to be approved by am absolute 
majority before being incorporated into the Argentine legal system, 85 while non-
83 Argentine Constitution, section 75.22: 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
Amen can Convention on Human Rights; the Intemat10nal Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
Intemat10nal Pact on Civil and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convent10n on the Prevention 
and Pumshment of Genocide; the International Convention on the Ehmmat1on of all Forms of Racial 
D1scnmmation; the Convention on the Ehmmation of all Forms of Discrimination agamst Woman; the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degradmg Treatments or Punishments; the 
Convent10n on the Rights of the Child; in the full force of their provisions, they have constitutional 
hierarchy, do no repeal any section of the First Part of this Constitution and are to be understood as 
complementmg the rights and guarantees recogmzed herem. They shall only be denounced, m such event, by 
the National Executive Power after the approval of two-thirds of all the members of each House. 
In order to attain constJtut10nal hierarchy, the other treaties and conventions on human nghts shall reqmre the 
vote of two-thirds of all the members of each House, after the1r approval by Congress. (author's emphasis) 
84 Argentme ConstJtut10n, section 75.22: 
Congress is empowered: 
To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and mtematJonal orgamzations, and concordats with 
the Holy See. Treaties and concordats have a higher hierarchy than laws. (author's emphasis) 
Argentine Constitution, section 75 25: 
Congress 1s empowered: 
To approve treaties of rntegratlon which delegate powers and junsd1ct1on to supranat10nal orgamzat10ns under 
reciprocal and equal cond1t10ns, and which respect the democratic order and human rights. The rules derived 
therefrom have a higher hierarchy than laws. (author's emphasis) 
85 Integration treaties with Latin Amencan countries require the absolute majority of all members of each house. In the 
case of integration treaties with non-Latin Amencan Countries the Nat10nal Congress, with the absolute ma.iority of the 
members present of each house, shall declare the advisability of the approval of the treaty which shall only be approved 
with the both of the absolute majority of all the members of each House, one hundred and twenty days after the said 
declarat10n of adv1sab1hty; Argentine Constitution, section 75.24 (2) 
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integration treaties are incorporated by legislation approved by a normal majority. 86 
There is no explanation in the Argentine Constitution for what constitutes an integration 
treaty. 
Broadly speaking, international agreements have either "co-operation" or "integration" 
purposes. Co-operation treaties aim to coordinate the actions of states to achieve some 
common goals. Under a co-operation treaty no sovereign powers are transferred to the 
created organisation. In contrast, integration treaties are treaties where a supranational 
organisation receives a delegation of powers related to the superior functions of the 
member states. Executive, legislative and jurisdictional powers on certain matters are 
transferred and the organisation can adopt decisions directly applicable within their 
territories. Integration treaties often involve the linking of economic and political 
domains of states, the main example being the European Union. 87 
4.4.2 The unconstitutionality of the IC SID Convention 
a) Missing procedural steps 
The Constitutional Reform was enacted on 24 August 1994 almost parallel to the 
incorporation of the ICSID Convention in Argentina's domestic legal system.88 Some 
steps incorporating the ICSID Convention into the domestic legal system were completed 
before the Constitutional Reform and others after it. It has been argued that certain 
requirements instituted by the Constitutional Reform have been left out of the ICSID 
Convention treaty making process, specifically the special approval requirements for 
integration treaties. As a consequence it is argued that the ICSID Convention and any 
award stemming from it are null and void. 89 
86 Argentine Constitution, section 75.22 (1)(3) 
87 Mattli W, "Explammg regional mtegration outcomes" (1999) 6(1) Journal of European Public Polzcy I. See also, 
Alfaro C E & Lorent! P, above n78, 429 
88 The ICSID Convention was signed by Argentma's Executive Branch on 21May1991, approved by Congress by 
Law 24.353 on 28 July 1994 and promulgated by the Executive on 22 August 1994. 
89 Perotti J, "Consideraciones de! caso argentmo ante la Jurisd1cci6n de! CIADI" Centro Argentina de Estudios 
Intemacionales (Argentme Center oflntemacional Studies- Workmg Papers Series), 9 at 
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It is important, then, to assess the ratification of the international treaties relevant to the 
Argentine Cases, including the series of BITs entered into with Argentina and the IC SID 
Convention. According to their preambles, BITs consist in the "promotion of greater 
economic cooperation among states" in order to achieve "economic development of the 
parties", to "stimulate private economic incentive" as well as to "maintain a stable 
framework for investment".90 BITs are clearly co-operation treaties and therefore form 
part of the category of treaties referred to in the Argentine Constitution section 75.22(1), 
meaning that they are incorporated by legislation approved by a normal majority and 
enjoy a rank higher than laws and statutes, but below the Constitution. 
The ICSID Convention approves the mechanisms for the settlement of disputes based on 
conciliation and arbitration. It does not require a delegation of competencies related to 
the state's activities or effect a progressive relinquishment of its sovereignty. Nor does it 
establish an organizational structure to manage state activity. The ICSID Convention 
simply binds states to recognise common procedural rules to be applied in order to settle 
a dispute.91 The impermanence of ICSID arbitration panels, which are constituted on an 
ad hoe basis for specific cases, 92 further differentiates it from integration organizations 
such as the United Nations or the European Union, which are permanent international 
agencies structured on the basis of a division of powers.93 
ICSID's lack of "integration" purposes means that the ICSID Convention corresponds, 
within the Argentine Constitution, to the procedure established in section 75.22(1) and 
does not require a special majority approval to form part of Argentina's legal system. The 
http://www.cae1.c0m.ar/es/programas/0011/08.pdf (21 July 2008). For support for this line of argument see, Tinoco 
Arbztratwn (1923) I UNRIAA 371. In that case the Tinoco government entered mto an agreement with a foreign 
corporation without obtainmg senate approval as required under its constitution. When the government fell, the new 
government passed a degree nullifymg the agreement. The arbitrator held that the claim based on the agreement should 
be dismissed as the agreement was ultra vires to the constttutton extstmg at the time of the agreement; SornaraJah M, 
above n36, 99 
90 Rosatti H D, above n82, 17 
91 Ibtd, 20 
92 Alfaro C & Lorent! P, above n78, 429 
93 Rosatt1 H D, above n82, 19 
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ICSID Convention ranks higher than other laws and lower than the Argentine 
Constitution. 
As discussed above, the ICSID Convention is not an "integration" treaty. If the 
Constitutional Reform provisions applied to the treaty making process, the procedure 
relating to integration treaties does not. Therefore the ICSID Convention was correctly 
signed, approved and ratified for its incorporation into the Argentine legal system and 
cannot be invalidated as unconstitutional on this ground. 
b) Violating public law principles protected by the Argentine Constitution 
The second argument for the unconstitutionality of the ICSID Convention relies on 
section 27 of the Argentine Constitution, which provides: 
The federal government is requested to consolidate peace and commerce relations with 
foreign powers by means of treaties that shall be subject to the public law principles set 
forth in this Constitution. 94 
The validity of the ICSID Convention in Argentina can be tested by ascertaining 
compatibility with the "public law principles" referred to in section 27. This argument 
has been developed on a number of grounds. 
(i) Breaching the basic foundations of Argentina's legal framework 
The public law principles protected by section 27 establish the basic foundations of the 
Argentine legal framework, the observance of which is a condition established for the 
validity of international commercial treaties.95 According to Argentina's former 
Attorney-General, Horacio Rosatti, these public policy principles include: (1) the 
republican representative form of government; (2) the principle of legality and reserve; 
(3) equality before the law; (4) the principles of due process; and (5) the non-absolute 
character of rights and the standard of reasonableness.96 Rosatti claims that the ICSID 
94 Translation taken from Alfaro C & Lorent! P, above n78, 418 
95 Rosatti H D, above n82, 27 
96 Ibid. 
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Convention/BIT combination is unconstitutional for breach of these principles contrary to 
section 27 of the Argentine Constitution. 
The representative and republican form of government97 is allegedly violated because it 
inhibits and curtails the legislative and judicial branches of government.98 The legislative 
branch is restricted from modifying its initial legal conditions through stabilization 
clauses; Rosatti uses the example of a BIT with Panama to illustrate this point.99 This 
relevant clause refers to the expropriation of investments without compensation by the 
modification of laws; it does not restrict Argentina's legislative activity per se, but 
requires compensation to be paid in the event that such laws result in expropriation. The 
clause is also heavily qualified by exceptions for public utility or social unrest. For these 
reasons it is unlikely that this argument will have any substantive effect on the Argentine 
Cases. Furthermore, there is no equivalent provision in the US-Argentina BIT, which is 
the relevant BIT in all but one of the decided Argentine Cases. Therefore the argument 
would have no bearing on the BITs establishing the basis for these cases or for arguing 
the invalidity of the IC SID Convention. 
The alleged inhibition or curtailing of the judicial branch relates to restrictions on the 
exercise control of constitutionality;1°0 the principle of due process of law is also claimed 
to be violated in this way. 101 Rosatti argues that Argentina cannot anticipatorily or 
definitively waive its right to undertake constitutional control of certain acts in domestic 
97 Argentme ConstJtut10n, section 1 
98 RosattJ H D, above n82, 27 
99 Bilateral Investment Treaty between Argentina and Panama (Approved by Law 24, 971): 
none of the parties shall take, dITectly or indITectly, measures of expropnat10n or nationalization, or any other 
similar measure, rncluding the modification or derogat10n of laws haVIng the same effect"- This example relate 
to expropnat10n- taken in the context of the Argentine Cases, this provisions m the US-Arg BIT provides 
....... - and it was not established- m this sense the argument that this proVIsrnn inh1b1ts the legislative arm of 
government 1s not established 
RosattJ also argues that the principle of absolute nature of rights and the standard of reasonableness is violated in this 
way: Rosatti H D, above n82, 28 
ioo Ibid, 27 
IOI Ibid, 28 
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courts.102 The anticipatory control of the constitution is breached because the BIT/ICSID 
Convention combination does not require the exhaustion of local remedies prior to its 
submission to arbitration. 
The Argentine Executive branch was given the power to submit disputes with foreigners 
to judges of other jurisdictions and arbitral tribunals in 1973. 103 This provision, in 
conjunction with the power to conclude treaties under the Argentine Constitution, 
provides the basis for Argentina's submission to disputes to a foreign jurisdiction in 
numerous international agreements. 104 The power of Argentine courts to decide questions 
arising under the Constitution is not disputed; section 116 of the Argentine Constitution 
grants courts the power: 
to hear and decide all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the 
nation ... and ... under treaties made with foreign nations: all matters in which the nation 
shall be a party ... 105 
However, this provision does not prevent the submission of disputes to an alternate 
jurisdiction, which is established above and supported by section 117 of the Argentine 
Constitution: 
In the aforementioned cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, with 
such regulations and exceptions as Congress may prescribe; but in all matters concerning 
foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and in those in which a province shall be a 
party, the Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction.106 
102 Ibid, 10; Bouzas R & Chudnovsky D, "Foreign D!fect Investment and Sustamable Development. The Recent 
Argentina Expenence" Univers1dad de San Andres V1ctona (Argentma) 2005, 5(a) 
103 Law 20.548 at article 7 (ADLA XXXIIl-D-3657), modifying law 11.672. Granato L, "Protecc16n de] mversor 
extranJero y arbitraJe internac10nal en los Tratados B1Jaterales de Invers16n" Workmg Paper no. 3, Centro Argentmo de 
Estudios Internac10nales: Derecho Internac10nal, 98 at http://www.cae1.c0m.ar/es/programas/di/mverson pdf(lO July 
2008) 
104 Granato L, above nl 03, note 254 and accompanymg text 
105 Argentme Constitution, section 116: 
The Supreme Court and the lower courts of the Nation are empowered to hear and decide all cases arising under 
the Constitution and the Jaws of the Nation, with the exception made m Sect10n 75, subsection 12, and under 
the treaties made with foreign nations; all cases concernmg ambassadors, public ministers and foreign consuls; 
cases related to admlfalty and maritime Jurisdiction; matters m which the Nation shall be a party; actions arismg 
between two or more provmces, between one province and the inhabitants of another province, between the 
mhabitants of different provtnces, and between one provmce or the mhabitants thereof agamst a foreign state or 
citizen. 
106 Argentine Constitution, sect10n 117 
130 
Chapter 4 
On this basis, in cases not concerning ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and when a 
province is not a party, the court does not have original or exclusive jurisdiction, thus 
defeating the requirement for anticipatory jurisdiction as a public policy principle under 
the Argentine Constitution. 
In the context of BITs, Argentina traditionally required the exhaustion of local remedies 
prior to submitting a dispute to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. The BIT 
signed between France and Argentina on 3 July 1991 marked the end of this trend and 
allowed for disputes to be taken directly to international arbitration. 107 In terms of the 
ICSID Convention, Rosatti's argument overlooks that the ICSID Convention allows 
contracting states to require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its consent 
to arbitration. 108 Argentina's consent without requiring this condition provides a strong 
presumption that its intention was to have recourse to arbitration under ICSID to the 
exclusion of any other remedy. 109 The impediment to exercising prior judicial control 
over a dispute thus lies not with the ICSID Convention but with the exercise of an 
autonomous right by Argentina when it ratified the ICSID Convention. 
The definitive waiver of constitutional control, claimed to breach public law principles, 
occurs by the non-reviewability of Awards under articles 26, 53 and 54 of the ICSID 
Convention. Section 116 of the Argentine Constitution gives Argentine courts the power 
to hear all matters to which the nation is a party, 110 while section 117 vests in the 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in such cases. Importantly, section 117 allows for 
any exception to this jurisdiction the Congress may prescribe. The Congress's acceptance 
107 Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of France for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protectwn of Investments, signed on July 3, 1991 and m force smce March 3, 1993 (France-Argentina BIT) 
108 ICSID Convention, article 26: 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to 
such arbitration to the exclusion of any other local remedy. A Contractmg State may require the exhaustton of 
local admm1strattve or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. 
109 IC SID, Report of the Executive Directors on the Conventwn on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Natwnals of Other States (1965) 4 ILM 524, par 32 at http://www.1csid.worldbank.org-ICSID-Stat1cF1les-
bas1cdoc-CRR Eng!tsh-final pdf 
110 Argentme Constitution, section 116 see above nl 05 
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of the IC SID Convention, which allows for the award of non-reviewable decisions, forms 
such an exception. Thus defeating claims that the ICSID Convention violates public law 
principles on this ground. 
A third argument in breach of the public policy principle of the representative and 
republican form of government is that the election of arbitrators by the executive branch 
of the government causes an imbalance of powers in government, which results in an 
erosion of the principle of "separation of powers", essential to the republican form of 
government. 111 This alleged violation lies not in the ICSID Convention, which requires 
only that the Contracting States appoint arbitrators without specifying how they should be 
appointed by the respective states, but with the Argentine government, and so cannot be 
relied upon to establish the ICSID Conventions unconstitutionality. 
Finally, Rosatti argues that the principle of legality and reserve112 is violated by the over-
estimation of the legal value of commercial treaties, which introduce a modification of 
the Argentine normative hierarchy. 113 This argument is circular, as it succeeds only if the 
other arguments supporting unconstitutionality are unsuccessful. 
(ii) Violating "matters" of public policy 
A broad interpretation of "public law principles" would include "matters of public 
policy". Matters of public policy are defined by Argentine law as a feature of some laws 
which regulate matters related to the basic order of society or the fundamental institutions 
of the state. 114 They are the laws which regulate principles of public policy. Argentine 
law registers the following categories of laws embodying matters of public policy: 
111 Rosatti H D, above n82, 29 
112 Argentine Constitution, section 19: 
The private actions of men which in no way offend pubhc order or morahty, nor tnJure a third party, are only 
reserved to God and are exempted from the authority of judges. No mhabitant of the Nation shall be obliged to 
perform what the law does not demand nor deprived of what it does not proh1b1t. 
113 Rosattl H D, above n82, 29 
114 Alfaro C E & Lorenti P, above n78, 423 
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Constitutional rules and principles;115 general legal principles; 116 good morals and 
justice standards;117 emergency laws; 118 and reform laws. 119 The classification of laws 
embodying "matters of public policy" is made by Congress itself, and courts have 
historically been reluctant to review this classification. 120 
Extending the concept of public law principles in this way would mean that section 27 of 
the Argentine Constitution requires international treaties to comply with public law 
principles recognised as such by the Constitution and by domestic laws related to matters 
of public policy. 121 Under the Constitution, no distinction is drawn between ordinary laws 
and those concerning "matters of public policy''; all of them are subordinated to 
international treaties. 122 Requiring treaties to comply with domestic laws relating to 
matters of public policy turns the constitutional legal pyramid upside down, because the 
Argentine Constitution plainly requires that international treaties prevail over domestic 
law.123 
Contrarily, it could be argued that a law which relates to a matter of public policy is 
actually representative of the Constitution, and so a treaty in conflict with a "matter of 
115 The Argentine Constitution registers its own supremacy over international treaties: Argentine Constitution sections 
27. 31 and 75.22 and 24 
116 Natzonal Civil Code (Cod1go C1v11), Law 340 Buenos Aires, 25 September 1869 at 
http://www.sau.rns.gov.ar/download/grt nac10n/grt codigo civ11.ht1nl article 14, section 2 provides that foreign laws 
(which mcludes awards) will not be applicable if they are m conflict with pubhc law principles. See, Alfaro C & 
Lorent1 P, above n78, 423 
117 These standards which are widely incorporated in national law often make reference to ideals of Justice and fairness; 
Ibid. 
118 Argentina's ultimate resource m penods of crisis 1s the enactlnent of emergency laws. These laws are often declared 
to be "pubhc pohcy laws" which means their provisions are mandatory and prevail over the remammg legislation and 
the will of the people. The pnvat1zation process of state-owned companies dunng the 1990's was performed under laws 
ofth1s type, mamly Laws 23.696 and 23.697of1989. So were the currency devaluation and "pes1fication" of 
obligations under Law 25.561 of2002 and Presidential Decree 214/2002"; Alfaro C & Lorentl P, above n78, 424 
119 The laws which implement policy decisions deemed of high relevance. The government provides them with features 
of ''public pohcy" to ensure their mandatory nature: A good example is Law 23 .928 of 1992, which regulated the 
"convertibihty" of the Argentme currency: Alfaro C & Lorenti P, above n78, 423 
120 Ibid, 424 
121 Ibid, 425 
122 Argentine Constitution, section 75.22 
123 Alfaro C & Lorenti P, above n78, 427 
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public policy" conflicts with the Constitution itself and not with a specific law. 124 The 
difficultly in establishing this position is that section 27 refers to "principles" of public 
policy and not to "matters", and it is difficult to identify a "principle" being breached by 
the ICSID Convention. For example, if an international treaty provides that Contracting 
States are banned from adopting "emergency'' policies, such a provision would be against 
public policy principles set forth in the Constitution, including inhibiting legislative 
power. But construing the ICSID Convention as in breach of national laws which are 
"matters of public policy" is inconsistent with the legal pyramid. 125 The Argentine 
Constitution sets forth the "Principles", the laws set forth the "means" or "matters", and 
the international treaties lie in the middle. Thus the validity of the treaties has to be tested 
against the "principles" under the Constitution and not the "matters" regulated by 
national laws. 
c) The competence to conclude treaties 
In addition to the hurdles establishing the invalidity of the IC SID Convention on grounds 
of unconstitutionality, Argentina's obligations under the ICSID Convention may also be 
preserved by the Vienna Convention. In essence, articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna 
Convention require a party to fulfill its treaty obligations and prevent a state from 
invoking the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty. 
An exception to this rule is provided by article 46 of the Vienna Convention regarding a 
state's competence to conclude treaties. 126 To invoke this exception, the violation of 
124 Ibid. 
125 The author 1s unaware of the breach of any such law 
126 Vienna Convent10n, article 46: 
Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties 
I. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed m v10lat10n of a 
provision of1ts mternal law regardmg competence to conclude treaties as mvahdating its consent unless that 
violat10n was mamfest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2. A v10lation is manifest if 1t would be objectively evident to any state conductmg itself m the matter m 
accordance with normal practise and m good faith. 
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public policy principles must concern a rule of "fundamental importance". A violation 
must also be "manifest", that is, "objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the 
matter in accordance with normal practise and good faith". 
Article 46 has seldom been invoked by states as a claim for invalidity. 127 The application 
of article 46 involves a question of fact and cases have shown that international law will 
not accept a claim of incompetence to conclude a treaty on this ground in all but the most 
clear cut cases. Courts have tended to favour the order of international relations and 
reveal a reluctance to look behind the ostensible authority of a state, 128 instead confirming 
no obligation on states to be informed about the legislative or constitutional 
developments of other states. 129 Nor has the incompetency of particular individuals been 
considered sufficient to negate a state's consent to a treaty. 130 
Rosatti argues, apparently based on article 46 of the Vienna Convention, that: 
what we [Argentina] are saying is that there is constitutional control and it is based on 
article 27 [of the Constitution] which has been in force since 1953, if investors failed to 
read this when they signed their contracts, then they should be claiming against their 
d . . 1 . h s fAr . 131 a v1smg awyers, not agamst t e tate o gentma. 
The essence of this argument overstates the exception allowed under article 46 of the 
Vienna Convention which does not simply allow a state to rely on the non-compliance 
with a national law in order to deny that it has consented to be bound by a treaty. 
Rosatti's interpretation would require an investor, entering into a commercial contract 
under the protection of a BIT, which has ICSID arbitration as its dispute resolution 
127 Triggs GD, International Law, Contemporary Principles and Practices, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2006, 
532 
128 Eastern Greenland Case Permanent Court oflntemat10nal Justice Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933) 
129 Cameroon v Nigeria, 10 October 2002, ICJ, 125 cited m Tnggs GD, above n127, 533 
130 Rio Martin Case 2 RIAA 615; Maritime Delimitation and Temtorial Questwns Case (Qatar v Bahrain) 1994 ICJ 
Rep 112 cited m Dixon M, Textbook on International Law, 61h edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2007,63 
131 Bourdm M, "No descarto ir a la Corte por los Laudos de! CIADI" interview with Rosatt1 conducted by Mana 
Boudin, www.mfobaeprofes1onal.com (authors own translation and parenthesis). Origmal text reads: 
lo que dec1mos es que si hay control de constitucionalidad tiene que ser sobre la base de artfculo 27 que esta 
vigente desde 1953, s1 los inversores no lo leyeron cuando firmaron el tratado, deberian reclamarle a sus 
abogados asesores no al estado Argentma. 
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mechanism, to consider the constitutional basis for Argentina's voluntary consent to the 
ICSID Convention. The fulfilment of this requirement would result in the cessation of 
international commerce, for it defeats any sense of certainty when contracting with a state 
and conflicts with international interpretation of the divergence between national and 
international law. 
Argentina is a signatory to the Vienna Convention, which acquired the status of domestic 
law once parliament adopted a law authorising its ratification.132 This means that the 
obligations of the Vienna Convention form an integral part of Argentine law, and gives 
national courts the power to prevent violations of treaty obligation on the basis of internal 
laws including its constitution. It also deprives Argentine courts of an excuse not to 
enforce the obligations of the ICSID Convention and BITs. 
While there is some merit in the argument that section 27 of the Constitution may 
constitute a rule of fundamental importance regarding Argentina's competence to 
conclude treaties, in order to find protection under article 46, the section also requires a 
manifest violation of that rule. The arguments developed by Argentina regarding a 
violation of article 27 of the Constitution include unspecific references to alleged 
violations principles of public policy and a reconstruction of the process of Argentina's 
ratification of the ICSID Convention to imply additional procedural steps. 133 A circular 
search for a basis on which to challenge the constitutional capacity of Argentina to enter 
into the ICSID Convention even if ultimately able to establish a violation of section 27 of 
the Constitution will be insufficient to be considered a manifest violation as required 
under article 46. In order to be considered manifest, a violation of a rule must have been 
objectively evident to a state conducting itself in accordance with normal practise and in 
good faith. 134 This requires that such a rule be publicised to the other state and does not 
132 Argentma's accession to the Vienna Convention was approved by Law 19865 of 10 March 1972 (signed by 
Argentina on 23 May 1969), Boletin Oficial de la Republica de Argentina, 11 January 1973 
133 See discussion above 4.4.2a) and 4.4.2b) 
134 Vienna Convention, article 46 (2) above n126 
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require a state to be informed of the legislative or constitutional development's of 
Argentina. 135 Even if Argentina is able to establish a breach or non-compliance of its 
national laws, including a provision of its constitution, Argentina's obligations under the 
Vienna Convention would clearly prevent it from relying on that non-compliance to deny 
that its consent to be bound by a treaty. 
4.4.3 Domestic review of ICSID awards 
A final challenge to the Argentine Cases involves subjecting ICSID awards to a domestic 
review mechanism before the Argentine Supreme Court. 136 This strategy conflicts with 
the binding obligation under the ICSID Convention that awards are final and not subject 
to any form of review outside those permitted by the ICSID Convention. 137 Awards are 
executed by national courts within a public international procedural context and are 
isolated from any national procedural law including Argentine law. 138 This is supported 
by Argentine Law. The recognition and domestic enforceability of foreign court rulings is 
regulated in Argentina by the National Civil and Commercial Procedural Code. Article 
517 provides that enforcement of foreign court rulings shall be governed by the 
provisions of the treaty governing the decision, 139 and article 519 extends this provision 
to foreign arbitral awards.140 
135 Cameroon v Nigeria, 10 October 2002, ICJ, 125 and Temple of Preah Vihear Case ICJ Reports 1962, 6 at 26 cited 
in Tnggs GD, above n127, 533 
136 Berges MA, "Constitutionalidad o InconstJtut1onahdad de Ja Jurisdicci6n de! CIADI y sus eventuales Jaudos" 
30/06/2006 Suplemento de derecho mternacional pnvado y de la mtegraci6n, 30 June 2006, 23 at www.EIDial.com 
(15 July 2006) 
137 See above 4.2 1 
138 Except to the extent permitted under articles 54 and 55 of the ICSID Convention, see above 4.2.2 
139 Natwnal Civil and Commercial Procedural Code (Cod1go Procesal, Civil y Commercial de la Nacwn), Law 17.454, 
Buenos Aires, 18 August 1981, Boletin Oficial, 27 August 1981, article 517 [ongmal text reads]· 
Las sentencias de tribunales extranjeros tendnin fuerza e1ecutoria en Jos termmos de los tratados celebrados con 
el pais de que provengan 
Where there is no apphcable treaty the enforcement of awards are governed by subsections (1)- (v). Which include at 
article (iv) the requirement that decis10ns abide with principles of public policy of Argentine Jaw. 
140 Natwnal C1v1l and Commercial Procedural Code, article 519 
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A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Argentina, Jose Cartel/one Construcciones 
Civiles SA v Hidroetectrica Norpatag6nica SA o Hidronor SA s/proceso de conocimiento 
(hereinafter the Cartel/one Decision) expressly allowed for the judicial review of a 
domestic arbitral award. 141 Arguments have been posed to use this decision as a 
precedent to subject ICSID awards to a novel domestic review mechanism before the 
Argentine Supreme Court. 142 
In the Carte/lone Decision the court struck down a domestic arbitral award involving a 
private party and an Argentine state-controlled corporation. Instead of following the 
accepted approach of annulling or partially annulling the award based on accepted legal 
principles, the court reviewed the merits of the case, disregarding an express waiver of 
this right. It held that a waiver of the review of merits is not valid when public policy 
principles are affected. 143 It went on to hold in broad terms that an arbitral award may be 
subject to review by the court if it is contrary to public policy, unconstitutional, illegal or 
unreasonable: 
[I]t cannot be fairly interpreted that the waiver of appeal to an arbitration award, extends 
to situations whereby the terms of an award are contrary to public policy. It is not 
possible to foresee, when formulating a waiver of this kind, that the arbitrators shall make 
a decision with such a vice. It should be noted that the appraisal of facts and the fair 
application of law are the arbitrators' duties and that, accordingly, their decision shall be 
final and conclusive under such circumstances. However, the award shall be subject to 
legal review if unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable. 144 
141 Corte Suprema de la Republica Argentia, Jose Cartellone Construcciones SA v H1droelectnca Norpatagoma SA o 
hidronor SA s/proceso de conoc1miento, 1 June 2004. 187. XXXVII 
142 Berges MA, above n136, 23 
143 Na6n, Horacio A. Gngera, "Arbitration and Latin America. Progress and Setbacks" (2005) 21 (2) Arbitratwn 
International, 162 
144 Author's own translat10n, origmal text reads: 
Que en atenci6n a lo expuesto, no puede lic1tamente interpretarse que la renuncia a apelar una dec1s16n arb1tral 
se extienda a supuestos en que los terminos de! laudo que se dicte contrarien el orden publico, pues no es 16gico 
prever, al fonnular una renuncia con ese contenido, que los arb1tros adoptaran una decis16n que mcurra en aquel 
vic10. Cabe recordar al respecto que la apreciac16n de los hechos y la aplicaci6n regular de! derecho son 
func1ones de los arbitros y, en consecuencia, el laudo que d1cten sera mapelable en esas cond1ciones, pero, en 
camb10, su decision podra impugnarse 1udic1almente cuando sea mconst1tuc1onal, 1legal o irrazonable 
cited in Miguel M H, "Caso Cartellone: i,eS tamb1en una calida manta para Calvo?" (2005) 3 IABA Law Rev1ew/Rev1sta 
Juridica de la FIA, 3 
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The references to ''unconstitutionality" and "contrary to public policy" use the language 
from the Argentine Civil Codes, where they are grounds for annulment. 145 However, the 
tribunal in the Cartel/one Decision used these grounds outside their civil code framework 
as a basis for conducting a review on the merits. The loose reference to "unreasonable" 
and the strong emphasis on the powers of the judiciary to review the award indicate that 
the judges favoured directly subjecting arbitral awards to appeals before the Supreme 
Court. 146 
Subjecting an international arbitral award to judicial review would be a clear rejection of 
Argentina's own precedent.147 In Fibraca Constructora SC.A. cl Comisi6n Tecnia Mixta 
de Saito Grande the Supreme Court declined to review an international arbitral award 
based on its obligations under the Vienna Convention. It held that voluntary acceptance 
of an international jurisdiction prevents the court from reviewing the decision of an 
arbitral tribunal, as to do so would contradict the spirit of international norms that both 
parties agreed upon.148 The decision in Cabrera, Geronimo, Rafael y otro cl Poder 
Ejecutivo Naciona/149 reaffirmed this position and emphasised the "Doctrine of Previous 
Conduct" ("Teoria de los Actos Propios"). That case involved a party who, having 
accepted the pesification of savings in accordance with decree no. 214/02 arising from 
the Argentine crisis, later sought to challenge the constitutionality of that decree. The 
court held that the application of a law to a particular case should be sustained when the 
party objecting to it has, by its previous conduct, excluded the possibility of being heard: 
... this court has held repeatedly that the voluntary submission of an interested party to a 
judicial regime, without express reservation, determines the inappropriateness oflater 
challenging this regime on a constitutional basis. 150 
145 Natwnal Civil and Commercial Procedural Code articles, 737, 752, 760, National Czvzl Code articles; 14, 21, 872 
cited m Na6n, Horac10 A. Grigera, above n143, 164 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ekmekdjzan, Migual A clSofovich, Gerado y otros, 7 July 1992; Fzbraca Constructora S.C A cl Com1s16n Tecma 
Mixta de Saito Grande, 7 July 1993, Fallos: 316:1669; Cafes La Vzrgznza SA , 10 October 1994, Fallos 317:1282 
148 Fibraca Constructora S.C.A. cl Com1s16n Tecma Mixta de Saito Grande, 7 July 1993, Fallos: 316:1669 cited m 
Miguel M H, above n144, 5 
149 Cabrera, Geronimo, Rafael y otro cl Poder E1utivo Nac1onal, 13 July 2004 
150 Miguel M H, above n144, 5 
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This doctrine mirrors the rule at international law which prevents a state from avoiding its 
international obligations by reliance on an internal law. 
The Cartellone Decision concerns a domestic dispute, and its reasoning will not 
necessarily be applied to ICSID awards, although that possibility has been considered. 151 
It can be distinguished from the Argentine Cases on various grounds, including that the 
case involved an arbitration system which did allow for public policy grounds as grounds 
for annulment. 152 However, the decision has already affected international arbitration 
with Argentina; a Federal Argentine judge recently suspended ICC arbitral proceedings 
based on the court's power to control and review arbitral awards for public policy or 
unconstitutionality reasons. 153 
As the Argentine legal hierarchy places international treaties above domestic laws, 154 an 
Argentine court cannot invoke domestic laws, including the Cartellone Decision, as 
grounds to review an ICSID Award, as the ICSID Convention does not allow for it. 155 
This is supported by the National Civil and Commercial Procedural Code which allows 
for the enforcement of foreign awards to be governed by their respective treaties. 156 The 
151 Berges MA, see above nl 36; Bourdin M, "No descarto ir a la Corte por los Laudos de! CIADI" mterview with 
Rosatt1 conducted by Maria Boudm, at www.mfobaeprofesional.com 
152 The impact of the Carte/lone Decision is more certain on non ICSID mternat10nal arbitration awards, includmg 
those bemg enforced under the New York Convent10n, which contain a public pohcy exception to enforcement, see 
above 3 .2, m particular footnote 15 and accompanymg text, see also Barbarosch G & Richards P, "Country Overviews 
- Argentma" The Arbitration Review of the Americas 2008 at 
htto://www globalarb1trationrev1ew.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentma (20 July 2009). 
Enforcement under the ICSID Convent10n is mdependent of the New York Convention and is easier to obtain, 
therefore the question of the apphcab11ity of the New York Convention to ICSID Awards is unlikely to anse, Schreuer 
C, above n4, 1101par4 
153 A federal judge granted interim measures suspending ICC arb1tral proceedmgs based on the broad powers 
recogmzed by the Carte/lone Decision to the Argentme judiciary to control and review arbitral awards for public pohcy 
or unconstitutionality reasons: Entidad Binacional Yacireta cl Enday y otros sf proceso de conocimiento Juzgado de 
la. instancia en lo Contencioso Admmitrat1vo Federal No. 3, Secretaria No 5, causa 26.2444/04 decmon of27 
September 2004 cited m Na6n HA Grigera, above n143, 164. See also the interim measures ordered by the Argentine 
Court of Appeals m Admmistratlve Matters which suspended UNICTRAL arbitration National Grid Transco pie (UK) 
v Argentina m EN-Procuracion de Tesoro v Camara de Comercw Internacional (Argentina v ICC) Lexis No 
35010977, Barbarosch G & Richards P above n152 
154 Argentine Constirution, section 72.22 
155 ICSID Convention, articles 26, 53 & 54 
156 See above nl39 & 140 
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application of the reasoning in the Carte/lone Decision to an I CS ID award would require 
the Supreme Court of Argentina to ignore these express obligations and would breach its 
requirement to comply with treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention. 157 
It has been suggested that governmental policies lie behind the Cartellone Decision and 
that the decision is directly related to establishing precedent for the government's stance 
on recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards against Argentina. 158 Whether or not 
this is correct, the political sensitivity of the issues in the Argentine Cases is clear and the 
government will carefully explore any opportunity to object to the enforcement of an 
ICSID award. From a legal perspective, subjecting an ICSID Award to a domestic review 
on the basis of the Carte/lone Decision is a clear breach of prohibitions at both domestic 
and international law. 
4.4.4 Success of challenges to constitutionality 
Argentina voluntarily entered into a system of BITs and the ICSID Convention. To 
escape from international obligations when faced with negative consequences on the 
basis of internal laws offends international public policy. It does so by undermining the 
confidence necessary to ensure certainty in international transactions. 159 The position 
established by the Vienna Convention at articles 26 and 27 is clear: a state cannot invoke 
its domestic laws to avoid an international obligation. These rules form part of 
Argentina's national law and should be the position taken in regards to arguments of 
unconstitutionality of the IC SID Convention in Argentina. 
[I]ntemational order public would vigorously reject the proposition that a state organ, 
dealing with foreigners, having openly, with knowledge and intent, concluded an 
157 Vienna Convention, articles 26 & 27 
158 This interpretat10n has been denied by the Legal undersecretary of the Argentina Mimstry of Economy and 
Production: 0 Sisles, "Rattfican Una AfieJa doctnna Sohre Laudos" La Nacwn 7 July 2004 cited m Na6n HA Grigera, 
aboven142, 167 
159 Romero S, above n75, 39 m reference to an award rendered m 1986 in case 4381 (J.D.119686, 1103) 
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arbitration clause that inspires the co-contractant's confidence, could thereafter whether 
in the arbitration or in execution proceedings, invoke the nullity of its own premise. 160 
If faced with these issues, the conclusion of the Argentine courts will be influenced by 
the above arguments. Ultimately their decisions will depend on the interpretation of the 
relationship between international and national law under the Argentine Constitution. 
4.5 Resolving the Argentine Cases 
Argentina is faced with the final CMS Award. How the arguments analysed above will be 
played out ultimately depends on the Argentine government's strategy in the Argentine 
Cases. This strategy will be impacted on by the future holdings in the Argentine Cases 
and whether the outcome for Argentina differs from that obtained in the current awards. 
Argentina has indicated that it will not directly comply with the CMS Award, which 
leaves the award creditor with the option of instituting enforcement proceedings in a 
Contracting State. 
The push towards enforcement proceedings by Argentina may, depending where 
proceedings are instituted, provide an opportunity to plead sovereign immunity from 
execution. 161 Alternatively, if enforcement proceedings are brought in Argentina, it may 
provide the opportunity to conduct a review of awards. 162 Publicly challenging the 
validity of the ICSID system through interviews, publications and non-compliance may 
also be a strategic decision to buy time. Delaying payment and creating a perception that 
compliance is unlikely could assist Argentina in settling claims with other parties. 163 
160 ICC Case No 1939 cited m Dunham P, "Balancmg sovereignty and the contractor's nghts m international 
construction arbitrations mvolvmg state entities" 5th /CC/FIDIC Coeference on International Construction Contracts 
and the Resolution of Disputes, October 2005, 3 
161 See above 4.2.2c) 
162 See above 4.4.3 
163 The settlement of as many cases as possible has been noted as one of Argentina's priorities: Bourdm M, "No 
descarto ir a la Corte por los Laudos del CIADI" interview with Rosatt1 conducted by Maria Boudm, 22 June 2005 at 
http://www.infobaeprofes10nal.com/notas/l 6705-Rosatti-No-descarto-ir-a-la-Corte-por-los-laudos-del-CIAD I.html (20 
October 2008) 
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The political and economic climate of Argentina impacts on its response to ICSID 
Awards. Any binding international obligations must be viewed in light of Argentina's 
domestic climate, a political reality which possibly requires Argentina to focus on more 
pressing domestic concerns than on the satisfaction of foreign creditors. 164 The desire of 
Argentina's current president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, to enhance domestic 
popularity by placing its people's needs and satisfying domestic concerns ahead of those 
of foreign creditors may also figure as one of Argentina's primary goals. Moreover, the 
sheer volume of IC SID claims presented may mean the country is unable to pay. 
While pressure not to damage its international reputation will be relevant to Argentina, 
recent developments have eased this pressure. The CMS Annulment Decision has been 
referred to as "essentially making it politically impossible for the government of 
Argentina to pay''. 165 Furthermore, Bolivia's recent withdrawal from ICSID's 
jurisdiction166 and Ecuador's limitation on ICSID's jurisdiction under article 25 167 
indicate dissatisfaction with ICSID and show that Argentina's actions may not be viewed 
negatively by all of the international community. This view is not confined to Latin 
America; a Washington trade lawyer, commenting on Brazil's status in relation to 
investment treaties, recently remarked that "the US business community clearly still likes 
BITs. But why Brazil or any other country would agree to sign one after looking at 
164 Mortimore M & Stanley L, "Obsolescencia de la proteci6n a los mversores extran1eros despues de la crisis 
Argentina" Rev1sta de la CEPAL, 88, Apnl 2006, 17 
165 Beattie A, "Concern grows over global trade regulat10n, International Investment Rules" Financial Times, 12 March 
2008 
166 On 1 May 2007 Bolivia sent formal notice of1ts withdrawal from the ICSID Convention at 
http://wwwbilaterals.org/art1cle.php3 ?id art1cle=8221 (8/07 /2008) 
167 On 4 December 2007 Ecuador gave notice under article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention: 
The Republic of Ecuador does not consent to the Internat10nal Centre for the Resolution of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) Junsdiction, for disputes ansing in matters relatmg to natural resourses such as oil, gas, mmerals and 
others" (author's translation) 
Ongmal text reads: La Repubhca del Ecuador no consentira en someter a lajurisdicci6n del Centro Internacional de 
Arreglo de D1ferencias Relatlvas a Invers1ones (CIADI), las diferencias que SUIJan en materias relatlvas al 
aprovechamiento de recursos naturales como petr6leo, gas, mmerales u otros See, 
http· //Jcsid. worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?reguestTvoe=CasesRH&actJon Val=OpenPage&PageTvoe= Announcem 
entsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement9 (08/07/2008) 
143 
Chapter 4 
Argentina defeats me". 168 Pressure on Argentina to comply with ICSID Awards in order 
to receive international funding has also been weakened. Despite its public denouncement 
of ICSID, Argentina has recently secured a number of significant World Bank loans. 169 
During the CMS v Argentina proceedings, Argentina, under the signature of its Attorney 
General, provided an undertaking to the claimant that: 
in accordance with its obligations under the ICSID Convention, it will recognize the 
award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in this proceeding as binding and will enforce 
the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories, in the event that 
annulment is not granted. 170 
This undertaking was regarded as "irrevocably commit[ting] Argentina to enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed upon it by the Award in the event that annulment is not 
granted". 171 In fact, the undertaking did no more than restate Argentina's obligations 
under article 54 of the Convention. For this reason, it can only provide comfort to 
claimants so long as Argentine courts interpret article 54 as the simple enforcement 
mechanism it is intended to be: 
... final awards under the ICSID Convention are directly enforceable, upon registration 
and without further jurisdictional control, as final judgments of the courts of the host 
State. It is true that immunity from execution is reserved (Article 55), but this simply 
leaves the issue of immunity to be dealt with under the applicable law: (Immunity from 
execution of the host State in its own courts would depend entirely on its domestic law). 
172 
The arguments analysed above suggest that Argentina will not afford ICSID enforcement 
mechanisms or ICSID awards the level of deference traditionally expected. Resorting to 
measures to defeat the enforcement of an award may provide a hollow victory for 
168 Beattie A, above n165 
169 Including the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Argentina announced on 6 June 2006 which includes up to 
US$3.3 b1lhon IBRD financing; US$126.7 million loan to improve transport condit10ns ofa strategic road network m 
the Provmce of Santa Fe; and two loans totallmg US$180 million for the Basic Mumc1pal Services Project and the 
Urban Flood Prevention and Drainage program. For a complete hst ofloans and their details see www worldbank.org 
17
°CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08 (Annulment Proceeding) 
Decis10n on the Argentme Repubhc's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award (Rule 54 of the 
ICSID Arb1trat10n Rules) par 28 
171 Ibid, par 50 
172 Ibid, par 40 
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Argentina. The ICJ could provide a forum for the home state of an award creditor to bring 
an action against Argentina for its refusal to pay an ICSID award, and the World Bank 
could take action against Argentina for avoidance of its treaty obligations. 173 
Significant resistance is developing against pursing enforcement of awards m the 
Argentine Cases. This is evidenced by the negotiation of settlement of proceedings and 
agreements to sell awards. 174 This suggests that award creditors are opting out of further 
ICSID related proceedings with Argentina. While this represents a hesitation by award 
creditors to rely on the compliance and enforcement mechanisms under ICSID, it also 
indicates that the awards in the Argentine Cases have some monetary value. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the strength of Argentina's challenges to complying with 
ICSID awards. It has shown that there are significant legal obstacles in both domestic and 
international law to successfully establishing these arguments. The jurisprudence on 
challenging ICSID awards is limited, and Argentina can be expected to closely analyse 
any opportunity it has to avoid compliance with ICSID awards. The relationship between 
international law and domestic law, when addressed by international tribunals, relies on 
uniform and reasonably straightforward principles. The approach of the Argentine courts, 
as with any national court, cannot be expected to follow this trend. The starting point for 
their examination, and the way that international law is integrated into Argentina's legal 
order, is the Argentine Constitution. 175 
173 As compliance with award obligations has been the norm in ICSID arbitration the effectiveness of these 
counteractions remain untested. See Baldwin E, KantorM & Nolan M, above n15, 2 
174 There have been reports ofa sale of the of the CMS Award ofUS$133.2 mil110n to the Bank of America: "Se vende 
un JU1c10 contra la Argentma por u$s 180 millones" Total News, 5 June 2008 at 
www.totalnews.com.ar/index2.php?opt10n=com content&task=v1ew&1d=l496&po (3/07/08); and the potential sale of 
theAzurix Award: Peterson L, "Enron looking to sell Azunx arbitration award" Investment Treaty News at 
http://www.1isd.org/pdt72006/itn octl3 2006.pdf 
175 Denza E "The Relat1onsh1p between International and National Law" Chapter 14, m Evans MD (ed), above nl 7, 
428 
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The issues discussed in this chapter should influence the way Argentina, and potentially 
its courts, address challenges to ICSID Awards in the Argentine Cases. However, the 
multitude of political, legal, economic and social factors make its difficult to predict how 
Argentina's government and courts will approach the complex questions arising from 
litigation involving international law. 
The value of an ICSID award lies in compliance with its obligations. Any delay to 
compliance implies additional time and costs to an award creditor. Value is further 
decreased when a supposedly final and binding award is potentially subject to review by 
a domestic court and may ultimately not be respected. If award creditors in the Argentine 
Cases are faced with non-executable awards, ICSID's powerlessness to enforce awards 
and the lack of institutional remedies against non-complying states may severely weaken 
the financial viability of ICSID awards. The Argentine Cases threaten to provide this 
precedent on a large scale, which will likely weaken the appeal of ICSID arbitration to 
investors. 
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Conclusions 
5.1 Overview 
This thesis has examined a series of investment treaty arbitrations against Argentina 
arising from its economic crisis of 2000-2001. Damages have been sought by investors 
for losses incurred from measures taken by Argentina during that crisis. These measures 
have been construed by investors as violating BIT provisions. The Argentine Cases have 
been brought before I CS ID and the repeated institution of proceedings against Argentina 
on virtually identical grounds has held a magnifying glass to ICSID arbitration. 
The Argentine Cases are at an early stage. Awards have been handed down in only seven 
of 42 registered cases. Rather than a limitation, studying the cases at this stage means that 
key lessons can be drawn out early. This allows awards in the remaining cases to respond 
to these lessons, which may in turn influence the impact the Argentine Cases will have on 
the development of IC SID arbitration. 
The thesis began by presenting the framework for investment treaty arbitration under 
ICSID, including the proliferation of BITs internationally and the frequent nomination of 
ICSID as a forum for dispute resolution in those treaties. The critical examination of the 
Argentine Cases in the subsequent chapters has demonstrated the implications of this 
structure. The cases have been examined against the sequential process of ICSID 
arbitration, and through this analysis the thesis has focused on three key issues, identified 
as having the greatest impact on the development of ICISD arbitration: inconsistency in 
awards when considering Argentina's defence; the restriction of annulment provisions to 
procedural issues; and potential challenges to compliance with award obligations by 
Argentina. 
A significant number of states have access to ICSID arbitration for the resolution of 
investment treaty dispµtes. Current worldwide economic uncertainty, including measures 
to prevent a run on national banks, illustrates that the Argentine experience cannot be 
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disregarded as a one-off experience. BIT protection and consent to ICSID arbitration 
through BITs is commonplace internationally. The under-utilisation of these tools may 
well be set to change, and states and investors alike are expected to consider the lessons 
drawn from the Argentine Cases in considering their approach to future ICSID 
arbitration. 
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The central aim of this thesis has been to contemplate the impact the Argentine Cases will 
have on the development of investment treaty arbitration under ICSID. To clearly 
respond to this aim the conclusions first identify the impact of the Argentine Cases on 
state recourse to ICSID arbitration, before discussing how the Argentine Cases may 
influence future ICSID awards. 
5.2.1 Influencing host states foreign investment strategy 
The use of BITs and the ICSID Convention as a strategy by host states to attract foreign 
investment with little or no regard for their legal implications has been challenged by the 
Argentine Cases. The repeated reliance on BIT protection by investors against Argentina 
has demonstrated that investors will use guarantees and protections offered by treaties 
and will institute arbitration proceedings under ICSID. 
Arguments challenging the constitutionality of the ICSID Convention and plans to 
subject ICSID awards to a review by national courts suggest dissatisfaction, on the part of 
some Argentine government officials and legal commentators, with the previous 
administration's decision to ratify BITs and the ICISD Convention. For the early 
Argentine Cases this may simply mean Argentina fails to comply with its international 
obligations. In a wider context, the Argentine Cases will likely influence state policy in 
relation to foreign investment. 
The Argentine Cases may cause host states to reconsider their current investment treaty 
framework and to monitor and understand the legal implications of BIT obligations and 
consent to ICSID. The flow of awards against Argentina may cause states to conclude 
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that the risk of exposure from their investment treaty framework is too costly, particularly 
if no appreciable investment gains can be attributed to their BIT and IC SID framework. 
This could result in the diminishment of investment treaty protection or a limitation on 
the extent of ICSID jurisdiction. At the very least, states will be expected to negotiate 
investment agreements as part of a clear strategy, which assesses the potential cost of 
commitments undertaken, and not merely as a tool to attract investment. 
5.2.2 Influencing investor recourse to ICSID 
The issuance of large arbitral awards in favour of investors in the majority of the early 
Argentine Cases has raised the profile of ICSID arbitration. This has been assisted by 
high profile of claimants in the Argentine Cases. BP, France Telecom, Telefonica, Enron 
and Suez are among the companies leading the docket of ICSID arbitration against 
Argentina, causing it to be referred to as the "who's who" of foreign investors. 1 The slow 
development of ICSID's caseload prior to the Argentine Cases can be partly attributed to 
the fact that many investors did not recognise the value of BITs entered into by their 
home states. The flurry of publications in the commercial sector regarding the Argentine 
Cases will likely lead to an increased appreciation of BIT protection and ICSID 
arbitration. It may make investors more willing to rely on these tools and to structure 
investments to ensure they fall within their protection. 
In the same way that the issue of awards against Argentina for millions of dollars 
encourages the use of IC SID, the non-payment of awards by Argentina will likely attract 
equal attention. In the Argentine Cases this may prompt investors to settle current 
claims. In the long term, investors will question the benefits of submitting ICSID 
arbitration if they perceive awards to be ultimately unenforceable. This may in turn 
threaten the viability of IC SID for the future resolution of disputes. 
1 Peterson L," Argentina - Legal Tango" Foreign Direct Investment, London, 1 August 2005 
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5.2.3 Impacts on ICSID arbitration 
The glaringly inconsistent interpretation of Argentina's defence in the early Argentine 
Cases has the potential to significantly affect ICSID Arbitration. An analysis of the CMS 
and LG&E Awards demonstrates the uncertainty in the scope of the defence of necessity 
both under treaty and customary international law, which now surrounds this vital 
element of the Argentine Cases. Conflicting awards, coupled with reluctance by tribunals 
to explain inconsistencies, weakens any informal precedent for the remaining Argentine 
Cases, and may in the future prevent parties to ICSID arbitrations from relying on these 
principles with confidence. 
The Argentine Cases require the consideration of complex issues of public international 
law in a highly commercial context. This thesis has demonstrated that a failure to 
correctly consider and apply principles of public international law, including principles of 
treaty interpretation and !ex specialis, can result in errors on fundamental issues. This was 
evidenced by the analysis of the CMS and LG&E Awards relating to Argentina's 
defences. The early Argentine Cases will likely prove a reference and focal point for 
arbitrators in future proceedings. The cases highlight the importance of the development 
of coherent and consistent arbitral awards that properly apply principles of public 
international law. The failure to respond to this concern in the remaining Argentine Cases 
will challenge the legitimacy of the ICSID arbitration, and cause parties to question the 
utility of submitting disputes to ICSID. 
The implications of errors relating to substantive issues, such as Argentina's key defence, 
are exaggerated by the lack of substantive review for ICSID awards. While the preference 
for finality over correctness is widespread in commercial arbitration, in the context of 
ICSID arbitration the participation of a state party, the financial impact of disputes, and 
potentially the consideration of public international law principles gives it a wider 
audience and greater impact than private commercial arbitration. The analysis of the CMS 
Annulment Decision in this context established that the lack of a substantive review 
mechanism makes it imperative that ICSID awards form part of a consistent and coherent 
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legal jurisprudence, including the correct consideration of public international law 
principles. The failure to do this in the early Argentine Cases has undermined the 
adequacy of ICSID annulment provisions and contributed to the debate for a higher level 
ofreview for ICSID Awards. 
The clearest threat to ICSID arbitration arising from the Argentine Cases is non-
compliance with final awards by Argentina. If this threat eventuates it will constitute a 
direct failure of ICSID arbitration and establish an unfavourable precedent for future 
cases. It is acknowledged that Argentine government strategy lies at the heart of this. 
However, the jurisprudential issues discussed in this thesis will impact on this strategy. 
The inconsistent application of legal principles in early awards, the identification of 
errors in annulment proceedings, and a lack of power to remedy them, provide policy 
grounds for Argentina to justify non-compliance with its international obligations and 
minimise any negative repercussions potentially experienced by Argentina for a failure to 
comply. 
5.3 Concluding Comment 
The critical examination of the jurisprudence, scholarship and policy issues surrounding 
the early Argentine Cases has identified the key factors likely to impact on the 
development of investment treaty arbitration under ICSID. This thesis has relied on the 
previous work of scholars who have debated the issues surrounding investment treaty 
arbitration under ICSID, it has built on this work by analysing new jurisprudence flowing 
from the Argentine Cases, and identified the lessons that can be learnt from these cases. 
The current increase in the caseload at ICSID suggests that it is developing as a forum for 
the settlement of investment treaty disputes. This growth is being led by the Argentine 
Cases. To benefit from this unique series of cases the tribunals and annulment 
committee's involved in the remaining cases must respond to the issues outlined in this 
thesis. The final impact of the Argentine Cases on the development of IC SID will depend 
on whether the lessons learnt from the early cases are applied to the remaining cases. This 
question will require re-examination when the remaining Argentine Cases are concluded. 
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Table of the Argentine Cases 
1. ARB/01/3 
2. ARB/01/08 
3. ARB/01/12 
w'",;4/i "',~> 
·Claimant 
,~5: '," < 
Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assets 
Pty Ltd 
CMS Gas 
Transmission 
Company 
Azurix Corp 
APPENDIXl 
Table of the Argentine Cases* 
Natural gas 
transportation 
concession agreements 
Gas transmission 
concession agreement 
Water and sewer 
services concession 
agreement 
Treaty between the Umted 
States of Amenca and the 
Argentine Republic Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection oflnvestrnents, 
signed 14 November 1991, 
entry mto force 20 October 
1994 (US-Argentina BIT) 
US-Argentina BIT 
US-Argentina BIT 
Award: 22 May 2007 
Annulment Proceedings· 
Committee constituted 22 May 
2008- Decision Pending 
Decision on Rectification: 25 
October 2008 
Award: 12 May 2005 
Annulment Decision: 25 
September 2007 
Award: 14 July 2006 
Annulment Proceedings. 
Committee Constituted 14 June 
2007- Decision Pending 
• Based on information atwww.icsid.worldbank.org (last updated 23 October 2008) 
Appendix 1 
;• 
)~1qtting". 
,' ~ ",::;;::~'?.. Jy,.- ,-, / 
Argentina breached fair and 
equitable treatment obligations 
under Article II(2)(a) and the 
"umbrella clause" at Article II(2)(c) 
of the BIT. Tribunal rejected 
Argentina's defences based on 
necessity and article XI of the BIT. 
Compensation ofUS$106.2 Million 
awarded. 
Tribunal rejected claims of 
expropriation under article IV and 
discriminatory and arbitrary 
treatment under article II(2)(b) of the 
BIT. Argentina had breached 
obligations to accord investor fair 
and equitable treatment under article 
II(2)(a) and the "umbrella clause" at 
Article II(2)(c) of the BIT. Tribunal 
rejected Argentma's defences of 
necessity under article XI of the BIT 
and at customary international law. 
Compensation ofUS$133.2 million 
awarded. 
Argentina had not expropnated the 
investment under IV(!). Argentina 
breached Article II(2)(a) of the BIT 
by failing to accord fair and 
equitable treatment Argentma failed 
to accord full protection and security 
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to investment under Article II(2)(a) 
of the BIT. Argentina breached 
Article II(2)(b) of the BIT by taking 
arbitrary measures that impaired 
Azurix's use and enjoyment of its 
investment. Compensation of 
US$165,240,753 awarded. 
Argentina breached under BIT with 
respect to (i) the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment and the 
prohibition to accord treatment less 
favorable than that required by 
international law under Article 
Award· 25 July 2007 (decision Il(2)(a); (ii) the prohibition of 
LG&E Energy Corp., on liability 3 October 2006) discriminatory measures under 
4. ARB/02/1 LG&E Capital Corp., Gas transmission US-Argentina BIT Article II(2)(b ); and (iii) the 
and LG&E concession agreement obligations covered by the "umbrella 
Internacional Inc. Annulment Proceedings: clause" under Article II(2)(c). 
Registered 19 September 2008 Argentina's conduct was justified 
under Article XI of BIT and 
exempted from responsibility from 1 
December 2001 until 26 April 2003. 
Argentma was liable, for damages to 
LG&E for breaches of the BIT 
outside this period. 
Argentina breached its obligations to 
Award: 28 September 2007 accord the mvestor the fair and 
equitable treatment under Article 
Sempra Energy Gas supply and Annulment Proceedings: 
II(2)(a) & breached "umbrella 
5. ARB/02/16 distribution concession US-Argentina BIT clause" in Article II(2)(c) of the BIT. Internacional 
agreement Application for annulment State of necessity under customary 
registered 30 January 2008 - international law & article XI of BIT (Committee not established) not established. Compensation of 
US$128,250,462 awarded. 
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Treaty between the Argentine 
Republic and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Unit on 
Camuzzi Gas supply and the Promotion and Reciprocal Pending: suspension of 6. ARB/03/2 Internacional S.A. distribution concession Protection of Investments proceedmgs extended by 
agreement signed 28 June 1990 and entry parties on 28 April 2008 
mto force 26 August 1992 
(Belgium/Luxemburg-
Argentina BIT) 
Electricity generation Pending: suspension of 
7. ARB/02/17 AES Corporation and distribution US-Argentina BIT proceedings extended by 
operations concession 
agreement parties on June 23 2008 
Treaty between the Argentine 
Republic and the Republic of 
Chile on the Promotion and Argentina not in breach of 
8. ARB/03/5 Metalpar S.A and Manufacturing and Sale Reciprocal Protection of Award: 6 June 2008 
obligations. 
Buen Aire S.A of Motor vehicles Investments, signed 2 August 
1991 and entry into force I 
January 1995 (Chile- Argentina 
Defence of necessity not considered. 
BIT) 
Settlement agreed by the 
parties and proceeding 
Electricity distribution discontinued at their request 
9. ARB/03/7 Camuzzi and transportation (Belgium/Luxemburg - (Order taking note of the International S.A Argentina BIT) discontinuance issued by the 
concession agreement Tribunal on January 25, 2007 
pursuant to Arbitration Rule 
43(1)). 
Tribunal dismissed claims relating to 
(i) umbrella clause; (ii) 
expropriation; (iii) and the 
10. ARB/03/9 Continental Casualty Insurance Company US-Argentina BIT A ward rendered 5 September requirement to protect the free Company 2008 transfer of assets. 
Argentina absolved from alleged 
breaches of investment treaty 
obligations under article XI of BIT. 
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With the exception of Argentina's 
restructuring of treasure bills held by 
Continental Casualty which occurred 
outside the period oft1me covered 
by article XI and therefore could not 
be considered necessary. For this 
act, Argentina was found to have 
breached the Fair and Equitable 
treatment standard of the BIT. 
Argentina liable for damages of US$ 
2.8 million plus interest: a fraction 
of the US$ 112 million sought by the 
claimant. 
Agreement on the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Pending: As requested by the Gas supply and Kingdom of Spain and the 
11. ARB/03/10 Gas Natural SDG, distribution concession Argentine Republtc signed in parties, the suspension of the S.A. proceeding is further extended 
agreement Buenos Aires on 3 October 
on 20 February 2008 1991 and entry mto force 28 
September 1992 (Spain-
Argentina BIT) 
Pioneer Natural Settlement agreed by the 
Resources Company, parties and proceeding 
Pioneer Natural Hydrocarbon and discontinued at their request 
12. ARB/03/12 Resources electricity exploration US-Argentina BIT (Order taking note of the (Argentina) S.A. and and exploitation discontinuance pursuant to 
Pioneer Natural concession agreements Arbitration Rule 43(1) issued 
Resourcl'.s (Tierra de! by the Tribunal on June 23, 
Fuego) S.A. 2005) 
Pan American Hydrocarbon and Pending: Request for the Energy LLC and BP discontinuance of proceedings 
13. ARB/03/13 Argentina electricity explorat10n US-Argentina BIT pursuant to ICSID Arbitration 
Exploration and exploitation Rule 43(1) filed on June 18, 
Company concession agreements 2008 
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El Paso Energy Hydrocarbon and 
14. ARB/03/15 International electricity exploration US-Argentina BIT Pending: 
Company and exploitation 
concession agreements 
Suez, Sociedad Agreement between the 
General de Aguas de Argentine Republic and the Pending: proposal for 
Barcelona S.A. and Water services Republic of France for the disqualification of an arbitrator 15. ARB/03/17 Interagua Servicios concession agreement Promotion and Reciprocal declined 12 May 2008. 
Integrales de Agua Protection of Investments, Proceedings have been 
S.A signed on 3 July 3 1991 and resumed 
entry into force 3 March 1993 
(France-Argentina BIT) 
Settlement agreed by the 
Aguas Cordobesas parties and proceeding 
S.A., Suez, and discontinued at the request of 
16. ARB/03/18 Soc1edad General de Water services France-Argentina BIT the Claimants (Order taking Aguas de Barcelona concession agreement note of the discontinuance 
S.A. v. Argentine issued by the Tnbunal pursuant 
Republic to ICSID Arbitration Rule 44 
24 January 2007 
Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Pending (the parties file post-Barcelona S.A. and Water services 17. ARB/03/19 Vivendi Universal concession agreement France-Argentina BIT hearing briefs on June 18, 
S.A. v. Argentine 2008) 
Republic 
Telecommunications-
concession agreement Pending: As requested by the 
18. ARB/03/20 Telefonica S.A. to provide local and Spain-Argentina BIT parties, the suspension of the international telephone proceeding is further extended 
and data transmission on 8 April 2008 
services 
Pending. As requested by the 
19. ARB/03/21 Eners1s S.A. and Electricity distribution Spain-Argentina BIT parties, the suspension of the 
others concession agreement proceeding is further extended 
on 28 March 2008 
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20. ARB/03/22 
21. ARB/03/23 
22. ARB/03/27 
23. ARB/03/30 
24. ARB/04/1 
25. ARB/04/4 
26. ARB/04/8 
27. ARB/04/9 
28. ARB/04/14 
Electricidad 
Argentina S.A. and 
EDF International 
S.A. 
EDF International 
S.A., SAUR 
International S.A. 
and Leon 
Participaciones 
Argentinas S.A 
Unisys 
Azurix Corp. 
Total S.A. 
SAUR International 
BP America 
Production Company 
and others 
CIT Group Inc 
Wintershall 
Aktiengesellschaft 
Electricity distribution 
concession agreement 
Electricity distribution 
enterprise concession 
agreement 
Information storage and 
management project in 
judiciary 
Water and Sewer 
concession agreement 
Gas production and 
distribution/power 
generation project 
Water concession 
agreement 
Hydrocarbon 
concession and 
electricity generation 
project 
Leasing enterprise 
Gas and oil production 
France-Argentina BIT 
France-Argentina BIT 
US-Argentina BIT 
US-Argentina BIT 
France-Argentina BIT 
France-Argentma BIT 
US-Argentma BIT 
US-Argentina BIT 
Germany-Argentina BIT 
Pending: As requested by the 
parties, proceedings suspended 
until 30 June 2008 
Pending: the proposal for 
disqualification of arbitrator 
was declined. Proceedings 
resumed on June 25 2008 
Pending: As requested by the 
parties, the suspension of the 
proceeding is further extended 
11 December 2007 
Pending: Tribunal held first 
session by telephone 
conference on I June 2008 
Pending: parties filed 
submissions on costs 26 May 
2008 
Pending: As requested by the 
parties, the proceeding are 
suspended until 31 May 2008 
Pending: parties filed a request 
for the discontinuance of the 
proceeding pursuant to ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 43(1) on 18 
June 2008 
Pending: Decision on 
Jurisdiction 2 April 2007 
Pending 
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Mobil Exploration 
and Development Gas Production Pending: the Claimants filed a 29. ARB/04/16 Inc. Sue. Argentina Concessions US-Argentina BIT second ancillary claim on 23 
and Mobil Argentina October 2007 
S.A. 
Settlement agreed by the 
Telecommunications parties and proceeding 30. ARB/04/18 France Telecom S.A. 
concession agreement France-Argentina BIT discontinued (Order taking note 
of the discontinuance on 30 
March 2006). 
Settlement agreed by the 
parties and proceeding 
RGA Reinsurance Financial reinsurance discontinued at the1r request 31. ARB/04/20 Company US-Argentina BIT (Order taking note of the services discontinuance issued by the 
Tribunal on 14 September 14 
2006) 
32. ARB/ 05/1 Daimler Chrysler Leasing and Financial Germany-Argentina BIT Pending Services A.G. services 
Compafiia General de Pending: As requested by the 
33. ARB/05/2 Electricidad S.A. and Electricity distribution Chile-Argentina BIT parties, the suspension of the 
CGE Argentina S.A concession agreement proceedmg is further extended 14 July 2008 
Agreement between the 
Argentine Republic and the 
TSA Spectrum de Telecommunications Netherlands for the Promotion Pending: Hearing on 34. ARB/0515 and Reciprocal Protection of Argentina S.A. concession Investments, signed on 20 Jurisdiction held 5 May 2008 
October 20 1992 and entry into 
force 1 October 1994 
Pending: As requested by the 
35. ARB/05/11 Asset Recovery Trust Financial Sector - Germany, US parties, the suspension of the S.A. collection contract proceeding is further extended 
21May2008 
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36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
ARB/07/5 
ARB/07/8 
ARB/07/17 
Giovanna a Beccara 
and others 
Giovanni Alemanni 
and others 
Impregilo S.p.A 
Urbaser S.A. and 
Consorcio de Aguas 
ARB/07/26 Bilbao Biskaia, 
Biibao Biskaia Ur 
Partzuergoa 
ARB/07/31 
ARB/08/14 
I CS ID 
Case No. 
ARB/08/9 
HOCHTIEF 
Aktiengesellschaft 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. 
Argentine Republic 
Giordano Alpi and 
others v. Argentine 
Republic 
Representing 195,000 
Claimants in $4.4 
billion claim relating to 
Argentma's default on 
the payment of 
soverei!!Il bonds. 
Bonds 
Water Concession 
Water Concesi6n 
Highway system 
construction contract 
Highway construction 
concession contract 
Bonds 
Italy-Argentina bilateral 
investment treaty 
Italy-Argentina bilateral 
investment treaty 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Pending: the Tribunal issued a 
decision on the scope of the 
jurisdictional phase on 9 May 
2008 
Pendmg: Tribunal recently 
constituted 
Pending: The Tribunal holds a 
first session by telephone 
conference on 16 July 2008 
Pending: Tribunal recently 
constituted 
Pending: Tribunal recently 
constituted 
Pending: Tribunal not yet 
constituted 
Pending:. Tribunal not yet 
constituted 
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APPENDIX2 
Table of Bilateral Investment Treaties with the Republic of Argentina• 
Partner State Signed Entry into Force 
1. Albania 21June2006 
2. Algeria 04 October 2000 28 January 2002 
3. Armenia 16 April 1993 20 December 1994 
4. Australia 23 August1995 11 January 1997 
5. Austria 07 August1992 01January1995 
6. Belgium and Luxembourg 28 June 1990 20 May 1994 
7. Bolivia 1 7 March 1994 01May 1995 
8. Bulgaria 21 September1993 11 March 1997 
9. Canada 05 November 1991 29 April 1993 
10. Chile 02 August1 991 01January1 995 
* Based on info rmation from: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/argentina.pdf and SICE: Foreign Trade 
Informa tion Systems at http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/ ARG/ ARGBITS _ e.asp (23 October 2008) 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
,. :~J ~',, ' :t'f '. ,· : ~i ' ' ' . . ' 
R'irtiiir Stati ; ~" J' ' ,( > ' ~ ~~, 
China 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Appendix 2 
05 November 1992 01 August 1994 
21May1997 01 May2001 
02 December 1994 01June1996 
30 November 1995 01June1997 
27 September1996 23 July 1998 
06 November 1992 02 February 1995 
16 March 01 
18 February1994 01 December 1995 
11May1992 03 December 1993 
09May1996 08 January 1999 
05 November 1993 03May1996 
03 July 1991 03 March 1993 
09 April 1991 08 November 1993 
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24. Greece 26 October 1999 
25. Guatemala 21 April 1998 07 December 2002 
26. Hungary 05 February1993 01 October 1997 
27. India 20 August1999 12 August 2002 
28. Indonesia 07 November 1995 01 March 2001 
29. Israel 23 July 1995 10 April 1997 
30. Italy 22May1990 14 October 1993 
31. Jamaica 08 February1994 01 December 1995 
32. Korea, Republic 17May1994 24 September 1996 
33. Lithuania 14 March 1996 01 September 1998 
34. Malaysia 06 September 1994 20 March 1996 
35. Mexico 13 November 1996 22June1998 
36. Morocco 13 June 1996 19 February 2000 
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37. Netherlands 20 October 1992 01 October 1994 
38. New Zealand 27 August 1999 
39. Nicaragua 10 August 1998 01February2001 
40. Panama 15 September 2004 15 September 2004 
41. Peru 10 November 1994 24 October 1996 
42. Philippines 20 September 1999 01 January 2002 
43. Poland 31July1991 01 September 1992 
44. Portugal 06 October 1994 03May1996 
45. Romania 29July1993 01May1995 
46. Russian Federation 25 June 1998 20 November 2000 
47. Senegal 06 April 1993 
48. South Africa 23July1998 01 January 2001 
49. Spain 03 October 1991 28 September 1992 
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50. Sweden 22 November 1991 28 September 1992 
51. Switzerland 12 April 1991 06 November 1992 
52. Thailand 18 February 2000 07 March 2002 
53. Tunisia 17 June 1992 23 January 1995 
54. Turkey 08May1992 01May1995 
55. Ukraine 09 Augustl995 06May1997 
56. United Kingdom 11 December 1990 19 February 1993 
57. United States 14 November 1991 20 October 1994 
58. Venezuela 16 November 1993 01July1995 
59. Vietnam 03 June 1996 01June1997 
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The Argentine Crisis: A Chronology of Significant Events* 
1980's 
1989 
1 April 1991 
1991-1994 
1995 
May 1995 
1996-1997 
July 1996 
1997 
August - September 1998 
January 1999 
Argentina suffers an extended period of economic instability 
including hyperinflation. 
Carols Menem elected President of Argentina. Menem appoints 
Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economy. They undertake a 
major restructure of Argentina's economy including tax 
reform, privatization and the adoption of a currency board. 
Convertibility law enacted which provides the legal basis for 
currency board and establishes convertibility of the Argentine 
Currency to the US dollar at a one-to-one fixed exchange rate. 1 
Argentine enjoys strong economic growth and the currency 
board is considered highly successful. 
The Mexican economic crisis (Tequila Crisis) causes a brief 
recession to the Argentine economy, GDP decline 2.8%. The 
economy rebounds and foreign investment increases. 
Menem reelected President. 
Renewed economic growth but account deficit and debt 
measures worsen. 
Roque Fernandez replaces Cavallo as Economy Minister. 
Financial crises in Asia. Although relatively stable, Argentina 
negotiates a "precautionary" program with the IMF to provide 
an emergency loan. Argentina's debt burden is growing. 
Russia's default on its government debt causes financial 
markets to tumble worldwide. 
Prolonged period of appreciation of US dollar affects 
Argentina's competitiveness in trade. 
Argentina enters recession and unemployment rises. 
Brazil devalues its currency and Argentina's exports to Brazil 
• Informat10n from Hornbeck J F & Marshall M K, "The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events" CRS 
Report for Congress, RS3 l 582, 5 June 2005, except where otherwise indicated 
1 Law No. 25.561 Public Emergency and Reform to the Prov1swns about Exchange Rate of 6 January 2002, Boletm 
Oficial de la Republica Argentina, 07 January 2002 
168 
Appendix 3 
fall. 
World prices for wheat and other Argentine exports decline. 
The end ofMenem's presidency and the election of President 
De la Rua.2 
October 1999 
In an attempt to decrease the fiscal deficit De la Rua's 
government imposes the first significant tax increases. 
Government announces $1 billon in budget cuts in expectation 
29 May2000 that fiscal responsibility will bring renewed confidence to 
economy. Cuts trigger a 20,000 person protest. 
Strong doubts about sustainability of debt cause the 
government to seek assistance from IMF. A $30 billion 
December 2000 multilateral assistance package from the IMF, multilaterals, 
private banks and the Spanish government is agreed to ensure 
funding for the following 12 to 24 months. 
12 January 2001 Poor economic performance prompts IMF to augment loan 
agreement by US$ 7 billion. 
2 March 2001 Economic Minister Jose Luis Machinea resigns and Ricardo Lopez-Murphy appointed. 
Two weeks after appointment Ricardo Lopez-Murphy is 
19 March 2001 replaced by Domingo Cavallo (his second time as Economy 
Minister) 
De la Rua government announces a $29 .5 voluntary debt swap 
16-17 June 2001 (megacanje)
3 in an attempt to restructure Argentina's massive 
foreign debt. The swap consisted of an exchange of debt bonds 
for others at longer maturities with higher interest rates.4 
The Convertibility exchange rate is adjusted to an evenly 
divided dollar-euro peg for foreign trade, providing an effective 
7% devaluation. Under the system export subsidies and import 
June 2001 tariffs are calculated on a euro/dollar exchange rate whilst the 
exchange rate for financial operations maintained as a 1: 1 
dollar for peso exchange. 5 
Instead of improving Argentina's competitiveness the market 
reacts negatively to government interference with convertibility 
2 De la Rua's election followed a messy political campaign which saw another candidate Duhalde and Menem commg 
mto conflict over Duhalde's focus on restructurmg foreign debt a move which 1romcally many Argentines' considered 
would threaten Argentma's hard won economic stab1hty and which arguably cost Duhalde the elect10n. 
3 CanJe is Spamsh for swap- "big swap" 
4 1MF, Policy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina 8 October 2003, 77 
5 Hornbeck J F, "The Argentme Fmancial Crisis: A Chronology of Events" CRS Report for Congress, RS21130, 31 
January 2002 
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system. 
July 2001 "Zero Deficit Law" announced which requires a balanced budget by fourth quarter of 2001. 6 
August 2001 An agreement for an US$8 billion package with the IMP 
reached.7 
1November2001 Argentina announces plan for debt restructure.8 
28 to 30 November 2001 
Capital flight (Bank Run), fearing an economic crash and 
possible devaluation banks begin to experience a significant 
withdrawal of dollars from banks. Central bank reserves fall by 
$2 billion in one day. 
Bank Deposit Freeze (Corralito) introduced, imposing controls 
on deposit withdrawals and outflow of funds from Argentina.9 
3 December 2001 Deposit withdrawals limited to $1,000 (pesos) per month. Cross-border transfers restricted to foreign trade transactions 
and credit card international clearing. 
Widespread protests begin over bank withdrawal limitations. 
5 December 2001 IMP withhold $1.24 loan installment, due to Argentina's 
repeated inability to meet fiscal targets. 
Government requires that proceeds of exports be transferred to 
7 December 2001 
Argentina. Funds can be maintained in the original currency. 10 
Argentina announces it can no longer guarantee payment on 
foreign debt. 
14 December Supermarket looting begins. 
19 December Rioting spreads to major cities, government declares a state of 
emergency. Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo resigns 
Following mass riots, looting and demonstrations over two 
20-21December2001 dozen people are left dead. President De la Rua resigns and 
Ramon Puerta is elected provisional president. 
24 December 2001 Rodriguez Saa appointed as president, in his inaugural speech 
6 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina 8 October 2003, 77 
7 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina 8 October 2003, 77 
8 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina 8 October 2003, 77 
9 Financial Entities Decree 1570/01 on lDecember 2001, Boletin Oficial de la Republica Argentina, 29787, 3 
December 2001 
10 Standard and Poor's "The Argentina Crisis: A chronology of Events After the Sovereign Default'', Canna Lopez 
(Analyst), 12 Apnl 2002 
-
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he announces that payments of Argentina's external debt to 
private foreign creditors are to be suspended.11 
Rodriguez Saa resigns from presidency following continued 
rioting and loss of party support. Ramon Puerta resigns to 
avoid re-appointment. No immediate successor emerges to take 
over presidency. 
Eduardo Duhalde appointed president. 
The Duhalde Government terminates convertibility under the 
Economic Emergency Law. 12 Peso is officially devalued by 
29% (to 1:4 with the US dollar) for major foreign transactions, 
with a floating rate for all other transactions. 
Other provisions of the law include: 
• A public emergency until 10 December 2003 
• Pesification of debts with original amounts below 
$100,000 (passing devaluation costs to creditors) 
• The right of adjustment of tariffs according to US PPI 
and other obligations emerging from private contracts 
abolished. This measure was to take place for 180 days 
during which time agreements and renegotiations were 
to take place 
Government guarantees dollar denominated deposits, but to 
curtail bank runs maintains a US$1 OOO limit on monthly 
withdrawals and all checking accounts exceeding $10,000 and 
savings accounts exceeding $3,000 converted to certificate so 
deposit and frozen for at least one year. Smaller deposits can be 
withdrawn as pesos at 1:4 exchange rate. 13 
Central Bank regulation of foreign exchange markets issued 
prohibited cross-border transfers unless the issuers acquired 
the dollars in the "free market"; that is, if the transfer did not 
imply a reduction in the Central Bank reserves. The scarcity of 
dollar bills and small operations, makes it virtually impossible 
for companies to acquire the necessary amounts of dollars to 
pay obligations abroad. 14 
11 IMF, Policy Development and Revtew Department Lessons from the Crisis m Argentina 8 October 2003, 77 
12 Law No. 25.561 Public Emergency and Reform to the Prov1swns about Exchange Rate of 6 January 2002, Boletm 
Oficial de la Republica Argentina, 7 January 2002 
13 Hornbeck J F, "The Argentme Fmancial Cnsis. A Chronology of Events" CRS Report for Congress, RS21130, 31 
January 2002 
14 Standard and Poor's "The Argentma Cns1s: A chronology of Events After the Sovereign Default", Carina Lopez 
(Analyst), 12 Apnl 2002 
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11 January 2002 Foreign currency markets open after three weeks and peso falls to 1.80 per US dollar. 15 
15 January 2001 Peso falls as low as 2.05 pet US dollar. 16 
19-20 January Duhalde reverses guarantee of dollar denominated deposits, 
which will be converted to pesos. 
24 January 2002 Utility tariffs frozen indefinitely. 17 
11 February 2002 Foreign exchange market opens for the first time with a fully floating peso. 
20 % duty on energy exports established. 
The Emergency Law envisaged a renegotiation of licences to 
14 February 2002 be conducted by a Renegotiation Commission. 18 
In meeting with IMP officials, Argentine representatives 
suggest that the country will need $22-23 billion in assistance. 
18 February 2002 Unemployment reaches 22%, general protests erupt into violent 
attacks on banks over continued restrictions on withdrawals. 
Significant inflation; consumer prices and wholesale prices 
28 February 2002 increased 3.1 % and 11 % respectively, despite the continuing 
deep recession. Poverty soars across the country. 
4 March2002 Tax on farm and manufactured exports imposed. Proceeds to be used to bolster social programs. 
The government announces its will issue $44 billion in dollar-
5 March 2002 and peso-denominated bonds to banks and depositors for losses 
incurred from the mismatch in peso conversion between loans 
and deposits. 
18 April 2002 Scotiabank (Canada) becomes first bank to cease operations in Argentina. 
24 April 2002 Argentina signs a 14-point plan that meets all the major IMP goals needed for lending to resume. 
11-13 May 2002 Argentina uses foreign exchange reserves to make $159 million 
repayment to IMP and $680 million repayment to the World 
15 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons/ram the Cns1s m Argentina October 8, 2003, 79 
16 Hornbeck J F, "The Argentme Fmanci~I Costs: A Chronology of Events" CRS Report for Congress, RS21130, 31 
January 2002 
17 IMF, Pohcy Development and Review Department Lessons/ram the CrlSls m Argentina 8 October 2003, 79 
18 Procedures defined by Decree No. 293/2002 
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Bank. 
19 May2002 State-owned Banco Nacion takes over three French banking 
affiliates, portending a deeper banking system crisis. 
21 May2002 IMF grants a one-year extension on $130 million payment due. 
Argentina is scheduled to repay $4.8 billion to IMF in 2002. 
Economy Minister Lavagna meets with IMF Managing 
22 May2002 Director Horst Koehler, who suggests the need for further 
reform. Argentine peso sinks to 3.6 to the dollar, down 72% 
since the financial crisis began. 
26 June 2002 In response to the government's !MF-oriented economic policy, protests result in 90 injuries and 2 deaths. 
Argentina's Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna announces 
that Argentine utilities can expect tariff adjustments to be 
25 June 2002 progressive. Argentina's four mobile operators (Telecom 
Personal, Unifon, CTI Movil, Movicom Bellsouth) raise rates 
up to 15% to offset losses from the devaluation of the peso. 
The Independent Advisory Group on Argentina submits their 
report, entitled "Economic and Financial Issues Facing 
29 July 2002 Argentina," to the Government of Argentina and the IMF, 
concluding that Argentina should adopt: 1) a monetary anchor 
to achieve price stability; 2) a formal inflation targeting policy, 
and; 3) a fully credible independent central bank. 
5 September 2002 The Executive Board of the IMF grants Argentina a one-year 
extension on a $2.8 billion payment due September 9. 
President Eduardo Duhalde issues decree to extend the period 
17 September 2002 in which the Economy Ministry and public utility contract 
holders can negotiate rate hikes. 
Government statistics show that GDP decreased by 15% 
19 September 2002 (annualized basis) in the first half of the year. Four-year 
recession and financial crisis reported as having cost Argentina 
ten years of economic growth. 
Ongoing debate regarding payment of debt to multilateral 
24 September 2002 institutions. Argentina is scheduled to make an $800 million payment to the World Bank in October 2002. A default would 
fully isolate the country from all international financial lending. 
The Argentine government gives banks $8 billion worth of 
25 September 2002 bonds to help compensate for losses incurred with the uneven 
conversion of banks assets and liabilities related to the January 
2002 devaluation. 
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18 October 2002 President Duhalde resigns effective May 25, 2003. 
11-month restriction on peso denominated bank withdrawals 
(corralito), affecting $6 billion of deposits ended. Restrictions 
on long-term certificates of deposit and the freeze on dollar-
25 November 2002 
denominated accounts (corralon) remain in effect. 
Utility rates rise by 10% for residential and commercial users, 
industry will see increases of 12-16%. Prices had been frozen 
since January as part of an effort to fight an expected rise in 
inflation. 
Argentina makes "good faith" gesture with $124 million 
18 December 2002 payment, split between the IMF ($28 million), World Bank ($41 million), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
($55 million). Continues to owe large balances to each. 
Argentina removes year-old restrictions on foreign exchange 
8 January 2003 trading (that limited payments for imports and profit 
remittances) as requested by the IMF. 
24 January 2003 The IMF Executive Board formally approves transitional loan to Argentina. Argentina pays arrears of $797 million to the 
World Bank and $770 million to the IDB. 
28 March 2003 All remaining bank deposits under the corralon released over a three-month time period. 
The Argentine government lifts restrictions on the first portion 
8 April 2003 (6.8 billion pesos) of fixed-term, dollar-denominated bank deposits frozen under the corralon. Agrees to issue bonds to 
compensate depositors for the difference in value due to the 
earlier forced conversion to pesos and inflation. 
25 May2003 Nestor Kirchner inaugurated as President of Argentina. 
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Treaty between 
United States of America and 
The Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment "' 
Signed November 14, 1991; Entered into Force October 20, 1994 
The United States of America and the Argentine Republic, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties; 
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to 
investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party; 
Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will 
stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties; 
Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain 
a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic resources; 
Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can contribute to the 
well-being of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally recognized 
worker rights; and 
having resolved to conclude a Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investment; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as 
equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes without limitation: 
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and 
pledges; 
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets 
thereof; 
• Source Umted Nat10ns Conference on Trade and Development at: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/d1te/iia/docs/b1ts/argentina us.pdf 
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(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value and directly 
related to an investment; 
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and artistic 
works, including sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human endeavor, industrial 
designs, semiconductor mask works, trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business 
information, and trademarks, service marks, and trade names; and 
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law; 
b) "company" of a Party means any kind of corporation, company, association, state 
enterprise, or other organization, legally constituted under the laws and regulations of a 
Party or a political subdivision thereof whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, and 
whether privately or governmentally owned; 
c) "national" of a Party means a natural person who is a national of a Party under its 
applicable law; 
d) "return" means an amount derived from or associated with an investment, including 
profit; dividend; interest; capita gain; royalty payment; management, technical assistance 
or other fee; or returns in kind; 
e) "associated activities" include the organization, control, operation, maintenance and 
disposition of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities for the 
conduct of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the 
acquisition, use, protection and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual 
and industrial property rights; and the borrowing of funds, the purchase, issuance, and 
sale of equity shares and other securities, and the purchase of foreign exchange for 
imports. 
f) "territory" means the territory of the United States or the Argentine Republic, including 
the territorial sea established in accordance with international law as reflected in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Treaty also applies in the seas 
and seabed adjacent to the territorial sea in which the United States or the Argentine 
Republic has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance with international law as 
reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
2. Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company of the other Party the advantages 
of this Treaty if (a) nationals of any third country, or nationals of such Party, control such 
company and the company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the 
ulht:r Party, or (b) lht: wmpany is l:onlrulled by nationals of a third country with which 
the denying Party does not maintain normal economic relations. 
3. Any alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect 
their character as investment. 
ARTICLE II 
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1. Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a 
basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated 
activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the more favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or 
maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol to 
this Treaty. Each Party agrees to notify the other Party before or on the date of entry into 
force of this Treaty of all such laws and regulations of which it is aware concerning the 
sectors or matters listed in the Protocol. Moreover, each Party agrees to notify the other 
of any future exception with respect to the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol, and to 
limit such exceptions to a minimum. Any future exception by either Party shall not apply 
to investment existing in that sector or matter at the time the exception becomes effective. 
The treatment accorded pursuant to any exceptions shall, unless specified otherwise in 
the Protocol, be not less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investments and 
associated activities of nationals or companies of any third country. 
2. a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy 
full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that 
required by international law. 
b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal 
of investments. For the purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VII and VIII, a 
measure may be arbitrary or discriminatory notwithstanding the opportunity to review 
such measure in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party. 
c) Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments. 
3. Subject to the laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, nationals of either Party 
shall be permitted to enter and to remain in the territory of the other Party for the purpose 
of establishing, developing, administering or advising on the operation of an investment 
to which they, or a company of the first Party that employs them, have committed or are 
in the process of committing a substantial amount of capital or other resources. 
4. Companies which are legally constituted under the applicable laws or regulations of 
one Party, and which are investments, shall be permitted to engage top managerial 
personnel of their choice, regardless of nationality. 
5. Neither Party shl'lll impose performance requirements as a condition of establishment, 
expansion or maintenance of investments, which require or enforce commitments to 
export goods produced, or which specify that goods or services must be purchased 
locally, or which impose any other similar requirements. 
6. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with 
respect to investments, investment agreements, and investment authorizations. 
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7. Each Party shall make public all laws, regulations, administrative practices and 
procedures, and adjudicatory decisions that pertain to or affect investments. 
8. The treatment accorded by the United States of America to investments and associated 
activities of nationals and companies of the Argentine Republic under the provisions of 
this Article shall in any State, Territory or possession of the United States of America be 
no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein to investments and associated 
activities of nationals of the United States of America resident in, and companies legally 
constituted under the laws and regulations of, other States, Territories or possessions of 
the United States of America. 
9. The most favored nation provisions of this Article shall not apply to advantages 
accorded by either Party to nationals or companies of any third country by virtue of that 
Party's binding obligations that derive from full membership in a regional customs union 
or free trade area, whether such an arrangement is designated as a customs union, free 
trade area, common market or otherwise. 
ARTICLE III 
This Treaty shall not preclude either Party from prescribing laws and regulations in 
connection with the admission of investments made in its territory by nationals or 
companies of the other Party or with the conduct of associated activities, provided, 
however, that such laws and regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the rights 
set forth in this Treaty. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly 
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ('expropriation-) except 
for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and the general 
principles of treatment provided for in Article II (2) Compensation shall be equivalent to 
the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid without 
delay; include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; 
be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on 
the date of expropriation. 
2. A national or company of either Party that asserts that all or part of its investment has 
been expropriated shall have a right to prompt review by the appropriate judicial or 
administrative authorities of the other Party to determine whether any such expropriation 
has occurred and, if so, whether such expropriation, and any compensation therefore, 
conforms to the provisions of this Treaty and the principles of international law. 
3. Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory 
of the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national 
emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be accorded 
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treatment by such other Party no less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or 
companies or to nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the more 
favorable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses. 
ARTICLEV 
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and 
without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) 
compensation pursuant to Article IV; ( c) payments arising out of an investment dispute; 
( d) payments made under a contract, including amortization of principal and accrued 
interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement directly related to an investment; 
(e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) 
additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment. 
2. Except as provided in Article IV paragraph 1, transfers shall be made in a freely usable 
currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of transfer with respect to 
spot transactions in the currency to be transferred. The free transfer shall take place in 
accordance with the procedures established by each Party; such procedures shall not 
impair the rights set forth in this Treaty. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, either Party may maintain laws 
and regulations (a) requiring reports of currency transfer; and (b) imposing income taxes 
by such means as a withholding tax applicable to dividends or other transfers. 
Furthermore, either Party may protect the rights of creditors, or ensure the satisfaction of 
judgments in adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, nondiscriminatory and 
good faith application of its law. 
ARTICLE VI 
The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request of either, to resolve any disputes in 
connection with the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the interpretation or 
application of the Treaty. 
ARTICLE VII 
1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a 
national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment 
agreement between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment 
authorization granted by that Party's foreign investment authority (if any such 
authorization exists) to such national or company; or ( c) an alleged breach of any right 
conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment. 
2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially seek a 
resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, 
the national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute for resolution: 
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or 
180 
Appendix4 
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures; 
or 
( c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3. 
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for 
resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the date on 
which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in 
writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration: 
(i) to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Centre") 
established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 ("ICSID 
Convention"), provided that the Party is a party to such convention: or 
(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, ifthe Centre is not available; or 
(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNICTRAL): or 
(iv) to any other arbitration institution, or in accordance with any other arbitration rules, 
as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute. 
(b) Once the national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the dispute 
may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the consent. 
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement 
by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of 
the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written 
consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the 
requirement for: 
(a) written consent of the parties to the dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID 
Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; 
and 
(b) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of Article II of the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 
June 10, 1958 ("New York Convention"). 
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a 
state that is a party to the New York Convention. 
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the 
parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry out without delay the provisions of 
any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement. 
7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a 
defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national or company 
concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or guarantee contract, 
indemnification or other compensation for all or part of its alleged damages. 
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8. For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company 
legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political 
subdivision thereof but that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events 
giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, 
shall be treated as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 
25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be 
submitted, upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in 
accordance with the applicable rules of international law. In the absence of an agreement 
by the Parties to the contrary, the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), except to the extent modified by the Parties or by 
the arbitrators, shall govern. 
2. Within two months of receipt of a request, each Party shall appoint an arbitrator. The 
two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator as Chairman, who is a national of a third 
State. The UNCITRAL Rules for appointing members of three member panels shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the arbitral panel except that the appointing 
authority referenced in those rules shall be the Secretary General of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration. 
3. Unless otherwise agreed, all submissions shall be made and all hearings shall be 
completed within six months of the date of selection of the third arbitrator, and the 
Tribunal shall render its decisions within two months of the date of the final submissions 
or the date of the closing of the hearings, whichever is later. 
4. Expenses incurred by the Chairman, the other arbitrators, and other costs of the 
proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties. 
ARTICLE IX 
The provisions of Article VII and VIII shall not apply to a dispute arising (a) under the 
export credit, guarantee or insurance programs of the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States or (b) under other official credit, guarantee or insurance arrangements 
pursuant to which the Parties have agreed to other means of settling disputes. 
ARTICLEX 
This Treaty shall not derogate from: 
(a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or administrative or 
adjudicatory decisions of either Party; 
(b) international legal obligations; or 
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(c) obligations assumed by either Party, including those contained in an investment 
agreement or an investment authorization, 
that entitle investments or associated activities to treatment more favorable than that 
accorded by this Treaty in like situations. 
ARTICLEXI 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own 
essential security interests. 
ARTICLE XII 
1. With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity in 
the treatment of investment of nationals and companies of the other Party. 
2. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in particular Article VII and VIII, shall 
apply to matters of taxation only with respect to the following: 
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article IV; 
(b) transfers, pursuant to Article V; or 
( c) the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or authorization 
as referred to in Article VII(l)(a) or (b), 
to the extent they are not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of a Convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation between the two Parties, or have been raised under such 
settlement provisions and are not resolved within a reasonable period of time. 
ARTICLE XIII 
This Treaty shall apply to the political subdivisions of the Parties. 
ARTICLE XIV 
1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange of instruments 
of ratification. It shall remain in force for a period often years and shall continue in force 
unless terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. It shall apply to 
investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or 
acquired thereafter. 
2. Either Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Party, terminate this 
Treaty at the end of the initial ten year period or at any time thereafter. 
3. With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination of this 
Treaty and to which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the other 
Articles of this Treaty shall thereafter continue to be effective for a further period of ten 
years from such date of termination. 
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4. The Protocol shall form an integral part of the Treaty. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in duplicate at Washington on the fourteenth day of November, 1991, in the 
English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
FOR THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: 
PROTOCOL 
1. During dispute settlement proceedings pursuant to Article VII, a party may be required 
to produce evidence of ownership or control consistent with Article I(l)(a). 
2. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to make 
or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following sectors: 
air transportation; ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance; energy and power 
production; custom house brokers; ownership and operation of broadcast or common 
carrier radio and television stations; ownership of real property; ownership of shares in 
the Communications Satellite Corporation; the provision of common carrier telephone 
and telegraph services; the provision of submarine cable services; use of land and natural 
resources 
3. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to make 
or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment with respect to certain programs 
involving government grants, loans, and insurance. 
4. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to make 
or maintain limited exceptions to national and most favored nation treatment in the 
following sectors, with respect to which treatment will be based on reciprocity: 
mining on the public domain; maritime services and maritime-related services; primary 
dealership in United States government securities. 
5. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the Argentine Republic reserves the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following sectors: 
real estate in the Border Areas; air transportation; shipbuilding; nuclear energy centers; 
uranium mining; insurance; mining; fishing. 
6. The Parties understand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the Treaty, 
"obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security" means obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. 
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7. The Parties acknowledge and agree that, to the extent of any conflict or inconsistency 
between the terms of this Treaty, and the terms of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation between the Parties, entered into force December 20, 1854 (the "FCN 
Treaty-), the terms of this Treaty shall supersede the terms of the FCN Treaty, and shall 
control the resolution of such conflict. 
8. The Parties confirm their mutual understanding that the provisions of this Treaty do 
not bind either Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. 
9. Notwithstanding Article II(5) and in accordance with the terms of this paragraph, the 
Government of the Argentine Republic may maintain, but not intensify, existing 
performance requirements in the automotive industry. The Government of the Argentine 
Republic shall exert best efforts to eliminate all such requirements within the shortest 
possible period, and shall ensure their elimination within eight years of the date of the 
entry into force of this Treaty. The Government of the Argentine Republic shall further 
ensure that such performance requirements are applied in a manner which does not place 
existing investments at a competitive disadvantage against new entrants in this industry. 
The Parties shall consult at the request of either on any matter concerning the 
implementation of these undertakings. For the purposes of this paragraph, "existing" 
means extant at the time of signature of this Treaty. 
10. The Parties note that the Argentine Republic has had and may have in the future a 
debt-equity conversion program under which nationals or companies of the United States 
may choose to invest in the Argentine Republic through the purchase of debt at a 
discount. 
The Parties agree that the rights provided in Article V, paragraph 1, with respect to the 
transfer of returns and of proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an 
investment, remain or may be, as such rights would apply to that part of an investment 
financed through a debt-equity conversion, modified by the terms of any debt-equity 
conversion agreement between a national or company of the United States and the 
Government of the Argentine Republic, or any agency or instrumentality thereof. 
The transfer of returns and of proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an 
investment shall in no case be on terms less favorable than those accorded, in like 
circumstances, to nationals or companies of the Argentine Republic or any third country, 
whichever is more favorable. 
11. The Parties note with satisfaction that the Argentine Republic is engaged in a process 
of privatization of various industries, including public utilities. They agree that they will 
undertake their best efforts, including through consultations, to avoid any 
misinterpretation regarding the scope of Article II(5) that would adversely affect this 
privatization process. 
Embassy of the United States of America 
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Buenos Aires, August 24, 1992 
No. 453 
Mr. Minister: 
I have the honor to refer to the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment, with Protocol signed at Washington, November 14, 1991 ("The Treaty"). 
During the negotiation of the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Argentine Republic discussed the inclusion in Section 5 of the 
Protocol to the Treaty of the Argentine Mining Sector. Based on those discussions and 
subsequent discussions regarding this matter, I wish to propose the deletion of the term 
"Mining" from the list of sectors in Section 5 of the Protocol. 
If the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this 
note, together with your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the two 
Governments amending the Treaty, which shall be subject to ratification. 
Accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 
Dr. Guido Di Tella, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 
Buenos Aires. 
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SPA/ENG 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 
Translating Division 
Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship 
Buenos Aires, November 6, 1992 
Mr. Ambassador: 
Appendix4 
I have the honor to address you with regard to your note dated August 24, 1992, which 
tJ reads as follows: 
[The Spanish translation of Ambassador Todman's note of August 24, 1992, agrees in all 
substantive respects with the original English text.] 
In that regard I wish to state that my Government agrees with the terms of the transcribed 
note and, therefore, I have the honor to inform you that the aforesaid note and this reply 
constitute an agreement between out two Governments that will enter into force open the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
[Signature] 
His Excellency 
Terence Todman, 
Ambassador of the United States of America, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
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